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Abstract
This dissertation examines private gun ownership and its sociocultural and political
implications in modern China from 1860 to 1949, a period characterized by foreign invasion,
constant military conflicts, and political decentralization. During this period, foreign guns, along
with their Chinese imitations, flooded society. In response to the social disorder, many Chinese
civilians turned to this new class of weaponry for self-defense. While historians have understood
the gun in China in terms of military modernization, this dissertation sets the privately-owned
gun in its social and political context, and studies why Chinese civilians chose to arm themselves
with guns and how governments of different periods responded to their armed civilians.
This study argues that growing social violence and the state’s inability to respond to it
led Chinese men and women seek to obtain their own weapons. This demand was fueled by the
gun’s powerful symbolism in public culture and social life, and by beliefs that guns were a
source of social status and self-empowerment. Civilian ownership of guns contributed to
persistent social violence, and also transformed power structures in local society and accelerated
local militarization, impacting the balance between state and society. Both late Qing and
Republican governments’ regulation and control over armed civilians was a dynamic and
contingent process, hovering between two practices: the state’s resolute maintenance of its
monopoly on the uses of guns, and its reliance on armed civilians in local defense. This study
argues that the state’s dilemma over whether to control private guns or rely on them prevented
the formation of an effective and consistent gun policy. In contrast, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) adopted a different policy towards private gun ownership, by making the
mobilization of an armed populace part of its massline policy. The CCP’s private gun policy
played an important role in strengthening the CCP’s presence and authority in wartime China.

Drawing from a variety of sources such as government documents, legal cases, social
survey reports, and popular writings, this study chronicles both the state efforts to deal with
armed civilians and the reactions from the bottom. This dissertation engages with and
complements wider research on modern Chinese history in examining violence, social life, and
the dynamic state-society relationship.
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INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China witnessed an unprecedented
level of social and political transformation. The Qing dynasty began to dramatically decline as
the once powerful Chinese empire was laden with overwhelming suffering from within and
without. The collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) and the formation of the Republic (19121949) did not bring socio-political stability to China. Instead, the nation was wracked by almost
constant warfare, political fragmentation, and unprecedented waves of banditry. Shen Congwen
(沈從文 1902-1988), one of the most influential writers of the Republican era, wrote a short
essay entitled “Old and New (新與舊 Xin yu Jiu),” in which he attributed the escalation of social
violence to the proliferation of weapons, which made their way from the hands of soldiers to
those of civilians. One theme that Shen expressed in the essay is that the ready availability of
guns gave those predisposed to aggression the means to seize local power. The public perception
of the 1911 Revolution was in reality its social byproduct: the rise of armed civilians and
resultant constant social violence.1
Shen’s description indicates the existence of a new social phenomenon in modern China
that deserves our scholarly attention. Non-military individuals or groups chose to arm themselves
with guns in the late nineteenth century, when the central government was impotent to maintain
its monopoly on violence. Private gun ownership became surprisingly common during the
Republican period, as constant warfare and political decentralization accelerated local
militarization. In both periods, Western guns manufactured by companies such as Colt,

Shen Congwen, “Xin yu Jiu,” (新與舊, Old and new), in Shen Congwen, Xin yu Jiu (Shanghai:
Liangyou tushu yinshua gongsi, 1936), 135.
1

1

Remington, Winchester, and Mauser, together with their Chinese imitations, flooded local
society. Japanese guns, too found their ways into China and were diffused in society.2 Observing
the variety of guns held in private hands led German missionary F. Strauss to conclude that
China was a “splendid gun museum.”3
Ownership of these guns had a profound and heretofore unnoticed impact on Chinese
society and ultimately, I argue, national politics. In a time of tumultuous upheaval, ambitious
individuals or groups, like the ones in Shen’s essay, armed themselves with guns to dominate
local society, which helped transform traditional power structures and challenge the state’s
monopoly on violence. Recognizing the danger of private gun ownership both to society and to
their own power, the late Qing government, the Nationalist Government (KMT), and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) made efforts to measure, and in some cases, regulate private gun
ownership. As my dissertation shows, the decisions that each political entity made about how to
deal with armed civilians had profound effects on the national political arena during the late
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The late Qing government officially
loosened harsh restrictions on gun ownership, and saw the armed civilians as important power
holders to defend the localities, if they were properly regulated. The Nationalist Government
followed the late Qing practice, and adopted a regulatory approach, seeking to allow guns to
remain in the hands of those it judged to be the “good people (良民 liangmin).” The KMT’s

2

As early as the late nineteenth century, Chinese revolutionaries sought to obtain weapons from
Japan, which experienced a successful program of military modernization. The firearm
smuggling reached a peak when Japan occupied Manchuria and established a puppet state in the
early 1930s, where had become a base for gun smuggling. See Leang-Li T’ang, ed. The Puppet
State of “Manchukuo” (Shanghai: China United Press, 1935), 122-24.
F. Strauss, “In Perils of Robbers,” in We Are Escaped, ed. F. Strauss (London: China Inland
Mission, 1932), 30.
3

2

effort to maintain control over violence and to utilize the armed populace to help the state defend
localities led to an inconsistent gun policies. The Communists approached civilian gun
ownership differently in the 1930s and 1940s, coopting armed civilians into their ongoing
revolutionary project.
The study of private gun ownership in Republican China thus provides a new prism
through which to examine state-society relations in modern China. Using a wide range of fresh
sources, this dissertation project sheds new light on China’s social power structures and statebuilding efforts. Despite the pervasiveness of fragmented violence brought about by unregulated
gun ownership, scholarly investigation of this subject has been rare. To date, almost all studies of
arms in China have related to China’s military modernization.4 European and American
historians have studied the history of international arms transfers, and examined China’s position
in the global arms network from the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the real influence of

China historians have explored several issues on China’s military transformation, ranging from
the reception of foreign technology, changes in the organization of the Chinese military, and the
ideas of Chinese military officials. Some important works include: John K. Fairbank, ed. The
Cambridge History of China, vols.10 and 11 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 19781980); Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration,
1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); Wang Ermin 王爾敏, Qingshi junshi shi
lunji 清史軍事史論集 (Essays on military affairs in the Late Qing) (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe,
1980). Thomas L. Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance
Industry, 1860-1895 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); David Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China’s
Modernization in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John
L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967). For the historiography of Chinese military modernization, see Richard
S. Horowitz, “Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 18501911,” in A Military History of China, eds., David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 153-74.
4

3

foreign weapons on the society of recipient countries are still complex and ill understood.5 As a
consequence, much is known about the various Chinese governments’ arduous efforts to acquire
Western military technology, but little work has been done on other aspects of the firearm’s
history in Chinese society.
My research shows that as more private individuals acquired guns, many Chinese
localities saw the emergence of military-based elite powers that challenged state authority. Philip
Kuhn and Edward McCord’s classic studies remain the most important works in the process of
militarization. These works demonstrate that local militarization kept the Nationalists from a
successful program of state-building.6 Using that research as a baseline, my work follows the
story into the 1930s and 1940s, when militarized elites, local bullies, and others contended for
dominance over local society. The new forms of firearms, whether imported from the West or
manufactured in China based on Western designs, were the essential tools in this struggle for
dominance, and for that reason I place the gun at the center of my research.
To fathom the social, cultural, and political implications of private gun ownership in
modern China, the questions at the core of my research are twofold: Why did Chinese people in
the modern period embrace private gun ownership? How did the state deal with an armed
populace in its state-building efforts? This dissertation posits that private gun ownership was not
only a social and cultural phenomenon, but also an important component of Chinese political

5

For the history of the arms trade, see Donald J. Stoker Jr. and Jonathan A. Grant, eds., Girding
for Battle: The Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815-1940 (Westport: Praeger Publishers,
2003); Jonathan A. Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of
Imperialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
6

Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social
Structure, 1769-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Edward A. McCord, The
Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
4

culture during the late Qing and Republican period. This dissertation argues that Chinese
civilians’ demand for guns was fueled by the gun’s provocative symbolism in social life,
including violence, social status, and self-empowerment. Both late Qing and Republican
governments’ regulation and control over the armed civilians appeared as a dynamic process,
hovering between two practices: the resolute maintenance of a monopoly on violence, and the
reliance on armed civilians in their efforts to defend localities. Both central and local
governments during this period adopted a “control/reliance” approach, which will be explained
in the following chapters. A series of programs, including gun registration, licensing, inspection,
and smuggling prevention were designed and implemented to maintain social order and stability.
In the meantime, the easy access to arms gave rise to a highly-militarized society. Local elites
who were able to “translate access to guns and military skills into local power,” in many cases,
served as agents for state penetration into society.”7 Thus, the political dilemma prevented the
formation of an effective and consistent gun policy in modern China.
In the Cambridge History of China, Mary Rankin, John K. Fairbank and Albert
Feuerwerker argue that “efforts to find a simple progression or a single key to the dynamics of
all this change in Republican China founder in the face of the size and geographical diversity of
the country, differences of local social organization, and unevenness of development in different
spheres.”8 According to this view, it is impossible to find a single model to explain the historical
trajectory of modern China, which has been undergoing dynamic transformation and possesses
substantial cultural diversity. My research on private gun ownership focuses on just one topic
7

Edward A. McCord, Military Force and Elite Power in the Formation of Modern China (New
York: Routledge, 2014), 102.
Mary B. Rankin, John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, “Introduction: Perspectives on
Modern China’s History,” in Cambridge History of China, ed. John K. Fairbank, vol. 13 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6.
8
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from which vantage point we can understand many aspects of China from the late nineteenth
century to 1949. The introduction of foreign guns, whether through cross-border commerce or
contraband smuggling underscores China’s involvement with the broader world. Chinese
civilians’ penchant for the lethal weapon in modern period reveals developments there were not
so different than occurred elsewhere in the world, where private gun ownership changed the
state-society relationship. It also reveals how Chinese people embraced violence as one part of
their social life. The state’s regulation efforts and the effectiveness of gun policies allow us to
capture the dynamic relations between state and society. From the late 1930s, the armed
populace, in the eyes of Chinese Communists, served as an important social force that could be
utilized to fulfill their revolutionary agenda. Thus, the gun manifested its multifaceted and fluid
nature in China. This dissertation complements our existing knowledge of weapons, violence,
state power, and societal change in modern China.
As the first comprehensive study to examine the phenomenon of private gun ownership
in modern China, this project uses a variety of primary documents to identify an important but
overlooked dynamic in the emergence of the modern Chinese state. This study will engage with
existing scholarship in social, cultural, and political history.
Scope
This dissertation focuses on the period from the late Qing’s Self-Strengthening
Movement in 1860 when foreign guns began pouring into China, to the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. My research takes 1949 as the terminus ad quem because
with the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party successfully
used a campaign to suppress “counterrevolutionaries” to disarm civilians. After 1949, the
Communist government claimed a monopoly on violence through the banning of private
6

possession of all firearms. It was from 1860 to 1949 that the general prevalence of privatelyowned guns loomed large in social life and political activities throughout China. This period was
characterized by foreign invasion, constant military conflicts, and political decentralization.
Under such circumstances, people chose to arm themselves when a weak government was
impotent to maintain social order and public security. Another reason to focus on this period is
that, for the first time in history, Chinese state (both the late Qing and the Republican
governments) was not able to defend the monopoly on the distribution of advanced firearms, and
even allowed ordinary people to own guns. The state’s shifting stances towards an armed
populace allow me to scrutinize the process and obstacles of the state building efforts.
Terms
The term “private gun” does not do justice to the variety of guns that circulated in Chinese
society. During the first half of the twentieth century, China was flooded with different types of
guns, including traditional bird guns, foreign guns of various brands, and their Chinese copies. A
few terms became common in this era, including “bird guns 鳥槍,” “foreign guns 洋槍,”
“civilian guns 民槍,” and “self-defense gun 自衛槍支.” This variety makes definitions
necessary. The muzzle-loading matchlock gun transferred from Japan in the sixteenth century
had already been localized in the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Chinese called the matchlock
“bird (鳥 niao) gun,” later known as the “native (土 tu) gun.” When trading restrictions were
lifted in 1842, foreign goods started to flood Chinese society. Chinese people called these
Western imported goods “洋貨 yanghuo”, indicated their “modern” and “superior” status, while
symbolizing native made as “pure local goods.” Western weapons poured into China in 1860
when China started to learn modern military technology. The western gun was given the prefix

7

“foreign” (yang), which served to denote its superiority over the traditional Chinese bird gun.
However, as Sherman Cochran in his book on consuming Chinese medicine during the early
twentieth century suggests, Chinese consumers’ distinction between “Chinese” and “Western”
was very broad and inexplicit. According to Cochran, “[Chinese customers’] notions of what was
‘Chinese’ included both old medicine and new ‘old’ medicine; and their notions of what was
‘Western’ included Chinese-made ‘new medicine’ as well as Western-made products.”9 As this
dissertation will show, the imitations of foreign guns constituted an important part of civilian
weapons. In this sense, if Chinese people began defining the term “foreign” broadly and
inclusively, it is no exaggeration to say that such an obscure notion can also be applied to
Chinese-made “foreign guns.”
Another important term is “private gun ownership,” which in my case refers to individuals
or groups who were not soldiers. In addition to ordinary civilians, spontaneous collective defense
forces organized by local elites are also at the core of my inquiry. These individuals and groups
pursued powerful weapons for a variety of reasons, including self-defense, showing their
elevated social status, or purely committing violence. My objects of study are those individuals
and groups without “a revolutionary agenda at transforming the basic structure of the state.”10
Nevertheless, this does not mean these individual or groups were insulated from national politics.

9

Sherman Cochran, Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 161. For the Chinese consumer culture, see Frank
Dikötter, Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007).
10

In this sense, my research resembles the work on worker militias by Elizabeth Perry. However,
her approach focuses on how worker militias built their citizenship and connected themselves
with national politics in urban area. I take another angle by exploring the role of gun in the
formation of individual and collective power. See Elizabeth Perry, Patrolling the Revolution:
Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2006).
8

Rather, they were closely connected with the state, especially when their holding of power
constituted a potential threat to the state authority in the eyes of the government officials or
political actors, who drew these armed individuals or groups into the political landscape, as the
state sought to either regulate or mobilize them.
The Proliferation of Private Gun Ownership: A Nationwide Overview
The total number of guns owned by non-military individuals cannot be calculated with
any precision. This is partly owing to the reality that a vigorous national program of gun
registration was absent during late Qing and Republican periods. Though successive
governments designated private weapons regulation policies including gun licensing and
registration, these procedures were never effectively implemented. The difficulty in accurately
estimating the amount of private guns also lies in the sheer diversity of Chinese people who
owned guns. Gun ownership was more prevalent among violence-prone people, such as urban
criminals and rural bandits, whose roving lifestyle also hindered their visibility. In the modern
period, affluent urban dwellers and rural residents obtained guns for self-defense purposes. But a
majority of them too left few historical traces.
As Edward McCord has shown, the formation of military power in Republican China was
an uneven process, which depended on “the particular circumstances, or opportunities, in
different areas.”11 In a similar vein, gun ownership was unevenly distributed in Republican
China. In the province of Guangdong, for example, gun ownership was especially common,
owing to the penetration of foreign guns from nearby Hong Kong and Macau. In some northern
provinces, like Henan, where bandit raids were common, many local residents bore arms for self-

11

McCord, The Power of the Gun, 11.
9

defense. As my research shows, bandits and outlaws were primary armed groups who armed
themselves with modern guns. Civilians’ action of pursuing guns partly stemmed from the social
insecurity caused by frequent banditry and crime. When the regions suffered from deteriorating
social disorder, people were more likely to acquire powerful weapons to defend themselves and
their communities. Based on a number of social survey report, historian Phil Billingsley
estimated the general distribution of banditry in modern China, which might be applicable to the
distribution of privately-owned guns, as offense and defense were intertwined.12

12

Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 28.
10

Figure 1: The distribution of bandits in Republican China. SOURCE: This map was adapted from
Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China, 32; Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China,
1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1976).
While difficult to estimate with any precision, based on social survey reports and criminal
cases, it is possible to figure out major regions that possessed large number of guns. Modern
Shanghai, for example, was one major point of entrance for foreign guns, which were held by
gangsters, members of the urban middle-class, bandits, and others. Before the Chinese
Communist Party’s takeover in 1949, the Shanghai Municipal Police Department issued more
than eight thousand gun licenses to the city’s civilians, who legally owned a weapon for self-

11

defense.13 Violent and ruthless acts committed by Shanghai gangsters who armed themselves
largely with rapid-firing weapons like the semiautomatic Mauser, almost reached their peak. A
crime statistic by the North China Herald, Shanghai’s most influential foreign newspaper of the
time, stated that the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) arrested more than 300 gangsters on
charges of armed robbery and murder from 1919 to 1923.14
Private gun ownership was likely more prevalent in Guangdong province than in other
Chinese provinces. After 1949, over 500,000 private guns were confiscated in Guangdong.
People in the province had a long tradition of using firearms even before the modern gun was
introduced in the late nineteenth century. Bird guns were commonly found in temple sacrifices,
lineage feudings, and epidemic banditry. In the decades after the First Opium War (1838-1842),
large amounts of firearms poured into Guangdong, mainly owing to its geographical proximity to
Macau and Hong Kong, two Western colonies that provided access to foreign guns. One 1924
newspaper report estimated that non-military individuals or groups in the province owned as
many as four million guns.15
Neighboring Guangxi province offered another focus for the prevalence of guns. Ethnic
conflicts and frequent banditry spurred people’s obsession with powerful weapons. As one local

Shanghaishi Gonganju Gongan Shizhi Bianzuanweiyuanhui 上海市公安局公安史志編纂委
員會, Shanghai Gonganzhi 上海公安志 (Shanghai Police Gazetteer) (Shanghai: Shanghai
shehui kexue chubanshe, 1997), 312; Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA) Q131-22-164, 165,
168, 169, 170, 171.
13

North China Herald, June 16, 1923. Gangsters’ activities were addressed in Brian G. Martin’s
The Shanghai Green Gang, Politics and Organized Crimes, 1919-1937 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996).
14

He Minhun 何民魂, “Zisha di Sunwen 自殺底孫文” (To kill Sun Yat-sen), Huazi ribao 華子
日報, October 24, 1924.
15

12

Communist cadre recalled, wealthy families made efforts to buy powerful foreign weapons in the
1920s, whereas the poor could only afford inferior guns or collectively buy firearms. Not willing
to join the military, local peasants obtained guns to defend themselves against potential attacks
from bandits or their rival ethnic groups.16 A newspaper article appeared in the Nanjing Minguo
ribao in 1936 noted that “it was quite common for peasants to arm themselves with guns for selfprotection when grazing livestock and farming.”17 Given Guangxi’s proximity to Guangdong,
Hong Kong, and French Indochina, guns of different types easily entered the province through
the hands of smugglers and other intermediaries.
The number of privately owned guns in Henan province soared in the decades after the
1911 Revolution when the province suffered from constant warfare as Henan’s central
geographical position “made it the site of pitched battles.”18 As Phil Billingsley’s research on
Henan asserts, warlordism helped create a condition that contributed to “the consequent increase
in banditry.”19 A conservative estimate in 1924 by sociologist He Xiya 何西亞 put the number of
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bandits at more than 51,100 belonging to at least 6,000 gangs. From the 1920s on, rural
militarization in Henan accelerated in response to weak central government, banditry, and
military conflicts. Local elites and peasants sought guns for either self-defense or organizing
militia forces. After the Nationalist government re-established its central authority in Henan in
1933, the provincial government then ordered privately-owned guns registered. According to
government statistics, 232,400 guns or rifles were registered and engraved.20 The prevalence of
the privately-owned guns in Henan was partially a result of banditry. For instance, to defend
against rapacious bandits, local elites in northern Henan forced the peasants to make
contributions to purchase firearms.21 However, at the same time, a social survey conducted by
sociologist Wang Yike 王怡柯 found the real number of private guns was several times higher.22
Wang’s survey was echoed by local Communist cadres, who were active in the Province to
mobilize the masses. It was reflected in the Communist document that almost all the middle
peasants in Western Henan owned at least one gun.23
All of Manchuria, including today’s Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces, was
another region that was known for the proliferation of guns in local society. The region
transformed into a “bandit world” after the fall of the Qing dynasty as it underwent economic
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and social dislocation. “Most peasant families had a gun, both to protect themselves from
predators and to allow them to ‘go bandit’ themselves should the need arise.”24 It was quite
common in Manchuria that wealthy landlords obtained guns to organize collective self-defense
forces. The Shengjing Shibao reported in 1912 that one local gentryman of the suburb of Mukden
owned 140 Russian guns, 72 Japanese guns, 13 Mauser rifles, and many other foreign weapons.25
After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and later established Manchukuo, the puppet state
immediately registered civilians guns which were then confiscated. Jin Shiming 金名仕, a high
ranking official in the puppet state, confessed after the Japanese surrender that he was ordered to
confiscate approximately 290,000 guns from civilians in Jilin province in 1934.26
The Issues and Historiography
The Social and Cultural Life of Private Gun Ownership
A full understanding of the relationship between private gun ownership and state politics
is not possible without explaining who carried guns and how. In considering the circulation of
private firearms and their social meaning to Chinese civilians, this project first sets the private
gun in its specific social and cultural context. This project suggests that “the gun issue” did not
come to the front line of China’s stormy history until the late nineteenth century. In the same
essay cited above, Shen Congwen noted that most local militias continued to use swords, spears,
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and traditional Chinese bird guns (niaoqiang) through the 1900s.27 Shen’s observation matched
that of T.R. Jernigan’s 1908 travel account, which claimed firearms with gunpowder were
seldom used in China’s interior regions, even though China invented the firearm in the early
thirteenth century.28
Private weapons were available from a variety of sources in the Republican period, and
those sources changed over time. Starting in the early 20th century, China was inexorably drawn
into a whirlwind of global economic, technological, and political changes, accelerating the
diffusion of personal weapons nationwide. Faced with slumping domestic markets for military
arms, many Western arms producers turned to China, with its vast population and mounting civil
insecurity, as a potential new market. Sales representatives from Remington, Colt, Winchester,
and many other companies came to China in large numbers to dispose of their surplus arms
following the end of the American Civil War, World War I, and Russian Revolution. Many
accounts of the time show that Chinese civilians came to prefer these foreign-made guns for their
greater accuracy, penetration, and operability. The invention of the self-loading semi-automatic
gun in 1902 made the foreign gun even easier for non-military people to operate. For example,
the Colt's Manufacturing Company’s business records show that by the late 1940s, its Colt
M1903, a self-loading gun designed by John Moses Browning, sold astoundingly well in
China.29
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The inclination towards foreign guns was inextricably intertwined with trends in
consumption. As China historians Sherman Cochran and Frank Dikötter remind us, “foreign”
always denoted “modern” and “superior” and signaled elevated social status. China’s huge
domestic market and its escalating demand spurred the emergence of gun merchants, who served
as intermediaries between arms manufacturers and Chinese customers. Henry Brewer, a sales
representative for the Winchester Arms Company, stayed in China from the 1890s to the 1920s.
His diary, housed at the Yale University Archives, shows that many foreign trading companies in
the treaty ports, like Canton and Shanghai, not only functioned as importers by providing
Chinese officials the weapons they needed to fight rebels or defend themselves, but also played
pivotal roles in circulating foreign guns among civilians.30 As bi-cultural intermediaries, these
comprador-merchants, who were familiar with the China market, greatly facilitated the actual
gun transactions. Fully utilizing their expertize in foreign firearms and adept at marketing
through modern advertizing in newspapers and periodicals, these middlemen became sole
licensed agents for urban dwellers to obtain this fashionable new product.
While legal trading companies offered civilians the latest guns at exorbitant prices, a
huge number of surplus or outmoded weapons from arms-producing states or armed conflict
prone regions flowed into China through illicit arms trafficking. Meanwhile, with the
introduction of foreign guns, early twentieth-century Chinese local society saw dramatic changes
in the technology of manufacturing guns. Once these foreign guns arrived in China, local
craftsmen learned to pirate their advanced design, and manufactured innumerable poor and
inexpensive copies. For example, Nanyang, a city of southwestern Henan Province, had
hundreds of small workshops operated by local gentry that imitated guns of foreign design and
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distributed them to local people. Lastly, the intermittent civil warfare during the Republican
period facilitated the civilians’ easy access to weapons. Some local newspaper accounts show
that, after doing battle, soldiers simply abandoned their weapons on the battlefield, which were
then picked up by local people. These scattered firearms, known to local people as “leftover
guns,” were gathered together in many cases to support the formation of militia forces. The
firearm suppliers, foreign gun smugglers, Chinese criminal organizations, and corrupt officials
saw the profitability of gun sales. A vast gun distribution network formed gradually, resulting in
the prevalence of guns not only in China’s coastal areas but also in the interior.
Gun Ownership and Power Structure in Local Society
Chinese acquired small arms for a variety of reasons, including self-protection against
armed bandits, elevating social status, and seizing local power. To analyze Chinese civilians’
motives for owning guns, this study draws inspiration from anthropologist Arjun Appadurai’s
assertion that “commodities, like persons, have social lives,” and “their meanings are inscribed in
their forms, their uses, their trajectories.” As he writes, “it is only through the analysis of these
trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that enliven things.”31
Thus, the social significance of guns varies in both actual times and social spaces, as Chinese
people of different classes might assign their weapons different symbolic values.
Influenced by Confucian values, Chinese traditional culture regarded lethal weapons as
implements of evil design. In the 1930s, the eminent historian Lei Haizong labeled Chinese
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culture a “demilitarized” culture (無兵文化 wu bing wenhua), in which the military side of
society was devalued, therefore sapping Chinese civilians’ ability to fight. Chinese civilians had
very limited access to life-taking weapons, except during periods of rebellions.32 However, the
view of weaponry had changed in the republican period when the social turmoil created by
predatory warlordism, foreign invasion, and the proliferation of armed banditry forced Chinese
civilians to arm themselves for self-defense. Offenders with lethal intentions often resorted to
guns when committing violent crimes. The social insecurity that resulted from frequent gun
violence led to an arms race of sorts, incentivizing other Chinese to purchase ever more powerful
guns, or replace their traditional Chinese weapons with potent foreign guns. Moreover, in the
context of social insecurity, state officials and intellectuals had already been pondering how to
mobilize civilians against potential enemies in local society. Sun Yat-sen, first president of the
Republic of China, and his fellow reformers emphasized people’s right of self-defense, which
would help the government fight against rebels and bandits. As a political tool to expel rebels
and maintain order, the idea of self-defense suggested that the right to use violence was
sanctioned if necessary.
This sanctioned violence led to a startlingly high level of private gun ownership, which
brought about tremendous and unexpected social consequences. In rural areas, the process of
what Prasenjit Duara calls “state involution” in the late Qing and throughout the Republican era
gave rise to regional predatory powers, which were freed from central constraints and controls. 33
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Over the course of political fragmentation and in response to the increasingly widespread armed
banditry, this period witnessed pervasive local militarization as a form of collective self-defense.
This process has been carefully examined by Philip Kuhn.34 Nevertheless, relatively few studies
have been done on how ambitious individuals and their followers wielded guns and transformed
local power structures. This new phenomenon was manifest in early 20th century Guangdong,
which shows that militarized mobilization in rural society generated new forms of social power
and domination, in which the use of guns played an increasingly decisive role. During the
warlord era (1916-1928), some ambitious individuals in Canton, who were eager to improve
their military prominence in local society, sought to acquire guns to establish their own
Merchants’ Corps. Consequently, local elites in many regions, who had managed local affairs in
the Qing dynasty, either obtained powerful guns to retain their dominance, or gave way to the
newly emerging martial elite.
Private Guns, National Politics: Regulating Gun Ownership in Wartime China
Widespread and largely unregulated private gun ownership also exerted appreciable
effects in the national political arena. Max Weber defined the modern state as a “compulsory
organization with a territorial basis” which “successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force in the enactment of its order.” 35 Nevertheless, civilian
possession of guns not only endangered public security, but also helped subvert central and local
government authority over local areas, affecting the power relationship between the state and
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commoners. In a state of what Joel Migdal called “strong societies and weak states,” the
Nationalist government had to face the failure of its bureaucratic penetration into local society. 36
In the city of Canton, for example, the government was wary of civilian gun ownership,
which it took to be a challenge to its authority. In the early 1910s, amidst tremendous social
instability, merchants in Canton created the Merchant Volunteers Corps for self-defense. In
August 1924, when Sun Yet-sen, then president of the Guangdong Revolutionary government
noticed in August 1924 that the merchants had purchased a large number of guns from Europe,
he ordered the guns confiscated. After the merchants’ carried out a two-month protest and strike,
Sun ordered his army to suppress the Corps, leading to the death of thousands of people. After
the incident, the KMT government enacted various mechanisms to restrict private gun
ownership.
Various mechanisms then had been enacted or proposed by governments to regulate the
foreign gun’s circulation. The Qing Code and many criminal cases of the late Qing confirm that
carrying of firearms by civilians was prohibited and that the penalty for violation was severe. In
the Republican period, the Nationalist government, on the one hand, allowed those people it
defined as “good civilians,” or liangmin to own guns to guarantee their rights of self-defense.
The Nationalists also worked to reduce firearm smuggling and implemented a national policy of
gun licensing to ensure the compliance of gun owners. On the other hand, the Nationalists
merged control of gun ownership with the baojia system, an administrative mechanism for local
control and surveillance. However, the number of guns in private hands increased rather than
decreased. These gun regulation efforts failed when regional power blocs undercut the central
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power. In wartime, the government even ceased scrutinizing unregistered gun ownership for fear
that restrictive control might provoke illegal gun owners to insurrection, as demonstrated in the
1938 incident described below.
In March 1938, Chen Cheng (陳誠1897-1965), a senior general in the Nationalist
Chinese military, wrote to Chiang Kai-shek, expressing his deep concern over the popular
movements in southwestern Shandong province. The confiscation of civilian-owned guns in
Shandong, Chen argued, did more to provoke peasants’ anti-government outrage than any
socioeconomic cause. Chen attributed the peasant unrest to the policy of confiscating guns
adopted by Han Fuju, the military governor of Shandong, who had been executed two months
previously for disobeying central government orders. Starting in the early1930s, Han took the
advice of Liang Shuming, a leading figure of the rural reconstruction movement, to collect
private guns, which were then distributed to militia for collective self-defense. However, local
residents were skeptical about the policy, fearing that they would lose their means of selfdefense. To avoid escalating tension, Chiang quickly ordered Shandong authorities to return the
guns and required them not to register any private weapons.37
In contrast, the lax gun regulations offered the CCP an opportunity to increase its
military strength when it established revolutionary base areas in Shandong. The CCP internal
documents show that its successful mobilization of armed civilians played an important role in
enlarging its influence in North China. The CCP took another position and emphasized the
strategic significance of armed civilians in sustaining its revolutionary enterprize. As the 1938
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incident in Shandong suggests, the CCP quickly exploited the potential military power of civilian
gun holders. Another case in Henan province indicates that the number of peasants owning guns
even determined where the CCP would choose to locate their revolutionary bases. In 1941, Wei
Gongzhi (危拱之 1905-1973), a local communist cadre in Henan province, observed that
“almost each county in West and South Henan had more than 10,000 guns in the hands of
civilians.”38 The general prevalence of private guns, resulting partially from lax government
regulations, offered the CCP an opportunity to increase its military strength when the CCP
established its revolutionary base areas in this region. The CCP’s gun ownership policy fit into
its general ideology of mass line policies. In seeking to mobilize these armed civilians, the CCP
prevented them from registering their guns with the local Nationalist government. Local
Communist cadres either organized the armed civilians into guerrilla units or confiscated private
guns for their military use. As chapter five will present, Communist cadres in northern China
adopted the theory of class struggle when dealing with the armed civilians in rural society.
Mobilizing the armed peasants was the first priority, who were then organized to force local elite
or strongmen to surrender their weapons. The mobilization of armed civilians in rural society
played an important role in strengthening its military power from 1937 to 1945.
Private gun ownership in the Republican period indicated a significant degree of power
devolution. Studying this phenomenon allows me to re-evaluate the dynamic interaction between
state and society. Previous studies in this field have either focused on elite mobility or have
scrutinized the organized form of elite activism in local society. Scholars like Mary Rankin,
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William Rowe, and David Strand have suggested that elites, through their extrabureaucratic
activities, filled the power vacuum in society.39 A recent approach has been to study the process
of state making. As Philip Kuhn, Prasenjit Duara, Xiaoqun Xu describe, in the shadow of “state
involution,” the state’s efforts were jeopardized by local elites.40 Rather than discretely exploring
elite activism and the state’s endeavors, my study takes these elements in a historical synthesis to
probe how private gun ownership complicated local society, impeding the practice of state
power.
As noted above, while the Nationalist government failed to implement a mechanism to
regulate private gun ownership, the CCP quickly realized armed civilians’ potential power in the
base areas. The CCP’s organizational achievement in rural China has been understood by
historians either as a hegemonizing process or as popular participation based on democratic
principles. The central question of the previous scholarship on the CCP movement in rural China
is “What are the strategies and policies that make peasants revolutionary?” Chalmers Johnson,
for example, attributed the successful rural mobilization to the rise of mass nationalism.
According to Johnson, the Japanese invasion deepened peasants’ national consciousness. The
political vacuum made peasants rely on the CCP, which provided the leadership resisting the
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Japanese Army.41 Mark Selden, on the other hand, criticizes that Johnson over emphasizes the
CCP’s nationalistic character. He argues that economic motives and the CCP’s mass line policies
played inevitable roles in strengthening the Party’s power in Shaanxi.42 Other scholars like Ralph
Thaxton highlights the role of Chinese peasants who themselves possessed revolutionary
passion, which was embedded in folk culture. According to Thaxton, it was the Chinese
communists who guided the peasants to the revolutionary course.43 However, these scholarly
works give little attention to the actual process of popular mobilization under the CCP’s
organization initiatives in a highly militarized society.44 This research departs from the above
two approaches that polarize statism and populism. Instead, through probing the CCP’s policy
towards armed civilians in base areas, I argue that the two paradigms were not mutually
exclusive. The findings of this project thus make a crucial contribution to the ongoing debate
about how the CCP built its grassroots organization, leading to its victory in 1949.
Sources
The scattered nature of source materials was one of the principal challenges for
completing this dissertation project. A research project on private gun ownership requires an
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investigation of why Chinese people chose to arm themselves with certain types of guns, how
they obtained these weapons, and the sociopolitical responses generated from the prevalence of
private-owned guns. However, no particular set of primary documents is available to answer
each single question, especially given the clandestine nature of many types of gun circulations,
and because anonymous gun owners left very few traces behind.
To overcome the barrier, the dissertation relies heavily on the documents produced by
witnesses and regulators. It uses three kinds of sources: print materials, archival documents, and
artifacts of material culture. The apparent regional variations, particularly between the urban and
rural areas, between the north and the south, and between coastal and inland areas, have to be
obtained through consulting a large range of textual materials. The sociocultural changes
associated with private gun ownership are documented in a bounty of materials which have
survived in the archives of governments and private agencies, but have largely been ignored by
scholars. The legal records and smuggling documents, though scattered in various Chinese
archives and newspaper reports, provide uneven documentation of intraregional foreign gun
circulation. While the clandestine nature of many firearm transactions in Chinese society makes
it difficult to fully understand the patterns of circulation, this project also refers to the statistical
evidence from the firearm suppliers’ side. For example, I obtained business documents of the
Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company in the Connecticut state archives, containing
primary sources encompassing the marketing strategies gun manufacturers used for approaching
the Chinese market.
Because the late Qing and Republican governments crafted laws that prevented civilians
from owning concealed guns and conducted meticulous gun registration, an equally
indispensable source is the nearly complete registration records preserved in Beijing and
26

Shanghai police archives. These records provide detailed documentation of legal urban gun
owners’ personal backgrounds and include foreign gun’s models and maintenance records,
supplying important information about urban dwellers’ motivations and penchants for foreign
guns. This project also makes use of material culture, visual evidence, literature, and pictorials to
explore the foreign gun’s cultural implications. The images of foreign guns appeared in many
literary works. Since a majority of the Chinese population was illiterate, visual evidence, such as
images in pictorials, caricature, and advertisements, is useful to illustrate the symbolism of guns.
The published legal documents of both late Qing and Republican China are useful
sources to study governments’ policies to regulate gun circulation and usage. However, the
crimes reported in newspapers, government statistics, and officials’ personal memoirs are crucial
to understanding the complexity of implementing gun control policies. In studying the
relationship between private gun ownership and national politics, the bulk of evidence is drawn
from archives in both mainland China and Taiwan. Of extreme importance are the records of
CCP internal documents scattered in provincial archives that I have visited in Shandong and
Henan, telling primarily the story of how the CCP in north China mobilized armed peasants, by
either organizing them into guerrilla resistance, or confiscating guns for its revolutionary agenda.
In addition to revolutionary documents preserved in archives, numerous memoirs from veteran
soldiers convey vivid details about the CCP’s endeavor to consolidate rural base areas and
guerrilla districts, and the strategies they crafted to ally with armed rural dwellers. Similarly,
another important source is the military documents preserved in the Academia Historica and the
Bureau of Military History and Translation in Taipei, which include detailed military logs and
commands, supplying altogether vital information about the KMT’s policy of arming the general
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population. These military sources are essential for comparing the actions and policies of the
CCP and the KMT toward armed civilians that might help generate different political outcomes.
Chapter Overview
This dissertation is organized both chronologically and thematically. The thematic
approach allows me to examine different implications that the issue of private gun ownership
generated. The chronological organization provides a comprehensive investigation of the
influences of privately-owned guns over time and space. The dissertation follows the foreign
gun’s journey in China from a tool people chose to bear to a symbol of a threat government
attempted to regulate. The first section contains chapter one explaining why some Chinese
people embraced guns and how these guns got diffused in local society. The second section,
composed of chapter two through chapter five, concentrates on how different political entities
regulated and even controlled civilian possession of firearms from the late nineteenth century to
1949. As I will present in the following chapters, an investigation of gun control policies adopted
by the governments of late Qing, early Republic, Nationalist, and the Communist’s border region
offers an opportunity to detect the continuity and discontinuity of the strategies pursued by
political entities to approach their relationship with local society.
Chapter one sets the gun in a social and cultural context and considers the social meaning
of the gun to Chinese civilians. It suggests that guns lived colorful social lives and exhibited
themselves as tools of violence, labels of social status, and symbols of self-empowerment. Many
of these symbols, coexisted and converged, which is evident of just how integral they were to the
social life of modern China. After discussing the multifaceted manifestations of the gun in social
life, this chapter goes further and examines the channels that facilitated the gun’s diffusion.
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As detailed in chapter two, the Chinese state’s inability to maintain its monopoly on
violence started from the late nineteenth century, when China suffered from both domestic
rebellions and external invasions. It suggests that the phenomenon of private gun ownership
became a political issue from this period. To address the problem, the late Qing government was
to adjust to the new social and political reality. The state’s regulation and control over its armed
civilians appeared as a dynamic process, hovering between two ideologies. First, the state sought
to maintain its monopoly on the most advanced weapons. Second, armed civilians were regarded
as an extension of state power. The state thus exercised a permissive policy towards private gun
ownership. The legacy of this policy, I argue, was felt in the Republican period.
The late Qing’s gun policy that mobilized the armed civilians to defend localities did not
achieve its end, but led to the state’s loss of its monopoly on violence. Revolutionary events
throughout China were spiraling out of control, which ultimately toppled the Qing dynasty. In
chronological order, chapter three then examines how the government of the early Republican
period tried to maximize its control over localities and the setbacks it encountered. To provide an
in-depth analysis of the dynamic relations between state and society, this chapter mainly focuses
on Guangdong, from which Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist revolution was initiated to defeat northern
warlords in China. As discussed above, privately-owned guns were more prevalent in
Guangdong than in other Chinese provinces. When Sun Yat-sen made Guangdong province the
base of its revolutionary initiatives, he was obliged to adopt a collaborative stance with gun
owners. Their relationship was irreconcilable and mutually suspicious, which led to the 1924
Canton Merchants’ Corps Incident. Dwelling on local newspapers, revolutionary documents, and
witness accounts, this chapter proves the overall thesis that the government policy towards
private gun ownership was contingent and dynamic. The collaboration and conflict between Sun
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Yat-sen’s government and social forces in Guangdong, the Canton Merchants’ Corps in
particular, suggested that the early Republican government frowned on private armed forces lest
they threaten the government’s monopoly on power. This chapter enriches our understanding of
the complexities of revolutionary agenda and local reality during the early Republic.
Chapter four is devoted to the Nationalist period (1928-1949). The Nationalist
government realized that civilian possession of guns subverted their authority over local areas,
affecting the power relationship between the state and commoners. Following the legacy of late
Qing and early Republican government, the Nationalist government adopted a regulatory
approach to ensure the gun was in the hands of good civilians. Specifically, the Nationalists
worked to reduce firearm smuggling and implemented a national policy of gun licensing to
ensure the compliance of gun owners. However, these gun regulations proved ineffective as
regional power blocs undercut the central power.
To make a comparison of gun policies adopted by different government entities, the final
chapter centers on the mobilization efforts of the Communists from the late 1930s, who saw the
mobilization of an armed populace as an opportunity to strengthen the CCP’s military and
political presence in North China. This chapter examines different strategies and tactics that the
CCP used to mobilize the armed peasants and landlords, and suggests how the CCP appreciated
the strategic significance of armed civilians in sustaining its revolutionary cause.
The short epilogue and conclusion chapter briefly examines how the Communist
Government in the early 1950s launched a movement throughout China to disarm the civilians.
Rather than taking advantage of the armed populace as the CCP did before the Communist
regime was established, this gun confiscation movement in the early 1950s echoed the overall
thesis that the state’s stance towards private gun ownership was contingent and inconsistent,
30

which was determined by political deliberation. This chapter then discusses the issue of private
gun ownership in contemporary China. A unified China under one-Party rule today guarantees
the maximum effectiveness of the gun control policy.
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~ CHAPTER ONE~
The Prism of Violence:
The Social and Cultural Life of Gun in Modern China
Introduction
In the late 1920s, Shanghai, China’s leading treaty port and international metropolis, was
a bustling hub teeming with novelty, wealth, cultural diversity, and, of course, terrible crime. 1
This modern city, nurtured since the late nineteenth century by the frequent exchange of people,
ideas, and commodities from, was now swollen with nearly three million people of various
nationalities, races, and social classes.2 Like their counterparts in other countries, foreigners in
Shanghai brought with them their customs, cultures, and objects, all of which helped make the
city cosmopolitan, as was evident in its the diverse and colorful urban life. Among these exotic
objects, some foreigners who themselves were competent marksmen (or women) also brought a
lust for the use of modern guns to the Shanghai people, who needed them for self-defense or
were simply fascinated by them. This is evidenced by some local Chinese people’s active
participation in the revolver shooting club in the foreign concession areas. In May 1928, the
Shanghai Revolving Association held a shooting competition in which Mrs. Li Junseng 李駿僧,

1

For the transformation of modern Shanghai, see Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The
Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1999); Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); For the urban crime in Shanghai, see Frederic
Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995);
Wakeman, The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2

For the urban population of Shanghai, see Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 26-27.

32

a wealthy lady from an illustrious family won the championship.3 Three months later, her
husband outshone all other shooting enthusiasts in another competition organized by the
Shanghai International Pistol Shooting Association.4
However, the better-off residents’ use of firearms does not present the complete picture
of the foreign weapon’s ubiquitous presence in a modernizing urban society. The introduction of
foreign guns also bred social problems such as armed crime and gun running. By this time
Shanghai crime rates had soared, and the city had gained its reputation as “the crime center of the
Orient.”5 American journalist Percival Finch, who had traveled extensively in China during the
Republican period, attributed the city’s poor public security to the ready availability of foreign
guns to criminals.6 Shanghai newspapers of the time were filled with stories on criminal cases of
shootings and armed robberies in which foreign-made guns figured prominently. Violent and
ruthless acts committed by Shanghai gangsters who armed themselves largely with rapid-firing
weapons such as the semiautomatic Mauser, had almost reached their peak.7 Witnessing the

“Shanghai shouqiang zonghui wuyue jingsai diyiming Li Junseng furen” (上海手槍總會五月
競賽第一名李駿僧夫人, Mrs. Li Junseng won the championship in the May shooting
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prevalence of gun violence, Finch did not exaggerate when he claimed that “armed crime is one
of the most difficult problems facing the Municipal Police.”8
How the wealthy Chinese like the Li Junseng family and unscrupulous armed criminals
obtained their foreign weapons cannot be documented with any precision. However, as modern
Shanghai experienced increasing interactions with the outside world, many Chinese in Shanghai
would have had ample occasions to encounter this modern weapon and its uses. Well-off
Chinese in search of comfort and security normally chose to reside in the International
Settlement or the adjacent French Concession, where they would find no difficulty in buying
modern guns in foreign trading companies as long as they obtained permission from the foreignrun municipal police in Shanghai. However, these trading companies, whose clients were largely
foreigners, were not the only entry channels. Gun running, a lucrative and organized business,
was fairly prevalent in 1920s Shanghai, and provided a means through which foreign weapons
found their ways to local gangsters, criminals, and even ordinary residents. For example, as
Finch marveled in his 1926 report, a first-class Mauser automatic, could be sold for at least four
times its original selling price in Hamburg, Germany. The huge profit margins generated from
such an enormous price discrepancy constituted an important incentive to organized gun-runners
and smugglers. “A huge trade in gun-running,” Finch wrote, “has developed between dealers in
Shanghai and dealers in European countries, who are able to buy easily and cheaply from the
manufacturers.” As he spelled out in the report, many illegal foreign arms entering Shanghai
were “brought in small batches by sailors,” who, serving as traffickers, delivered their clients the
arms they required from foreign suppliers.9
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The incidents of Chinese men and women’s uses of guns, regardless of their actual
intentions, frequently appeared in local newspapers and criminal reports of the time. However
scattered and unconnected, these cases suggest new elements that characterize some aspects of
Chinese social and cultural life during the early twentieth-century. To the Shanghai residents
during this period, these newspaper accounts represented at least three different images of the
gun and its uses. First, the image of the delicate foreign gun was perceived as a symbol of social
status and modernity. Immediately after the 1928 shooting contest, Mrs. Li’s portrait appeared in
the influential pictorial magazine Guohua shibao 國畫時報, in which she was holding a
beautiful Colt pistol, wearing Cheongsam (qipao) dress 旗袍, and having a fashionable hairstyle.
All these material objects and appearance, as China historians Leo Ou-fan Lee and Henrietta
Harrison argue, embodied an advancing modernity.10 Second, the frequency of armed robbery,
abduction, and homicide made Shanghai residents associate guns with violence, crime and
danger.11 Third, in the face of frequent urban crime, carrying either a foreign gun or Chinese gun
was seen as most immediate means of defense against potential threats.
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Figure 2: Mrs. Li Junseng won the shooting competition (1928). SOURCE: Guohua
shibao 國畫時報, May 28, 1928.
Nevertheless, the multifunction of the gun was far from unique to this cosmopolitan city.
From the late nineteenth-century onward, the numbers of privately-owned guns increasingly
soared throughout China. The social status of private gun owners was varied in terms of their
class, gender, and occupation. For example, one social investigation of the 1930s suggested that
most big landlords in Henan and Hebei provinces owned at least tens of guns to both maintain
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their dominance over local communities and to protect their properties.12 In both provinces,
gangsters and bandits endeavored to acquire ample guns to commit crime and banditry. In the
late 1930s when China suffered from Japanese invasion, the image of the gun appeared in many
literary works, which illustrated the action of arming oneself as showing Chinese people’s
resolution to fight for the country.
Thus, guns lived in a colorful social life and exhibited itself as tools of violence, labels of
social status, and symbols of self-empowerment. It played a larger role as traditionally supposed
in the theatre of modern China. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the social and cultural
life of gun from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. It tends to answer the questions
like why the gun became socially acceptable in modern China, what roles the gun played in
social life, and how it made itself accessible. As it turned out, many types of the symbolism of
the gun, including violence, modernity, and self-protection, coexisted and converged, which was
integral to the social life of modern China. Based on a variety of sources, including newspaper
reports and archival documents, this chapter starts with how the demands for guns were
generated by people with different needs, and then discusses the image of the gun in public
culture and social discourse. Finally, this chapter examines various channels through which the
guns got diffused in both coastal and interior areas.
The Traditional Image of the Gun: Violence and Crime
In his seminal work on the role of violence in Chinese history, anthropologist Steven Harrell
argues that Chinese culture, in contrast to many other cultures, condemns violence and “plays

See Zheng Qidong 鄭起東, Zhuanxingqi de Huabei Nongcun Shehui 轉型期的華北農村社會
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12
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down the glory of military exploits, awards its prestige to literary, rather than martial, figures,
and seeks harmony over all other values.”13 Nevertheless, in the social and cultural trajectory of
late imperial and modern China, against which traditional literati claimed Chinese culture as
pacifistic and demilitarized, violent actions assumed a much more visible role in social life.
Violent conflict was endemic in many regions, which, according to Harrell, can be classified into
two kinds: vertical violence (“dominance by one group over another”), and horizontal violence
(“disputes between equals).14 Both kinds of violence existed in a variety of ways, such as class
conflicts, lineage feudings, class conflicts, rebels, banditry, and many others. Chinese elite
culture, according to William Rowe, holds contempt for the violent behaviors.15 Negative lexical
items in the Chinese language including fei 匪, zei 賊, or dao 盜 are used to describe bandits,
rebels, or robbers, whose behaviors should not “exist in the eyes of good society.”16
A violence-prone person would use any tools to commit violence, but from the late
nineteenth century on, evidence from many sources suggest that modern gun either imported
abroad or produced in Chinese new arsenals were the preferred weapons in many criminal cases.
When the foreign gun was introduced into China in the late nineteenth century, its usage in
crime, banditry, and other conflict behaviors reinforced its symbolism of violence. Thus, how do
we understand the relationship between the circulation of foreign guns and the frequency of
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banditry or crime in modern China? Based on the computer-aided analysis, Chinese legal scholar
Michael Ng suggests that crime was overwhelmingly concentrated in major treaty ports and
modern cities, which witnessed dramatic social and economic transformation owing to the rapid
modernization.17 In the early twentieth century, shooting incidents commonly reported in local
newspapers, mainly in major modern cities. These incidents were not isolated and had continued
sporadically to be automatic response of social insecurity in many major Chinese cities like
Beiping, Tianjin, and Shanghai during the Republican period. Sidney D. Gamble (1890-1968), a
renowned sociologist who travelled in China between 1917 and 1932 to collect social-economic
data, investigated that the violent crime rates grew rapidly for most of the period in Beiping.18
Gamble’s survey of Beiping’s urban crime was echoed by Chinese leading criminologist and
Professor at Yenching University Yan Jingyue (嚴景躍 1905-1976), whose empirical study on
the crime in the 1920s also confirmed the trend, particularly the rise of homicide rates.19 Because
the gun-involved incidents were not tallied separately in the official crime statistics, it is difficult
to perceive the role of private-held firearms in committing crime or homicide from Gamble and
Yan’s crime data supplied by the police agency of Beijing.20
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And yet, other contemporary sources such as newspaper reports and criminal cases
suggested the illegal use of guns was the major perceived reason driving the rise of homicide
rates. For example, commenting on the poor public security of Beijing, a reporter stated in a
Dagong bao 大公報 editorial that “gun robbery was a fairly common occurrence.”21 In another
influential field study of crime in relation to social change in China, Yan Jingyue claimed that
the means of committing crime had been vastly modernized with the introduction of rifle or
pistol.22
The penetration of foreign guns into China’s territories was also observed by many reporters
and social survey practitioners.23 In his 1920s interview with a bandit in Manchuria, Yan Jingyue
was astonished to learn of the easy availability of gun among bandits. According to one bandit
named Liu T.C., they managed to purchase guns from a Japanese pharmacy store in Shenyan 瀋
陽 (Mukden) clandestinely. The owner of the store concealed a rifle, pistol, as well as bullets at
the bottom of a dry well. Liu later found that “almost all the stores operated by Japanese engaged
in arms and drug dealings.”24 The availability of foreign-made firearms and ammunition was also
noted by foreign visitors. One of them was Dr. Harvey Howard, a missionary and professor of
Ophthalmology at Peking Union Medical College, who observed the proliferation of foreign
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weapons in the late 1920s Manchuria. During his tenure at the college, Howard and his eleven
year-old son were kidnapped by a group of Manchurian bandits in 1926 and were held for ten
weeks. As noted in his famous memoir of this adventure Ten Weeks with Chinese Bandits, “most
of the rifles [used by these bandits] were of Russian manufacture, of the years 1904 or 1917 as
indicated by the stamps upon them. Several had Japanese rifles with the emblem of the ‘rising
sun’ on their barrels.” Some other rifles included German type and that of Chinese manufacture
by Hanyang or Mueken arsenals.25 With respect to the small arms, Dr. Howard noted they were
exclusively Mauser pistols of German origin. Speaking in fluent Chinese and treating the
bandits’ ailments with care, Howard quickly gained their trust. He was informed that these rifles
were typically expensive, ranging up to $150 per piece, while a German made Mauser pistol
might cost over than $350.26 Because of this, these guns mostly served a deterrent purpose, and
none of the bandits had ambition to learn shooting through costly practicing. The sources of their
weapon supply could be myriad: some of them retained the guns during their service as soldiers;
some guns were procured from smugglers in an underground market in Harbin, an already
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international city at the time;27 bandits might also benefit from their secured relations with
nearby warlord soldiers who supplied them with needed weapons.
Yan’s social survey and Howard’s eyewitness account, on close scrutiny, displayed one
significant historical transition in modern China: outlaws and bandits gradually replaced their
cold steel weapon or bird guns to the powerful foreign guns, including the ones manufactured by
newly established arsenals in China. Both the popular belief and government action held that the
gun is intrinsically the more lethal weapon than other weapons like swords, knives, or daggers.
As it will be addressed in the next few chapters, both the Qing and Republican governments took
efforts to maintain the monopoly of the most powerful weapons, and enacted restrict laws to
regulate private gun ownership. Their policies with respect to firearms reflected an anxiety that
unregulated guns had the potential to endanger public security or even the basis of legitimate
rulership. Because the gun was more powerful weapon whereas alternative weapons including
sword and knife were less so. Urban crimes or rural bandits chose guns precisely because they
were determined to bring death or deterrence when they committed the crime. From the late
nineteenth to the early twentieth century, urban outlaws and rural bandits took advantage of the
underground firearms circulation network, seeking to arm themselves with advanced foreign
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guns. The symbolism of the gun as a tool of violence was reinforced given the frequency of
criminal activities.
Guns, Self-defense, and Modernity
From the late nineteenth century, there was a multiplicity of Chinese terms denoting
modern guns. The characters yangqiang 洋槍 (foreign gun) might be the first terms used to
distinguish this Western weapon with traditional bird gun. Another term kuaiqiang 快槍 (quick
gun) denoted the foreign gun’s accuracy and advanced technique. During the Republican period,
for the urban civilian, another term ziwei qiangzhi 自衛槍支 (self-defense gun) was commonly
used, which blurred the gun’s place of origin and style, but denoting its function in selfdefense.28 We have no clue how the civilians accepted these terms in their social life. What is
confirmed is that most terms were initiated by the state rather than society. The state allowed the
civilians to own guns to defend themselves. For the most people other than bandits and crimes,
the foreign gun provided them the means to protect themselves and their communities.
Therefore, armed people were comprised of not only these rural bandits and urban outlaws,
but also many ordinary civilians. The urban middle class was the first group to embrace foreign
guns.29 The introduction of foreign guns from the late nineteenth century allowed the new middle
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class to use the modern firearms directly, rather than experiencing a transition from the
traditional weapons to the modern ones. For the urban wealthy dwellers, the foreign gun brought
them both security and a feeling of elevated social status. First, as discussed above, the frequency
of criminal activities pushed them to acquire more powerful weapons. Second, they were
interested in most recent foreign guns as a symbol of prestige. For example, 143 pistols owned
by ordinary civilians were registered with the Beiping municipal police department in 1947, over
ninety percent of which were manufactured by foreign firearm companies, including Remington,
Colt, Winchester, Browning, and many others.30
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Figure 3: The Types of Guns Owned by Beijing Dwellers in 1947. SOURCE: Beijing Municipal
Archives, J181-014-00746.
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The small number of registered guns on file would not give the Beiping police a sense of
security. Certainly, for a majority of gun owners, firearm registration was meaningless. At the
same time, gun licensing was not harshly enforced. The fluid character of armed bandits and
large number of unregistered guns in society make any conclusion about the distribution and
extent of gun ownership among different groups must be tentative. All these accounts,
nevertheless, suggest that gun ownership, as one major sign of serious social instability was
particularly prevalent in modern Chinese society. These eyewitness accounts also indicate the
civilian weapon underwent a dramatic transition from cold steel arms and bird guns to more
powerful guns manufactured by foreign firearms companies or their Chinese counterparts. Prior
to the late nineteenth century, civilian weapon was always composed of knives, spears, swords,
and low-quality bird gun, which could be made locally with indigenous method (土辦法
tubanfa).
In the years following Qing China’s dramatic decline through foreign aggression and
devastating popular uprisings, owning a foreign made gun gradually became a prerequisite for
exhibiting strength. The bandits, as mentioned by Dr. Howard, obtained the foreign guns in the
black market at an expensive price, though they only displayed their weapons rather than
shooting others. This transition was also embodied in the practices of collective defense. When
local community decided to organize a militia for self-defense purpose, their first act was always
to search for powerful foreign guns. For example, when Linyu County of Zhili 直隸 Province
was constantly harassed by roving bandits, local community led by commercial gentry elite
contributed funds to purchase two hundred Mauser guns and other armament in Tianjin, a nearby
port city, which appeared as a convenient inlet for arms due to the city’s frequent foreign
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contacts.31 As will be discussed in the second chapter, militia was poorly equipped in pre-modern
period partly because their defense activities were monitored by the government, and also due to
their weapons outclassed the sporadic outlaws. When bandits started to arm themselves with
powerful weapons, local militia resorted to more powerful weapons to maintain their defensive
poise. As indicated in the Linyu’s case, one source of foreign guns was treaty ports where
civilians could the weapons they needed to fight rebels or defend themselves.
To understand the tremendous social change brought about by foreign gun ownership, the
foremost question deserved to be studied is what factors account for the ready access to guns for
non-military individuals. The foreign gun’s pouring into modern China did not mean Chinese
traditional bird guns withdrew from the historical stage completely. Rather, it is much safer to
argue that the diffusion of foreign guns added complexity to public order situations, especially in
some violence-prone regions that were already filled with obsolete bird guns. The diffusion
pattern of private weapons developed from the late nineteenth century and bore many similarities
with the one of traditional bird gun. Just as the matchlock introduced into China in the sixteenth
century, regions differed apparently in how readily they received the exotic weapon. In some
most interior provinces, living without frequent foreign contacts, the spread of foreign
commodities was less rapid than the coastal regions or treaty ports that were subject to the
intrusion of foreign elements. Another similarity is that both periods witnessed a process of
foreign weapon’s domestication, which took place not only in state-operated arsenals, but also
among civilians themselves.

31

“Juban Xiangtuan 舉辦鄉團,” Dagong bao, January 11, 1910.
46

Beyond Violence: The Gun’s Symbolism in Popular Culture
Prior to the early twentieth century, gun’s symbolic role as a brutal and evil implement
was always highlighted in popular culture. The elite ideal in traditional China was to esteem
literacy and to despise martiality (重文輕武 Zhongwen qingwu).32 The cultural tradition made
ordinary people’s use of firearms inevitably marginalized. Chinese writers of the late Qing did
not conceal their disdain and disgust about the private gun ownership, which was associated with
banditry and outlaw activities, if their use of the gun was not officially sanctioned. Liu E (刘鹗
1857-1909), expressed such sentiment in his famous late Qing semi-autobiography The Travels
of Lao Can (老殘遊記 Lao Can youji). He presented a story, in which a local magistrate found a
wealthy and educated family concealed bird guns when the magistrate chased a group of bandits.
Even though the family explained they purchased guns for self-defense against roving bandits,
the magistrate himself believed that the family had colluded with bandits, because “good
civilians would never dare to obtain military weapons.”33
The frequency of urban crime and banditry created an urgent need for self-defense, which
also reinforced the symbolism of gun as tool for deterrence and protection from danger. The
gun’s image in public culture was not limited to its instrumental role in the early twentieth
century. As China’s sovereignty was severely trampled by Japan from the early 1930s, another
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symbolism was attached to the gun by Chinese intellectuals, who used cartoons, woodcuts, or
other forms of art to articulate its new meanings.
An analysis of the image of gun presented in visual arts allows us to examine how the
popular culture illustrated the image of the gun. These intellectuals, through their brushes and
pens, gave gun another meaning beyond killing or self-defense.34 More explicitly, they tended to
show the gun as a weapon to protect the nation and to fight against Japanese imperialist. One of
the practitioners was Zhang Mingcao (張明曹 1911-1978), one of major woodcut artists and
painters in Republican China. During the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), Zhang used
his woodcut and cartoons to stir people’s emotion and to increase people’s patriotism.35 The
frequent appearance of the image of the gun in his woodcut indicated that Chinese intellectuals
like Zhang Mingcao vested gun another symbolism.
Zhang Mingcao received training in painting and woodcut in Shanghai in the early 1930s,
when the Chinese modern woodcut movement was reaching its climax.36 After the outbreak of
the Second Sino-Japanese War, Zhang and other artists were active in promoting people’s
patriotism by using their vernacular arts. In 1938, Zhang Mingcao published the woodcut work
hostility (仇 chou), which made him well-known in the field of Chinese woodcut. 37 In this work,
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Zhang illustrated a blacksmith who and his family were forced to seek refuge from the Japanese
invasion. They met a group of Japanese army on the way, who looted their belongings and
arrested them. His wife was raped and killed, while he was ordered to work for the army. Later,
the gunsmith escaped and stole a rifle from the Japanese soldier. Zhang Mingcao used a couple
of woodcuts to illustrate how the gunsmith used the gun to take part in the guerrilla war against
the Japanese. In this woodcut work, the image of gun was subjected to change. It was initially
described as a tool to kill Chinese people, which was later transformed into a tool against
Japanese invaders. When the gunsmith took up the rifle that he stole from a Japanese soldier to
participate in the guerrilla war, the symbolism of gun was to provoke Chinese people’s
resolution to fight and to defend the nation.
Zhang Mingcao’s other cartoon and woodcut similarly indicated gun’s symbolism as a
determination to fight against the Japanese. In another woodcut work entitled Reaphook (鐮刀
Liandao), Zhang described a rural woman who encouraged her husband to kill the Japanese
enemies with a rifle. She took up the reap-hook instead. Similarly, Zhang’s work Arming the
Masses (民眾武裝起來 Mingzhong wuzhuang qilai) conveyed the message that motivated
Chinese people armed themselves with rifles against the threat.
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Figure 4: Reaphook by Zhang Mingcao. SOURCE: Zhang Mingcao, Zhang Mingcao Ji:
Banhua Juan, 61.
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Figure 5: Arming the Masses by Zhang Mingcao. SOURCE: Zhang Mingcao, Zhang Mingcao Ji:
Banhua Juan, 77.
Zhang’s work was one among many art forms that illustrated the image of guns. Historian
Chang-Tai Hung believes these works reflected “the political and social conditions of the age
and offered valuable insight into popular attitudes.”38 However, in the war context, we have no
clues about how the general public understood these works. In other words, it is unclear how
many civilians then sought to arm themselves after reading these works. Chinese intellectuals
and artists drew images of the gun in the belief that they would arouse people to “resist rather
than cooperate with the Japanese invaders.” As Louise Edwards’ work on wartime cartoons on
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sexual violence suggests, “the efficacy of these images as instruments designed to spur resistance
and resolve remains in doubt.”39 This similar uncertainty also happened on Zhang Mingcao’s
woodcut on the image of a gun. Ultimately, these images reveal the attitudes of Chinese
intellectuals and artists on violence and resolution against Japanese invasion, in which the power
of arming the masses loomed largely. These artists’ works indicated that the meaning of the gun
was floating. More than a symbol of cruelty, it was a tool could be used to defend the nation.
Chinese Women with Guns
Unlike during the Qing period when the use of the gun was a monopoly of man, the
transformative Republican period witnessed the involvement of women. As mentioned in the
beginning, in the early twentieth century, wealthy ladies in modern Shanghai played a part in the
shooting clubs or participated in competitions held by male-dominated associations. In this case,
her sporting shooting activity was sanctioned and even encouraged by her husband, who was
also interested in shooting in the club. Of course, the experience of Li Junzeng, who lived in an
illustrious family in cosmopolitan Shanghai could not apply to all Chinese women in the early
twentieth century, whose subordinate feminine roles had not been shaken.40 As many cases
suggest, Chinese women’s involvement in the use of guns extended beyond shooting activities.
They took up either pistol or rifles for several other reasons. Some women showed out their
skills in shooting to protect themselves, their families, and their communities. Foreign guns also
provided female criminals the tools to practice violence or to take part in banditry. However, it
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would be misleading to argue that that Chinese women empowered themselves with guns to alter
their subordinate position. Then, how does the women’s use of guns broaden our perspective of
gender and feminism in modern China?
When foreign gun appeared in Chinese society, it was deemed an efficient tool to commit
violence. In the urban areas where female offenders had little difficulties to obtain firearms,
foreign guns were more likely to be used in homicides and other criminal activities. From these
criminal cases, the role of Chinese women in these gun-involved cases could be detected. In the
early spring of 1935, Liu Jinggui 劉景貴, a twenty-four years old female student at Beiping Fine
Arts Academy realized that his rival in love (情敵 qingdi) Teng Shuang 騰雙 taught physical
education at Zhicheng Girl’s Middle School. On March 16, 1935, Liu made her way to the
school’s dormitory where Teng had been residing. Teng Shuang had never met Liu Jingming
before, nor had she discovered her husband, Lu Ming 錄明, had an extramarital affair with Liu.
When the two young women met in the dorm, Liu quickly pulled out her American Browning
pistol hidden in her satchel, and instantly shot Teng Shuang seven times in her head, shoulder,
chest, and elbow. Recognizing her death, Liu fled the scene, but was apprehended immediately
by the school guard, who heard the gunshots on campus.
After two years’ interrogation by the Beiping municipal court, Liu was convicted of
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. As the interrogation went on, more details about the
Liu Jinggui’s case were released. According to Liu Jinggui’s confession, she got engaged to Lu
Ming, an award-winning shot-put player in the April of 1934, who, however, broke their
betrothal promises months later as he fell in love with Teng Shuang. Liu agreed finally by
accepting six hundred yuan from Lu and Teng. However, their relationship continued to be
intimate underground. In March of 1935, they had been engaged in a clandestine love affair in a
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Beiping hotel for five days. After that, Liu personally realized that it was Teng who broke their
engagement and decided to kill her for revenge.41
Liu Jinggui’s crime resembled another well-known homicide case that happened in the same
year. Shi Jianqiao (施劍翹 1906-1979) assassinated former warlord Sun Chuanfang (孫傳芳
1885-1935) in Tianjin’s foreign concession with a Browning pistol, the same model as Liu
Jinggui’s weapon. In that scene, Shi declared that she avenged the death of her father who was
killed by Sun ten years earlier. Both cases immediately received considerable coverage and
crystallized extensive public debate over whether passion, or qing would help exonerate the
assassins. In her pioneering studies of both cases, Eugenia Lean likewise considered that the
public sentiments surrounding the assassinations indicated the formation of a new “critical urban
public,” through which different social groups could interact with the government, and ultimately
could “sway legal proceedings, threaten the moral authority of cultural elites, mediate centerwarlord relations, and influence the state’s tactics in legitimating its power” in the Republican
period.42 Contemporary writers and reporters who vigorously made commentary on Liu and
Shi’s cases indeed helped arouse such public sympathy, underlying the role of passion (qing)
squeezed from love or filial piety in exonerating female’s violent behavior in Republican China.
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Moreover, yet, once we delve into the details of the case, especially the actual process of the
murder, we may realize some new and heretofore unnoticed elements in the early twentiethcentury Chinese urban life. When contemporary reporters and writers commented on both cases,
they did not feel astonished that even educated Chinese women, who were always portrayed as
delicate, docile, and dependent in the pre-modern period had no difficulties to obtain foreignmade guns to commit violence.
Given that successive Chinese governments constantly introduced controls regulating the
sale and ownership of weapons of any kind, how were Liu Jingshi and Shi Jianqiao able to
acquire Browning pistols? According to the intricate and thoroughly documented interrogation
carried out by the professional Beiping police officers, Liu Jingshi confessed that she had
brought the gun along with seven bullets from an unknown rickshaw puller for eighty-four
yuan.43 Existing records, however, do not tell us whether the policemen searched the rickshaw
puller who sold gun, or even further investigated a potential black market that helped the gun
diffusion. Due to the large number of rickshaw pullers and demographic mobility in Republican
Beiping, it was of course impracticable for the police agency to trigger an optimistic
investigation. In Tianjin, Shi Jianqiao claimed that she bought the Browning along with six
bullets from a defeated solider for sixty yuan.44
The function of the gun was not confined to commit violence, modern women who
acquired gun aimed to protect themselves and their families. In Shanghai, a shooting club
organized shooting practices for wealthy ladies, showing them how to protect themselves with a
43
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gun. Trading companies also sold women tiny pistols, which could be easily put in their purses.45
In wartime China, when their husbands were drafted into the army, women learned shooting to
protect their communities. In the Nanhai County of Guangdong province, for example, a
majority of males joined the army during the Second Sino-Japanese War, leaving mostly women
and elderly in the villages. Local women organized all-female militia forces to protect their
villages. They got the weapon from local elite or government.46

Figure 6: “In farming, In training, and in practicing.” SOURCE: Zhanwang 展望, no. 10 (1939):
25.
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Women’s use of guns did not mean they successfully altered their subordinate position by
participating in masculine activities. Rather, their use of guns suggested at least two important
changes in modern China. First, the introduction of the foreign gun, which was much easy to
operate, shortened the power gap between male and female. If Liu Jingshi’s case was not
sufficient to prove it because both the victim was another woman, Shi Jianqiao’s case certainly
did. A woman with no shooting experience was able to kill a former warlord with her Browning
pistol. The introduction of the foreign gun made hand to hand combat unnecessary. Second,
women’s use of guns against the perceived threat reveals how these armed Chinese women
placed themselves in national politics. The gun gave them certain degree of autonomy to protect
themselves, rather than relying on their husbands as before. In this sense, the use of the gun
legitimized their engagement with the politics.
Gun and Power Domination in Republican China
In Republican China, access to weapons became a resource for ambitious individuals or
groups of men who saw opportunities in the wielding of local power. For example, the Sangzhi
County 桑植縣 of Hunan Province established a salt tax bureau in the early 1915 and obtained
twelve guns to defend against rapacious bandits. He Long (賀龍 1896-1969), a local bandit
organized a group of adherents to attack the bureau with two cleavers and seized these guns. He
Long then utilized the guns to commit banditry, and later formed military unit to obtain his local
dominance. Gradually, his military prominence allowed him to become a Communist general. It
is clear from this case that the guns acquired new meanings along with the change of context.
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They alternated from the tools of defense to the tools of committing violence, and finally
facilitated ambitious individuals to obtain power dominance. 47
In the early twentieth century, China underwent rapid and tremendous changes: the keju
system (科舉 civil service examination) was abolished; the late imperial dynasty was
overthrown; the whole country was exposed to the outside world. One of the most striking
features was the process of militarization had accelerated, transforming the traditional power
structure, in which Confucian elites collaborated with the state officials to manage local affairs.
Under the condition of local militarization, local elites, who were previously authorized
privileges through classical education, now had to find other ways to secure their local
dominance or gave away to newly emerged martial elite. For example, in the early 1910s, the
Qian family of Wuxi City, a great literary elite lineage in the prosperous Jiangnan region, wasted
little time to purchase foreign guns and trained local people to use them to defend their
communities. At least in part, this was a response to the new social and political situation, in
which traditional ways of obtaining social status gradually gave way to the channels of obtaining
military dominance.
Circulation Mechanisms
We have examined the circumstances under which Chinese people of different strata
owned and used guns. By the early twentieth century, mainly as a consequence of increasing
social turmoil and the fears of personal safety, the private gun ownership became widespread in
many regions. The diverse values and meanings people attached to their arms were also
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embodied in the circulation mechanisms, which provided people with varied demands the
weapons. The circulation of guns shared some characteristics of the circulation of other
commodities. That is to say, a two-tiered pattern of consumption was in place. As what historian
Frank Dikötter has argued in the research on Chinese consumer culture, “[I]n a country marked
by opposition between the poverty of the many and the riches of the few,” the “imports were
used by elites as visual evidence of social status, while cheap imitations satisfied the demand for
new products among ordinary people both were included in a culture which worshipped the
tangible and craved the new.”48 Dikötter’s assertion of the two-tiered consumption of everyday
commodities also applied to the circulation of guns. A wide gap existed between the well-off
elites who conspicuously demanded sophisticated and accurate foreign guns of greater quality
and the ordinary individuals or groups who armed themselves with affordable and even primitive
ones. Another reason to examine the circulation mechanisms lay in the transformation of values
when guns moved from one location to another. Whether by purchase, theft, or pickup, the
weapon’s original values and function also underwent some sorts of transformation.
Commerce
From the late nineteenth century, as China was no longer hermetically sealed off from the
outside world, foreign guns, like many other exotic commodities, found their ways into China,
making them available to many non-military individuals. To some extent, the circulation of guns
shared some common features of the circulation of other commodities, which required the
concerted effort among manufactures, intermediaries, and consumers. Previous scholarship has
identified China’s position in the global arms market. The arms acquisitions from abroad started
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from the 1860s when the late Qing reformers endeavored to modernize its military equipment,
and reached peak in the warlord period as the acquisition of powerful weapons was a major
determinant for warlords to obtain power.49 The internecine military conflicts and China’s urgent
need for military modernization made many western gun manufacturers regard China as a
potential market.50 Previous research on the arms trade does not provide a full picture as
historians tend to underestimate how these foreign guns made themselves available to a large
portion of the non-military population.
Innovations in guns started to accelerate in the Western countries, manufacturing
revolvers first and the later semi-automatic pistols. The advent of easily operated and accurate
foreign guns provided modernizing elites and the emerging middle-class people the weapons
they required to protect themselves and their families. As discussed above, the gun registration
records of the Beijing Municipal Archives suggested the wealthy people always chose Mauser,
Colt, and Browning pistols as their weapons. Even though an underground black market
flourished in the early twentieth century, through which some criminals found no difficulties to
obtain foreign guns to commit violence, most wealthy civilians like Mr. and Mrs. Li Junseng
turned to foreign trading companies to purchase foreign guns at high prices.
From the late nineteenth century, foreign companies actively explored the Chinese
market to sell their arms. In contrast to the Western countries, in which gun manufacturers
portrayed their products as symbols of masculinity or social status to attract their customers,
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arms sellers in China always promoted the connection between firearms and self-defense.51 In a
period marred by internecine military conflicts, robbery, and banditry, Western gun
manufactures were aware that their potential consumers placed a higher priority on the gun’s
ability to defend themselves. According to the private gun registration records preserved at the
Shanghai and Beijing Municipal Archives, the emerging Chinese middle-class preferred Colt,
Browning, and Mauser.
These three firearm manufacturers ardently explored the Chinese market, by either
dispatching sales representatives or distributing advertisements to attract Chinese consumers.52
Sales representatives were sent to China in large numbers to dispose of their surplus of firearms.
Their primary consumers were undoubtedly contending military powers. During the early
Republican period, when China suffered from the political turmoil caused by warlordism. As
Anthony Chan suggests, “the issue of an armaments stockpile was always a concern of the
warlords,” who competed to purchase powerful foreign arms to secure their political dominance
in their sphere.53 Sales representatives were sent to China in a large number, who built
consolidated personal relations with various warlords. Existing documents reveal little about
their activities in China. It is extremely difficult to detect how these sales representatives came to
contact directly with Chinese civilians. What can be conjectured was that they took advantage of
the trip in China and advertised their products by all means. For example, Henry Brewer, who
were dispatched by the Winchester Repeating Company based in Hartford, Connecticut in the
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late 1890s to sell the arms to the late Qing government. While he was in China, he took any
occasions to promote the image of Winchester rifles to local Chinese elites. When he was in
Hankou, he found that local people were firing the cannon to break down and drive away the
cloud devils, as the region had had months of heavy rains. However, their firming seemed not to
bring any change. The clouds did not break up. As recalled by Henry Brewer, he saw the
opportunity and used his arms manufactured by Winchester to shot at the sky. A few days later,
the weather was fair, and he thus produced “an excellent ad for their guns.”54
Advertising was a major channel for the circulation of modern commodities, which also
applied to the sale of weapons. The Colt Company placed this Chinese pamphlet in the major
trading companies of China, which were then available for Chinese consumers to read. We have
no clues about the role of advertisements played in selling their products. Since most western
arms manufacturers sold Chinese people weapons through intermediaries, which appeared as
trading companies in treaty ports. Trading companies in many cases simply published their
advertisements in local newspapers. In the early twentieth century, gun advertisements appeared
in the Shengjing Shibao, a major newspaper in Manchuria. Japanese trading companies such as
Mitsui and Taicho had the list of their weapons in the newspaper.55 Existing sources do not
reveal detailed information about their consumers. In the late Qing and early Republican period,
ordinary civilians and local militia forces were eligible to purchase firearms in these trading

54

William Henry Brewer Papers, Yale University Archives.

55

Some trading companies published advertisements in local newspaper, in which the types of
guns were listed. A few examples include “Taicang yanghang gaobai 太倉洋行告白,” Shengjing
Shibao, September 1, 1906; “Gangcun yanghang guanggao 廣存央行廣告,” Shengjing Shibao,
September 7, 1906.
62

companies, only if they obtained licenses from the local government. It is hard to suggest how
many civilians purchased guns from these companies.
The Colt Manufacturing Company, headquartered in West Hartford Connecticut sought
to expand the Chinese market by emphasizing Colt pistol’s superior performance. The
company’s marketing strategies offer a prime case to reveal how arms manufacturers were
connected with Chinese consumers. Given the social context of China in which the sentiment of
insecurity dominated civilian life from the late nineteenth century, Colt advertised to wealthy
Chinese civilians with language that portrayed its pistol as the “treasured object for selfdefenders.” In this printed advertisement, the Colt emphasized its product was the “most stable,
most accurate, and most reliable.” 56
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Figure 7: Gun Advertisements from the Colt’s Manufacturing Company. SOURCE: Colt
Collection, Connecticut State Library, 974.62. H2572.
Regular commerce became an important way for Chinese people to obtain firearms. As
discussed above, the prevalence of private gun ownership was determined by two factors:
availability of firearms in market and increasing demand from Chinese consumers who required
guns for self-defense. Though not in large numbers, regular commerce provided eligible
individuals or groups to obtain guns of the most recent design. However, it does not mean the
wealthy middle class and some militia forces were only customers of trading companies. In
many cases, urban outlaws and bandits could purchase guns from trading companies
clandestinely. Though the Nationalist government enacted law prohibiting these companies from
selling arms to individuals or groups without government permit, the prohibition was not
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effectively implemented.57 The distribution of guns in modern China was highly uneven.
Determining social status, many other Chinese had limited access to the foreign guns from
regular commerce. Other heterodox channels ranging from smuggling, self-production, and
transference from military, played more dominant role in making firearms circulate in local
society.
From Military Weapon to Civilian Weapon
While the 1911 Revolution had successfully brought down the Manchu reign and
established the new Chinese Republic, China had continued to experience a rising level of social
disorder and disunity until 1949. Yuan Shikai’s betrayal of the revolution and eagerness to
restore the monarchy provoked immediate protests from revolutionaries and military governors
of most provinces. Yuan’s death in 1916 shook off the restraints he imposed upon provincial
militarists and created a political vacuum which military governors or warlords competed to fill
in. A period of warlordism ensued from 1916 to 1928, appearing as one of the most disastrous
episodes in modern China. The whole nation was sucked into chaotic military struggles among
warlords and Sun Yat-sen’s National Revolutionary Army. One Republican economist calculated
that almost all the provinces had suffered from military conflicts during this period. On average,
bloody conflicts hit more than seven provinces annually from 1916 and 1924, and about 14
provinces after 1924.58 Since military force always played a decisive role in consolidating and
expanding political influence, warlords competed to accumulate military strengthen through
recruiting soldiers and acquiring weapons. By the 1920s, the total number of military individuals
“Shanghai haiguan jinyun junxie zhi xinguize 上海海關禁運軍械之新規則,” Shengjing
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was being conservatively estimated at over two million, four times than that of ten years
before.59
The increasing numbers of soldiers and incessant military conflicts during the early
Republican period facilitated the diffusion of weapons into local society. In many cases, defeated
or runaway soldiers either carried their guns away with them, or transferred their weapons to
bandits or militia forces.60 It was during the period of warlordism that the transference from
military weapons to civilian weapons reached its climax. For example, after the Feng-Zhi War 奉
直戰爭 in 1922, “warlords’ army was dismissed, and many soldiers ran away. Almost all the
soldiers took away their arms, which endangered public security.”61 After the battle, local
peasants picked up the leftover guns or ammunitions and then sold them to either bandits or
militia forces. According to a 1922 newspaper report, local police found a peasant drove a big
cart with six baskets on it. It was found that he put more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition in
the basket.62 In other cases, bandits or outlaws stole or seized guns owned by either individuals
or militia forces, which, too, helped the gun’s transference from military guns to non-military
ones.
Self-Production
The final means by which guns circulated was by private production. As discussed above,
for the most rural population, foreign guns at an expensive price were hardly affordable to the
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most ordinary people, who also needed guns to defend themselves. Many underground channels,
in addition to smuggling, provided these people the primitive guns they required. When the
foreign guns were introduced into China in the late nineteenth century, local gunsmiths quickly
acquired a rudimentary technical know-how, producing less sophisticated weapons. If the gun
smuggling was an integral part of the coastal landscape, private production became one major
ways for the interior regions to get their weapons.
Conclusion
Traditional Chinese values placed a heavy importance on harmony and benevolence,
which gave preference to civil rather than military virtues. Of the major philosophical schools
that deployed pacific sentiments, Daoism arguably displayed the most disgust over the use of
weapons. This belief was duly reflected in Laozi’s Daodejing 道德經 as follows “Now arms,
however beautiful, are instruments of evil omen, hateful, it may be said, to all creatures.
Therefore, they who have the Dao do not like to employ them.”63 Notwithstanding the
predominance of the pacifistic value in Chinese tradition, the presence of weapons among
civilians was not uncommon in history. When the first explosive small arms first landed in China
through Japanese pirates in the sixteenth century, many Chinese civilians had been arming
themselves with traditional cold steel weapons for millennia. Ordinary people had various
occasions to bear weapons, including hunting, self-defense, or practicing martial arts.64 In the
period of political tension and deteriorated economic situation, peasants in an attempt to advance
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their marginal social status might take up their primitive weapons at hand against wicked rulers.
One typical example was the late Ming peasant rebellion led by Li Zicheng 李自成 (1606-1645),
whose rebel army successfully overthrew the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). When the rebellion
was still in its infancy, their primary weapons consisted of spears, swords, bows, and arrows.65
The representations of weapons also appeared in literary forms. Wandering knights-errant,
righteous bandits, and armed swordsmen were portrayed in classic literature as intrepid heroes,
who devoted themselves to helping the poor and the oppressed. Water Margin 水滸傳, a great
classic novel dedicated to a group of rebel heroes who organized a brotherhood community to
defy the North Song Dynasty (960-1127), illustrates the magic use of eighteen types of weapons
by those romantic rebels in the fight for justice.66 The manifestation of arms into both material
and virtual forms attested that the privately-owned weapon had more or less penetrated into
everyday lives of a large section of the population.
When China started its military modernization efforts in the 1860s, foreign guns were
introduced into China, which provided Chinese people alternative choices of weapons. Since
then, the gun was no longer a monopoly of the government. In 1880, Zou Tao (鄒濤 1850-1931),
a novelist and newspaper editor moved to Shanghai, where he devoted himself to writing a
courtesan novel, The Shadows of Heaven and Earth in Shanghai (海上塵天影 Haishang
chentianying), which was published in 1904. Zou lived in a colorful life. He obtained the
prestigious Flowering Talent (秀才 xiucai) degree, and then became ardently interested in
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Western culture and technology. In the novel, there was an episode in which a xiucai of Shanghai
was talking about foreign guns to a courtesan. He enumerated very quickly the most recent types
of foreign guns and their detailed description, ranging from the American-manufactured
Remington rifle to the Mauser semi-automatic pistol. The xiucai then compared these foreign
guns in terms of their range, accuracy, and penetration. Scholars who study Zou Tao and his
work have suggested that his novel appeared with “copious and explicit connections to the
author’s life.”67 From the novel, it can be assumed that even an educated elite of the late Qing
like Zou Tao had the channel to grasp the knowledge of foreign weapons. As the late Qing
government initiated and deepened its military modernization from the 1860s, a growing number
of Western works on modern weaponry were translated into Chinese in Shanghai, through which
people might learn about modern guns. We have no clue if Zou Tao himself either owned or
carried a foreign gun. The episode in the novel attested that a section of population in China
started to be intertwined with the global military trend. A few decades later, some Chinese
people not only grasped the knowledge of firearms, but also obtained and leaned to use these
guns. The introduction of the foreign gun generated social and cultural responses.
During this period, the gun’s symbolism of violence was subjected to change in
transformative modern period. Its social meaning was not confined to violence and killing. This
chapter presents a social and cultural history of guns in China. One non-military individual might
arm himself to embrace modernity, or to pursue power for local dominance, or to show his
determination to fight against a potential threat. All these symbolisms and uses coexisted and
coverged in modern China. In a period when the weak government was not able to provide

67

Patrick Hanan, Chinese Fiction of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: Essays by
Patrick Hanan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 24.
69

protection to its civilians, people empowered themselves through the acquisition of powerful
weapons. Unlike the traditional period, when bearing a gun was a monopoly of soldiers and
rebels, in the modern period, the action of arming with guns was socially and culturally
sanctioned. Nevertheless, this does not mean the government was willing to give up a monopoly
on violence. How to regulate gun ownership will be a theme in the next four chapters.
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 CHAPTER TWO 
Between Social Control and Popular Power:
The Circulation of Private Guns and Control Policies during the mid to late Qing, 1781-1911
Introduction
On February 29, 1908, Shen Jiaben (沈家本 1840-1913), a prominent jurist and legal
reformer of the late Qing Dynasty, presented the throne with a draft version of the criminal code
called the Current Criminal Law of the Great Qing (大清現行刑律 Daqing xianxing xinglü). The
new legal code was officially promulgated in 1910, just one year before the overthrow of the
Qing court. As a crucial part of the New Policies reform (新政 xinzheng, 1901-1911) initiated by
the Qing court to revitalize the fragile government after many years of domestic uprising and
humiliating foreign invasion, the radical revision of the traditional legal code aimed to build a
modern and independent judicial system. One prominent revision that marked a departure from
traditional criminal legal practice was the statute on private possession of weapons. Unlike the
Great Qing Code (大清律例 Daqing lüli), which strictly prohibited most common people from
possessing firearms, the new criminal law loosened the state’s grip on private firearms,
proposing that ordinary individuals be allowed to own either bird guns or foreign guns for selfdefense purposes as long as they had their weapons registered.1

1

According to the Great Qing Code, the Qing government permitted three groups of people to
carry bird guns. People living in the dangerous mountains and valleys were eligible to own
firearm against wild beast; people living along the coast could use gun to protect themselves
against pirates; ordinary individuals who lived in Gansu and Shanxi provinces were allowed to
use gun because the regions were figured by tense ethnic conflicts. See The Great Qing Code,
trans. William C. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 205-06.
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For the first time in Chinese history, the criminal code removed settled legal provisions
that only those living in remote mountainous and coastal regions could carry firearms, and even
then under strict government surveillance. In the draft statute, the state officially loosened harsh
restrictions on gun ownership. This radical change indicated judicial reformers of the late Qing
adjusted their reform agenda to the new social situation. As Shen Jiaben and his colleagues
explained,
[Right] now most bandits and robbers can obtain guns, and ordinary people are not
capable of effectively defending themselves without equally lethal firearms ….Thus, all
people should henceforth be permitted to carry foreign guns or bird guns for selfdefense.2
Bureaucrats of the late Qing were not alone in capturing the reality of social turmoil and
preparing to reassess firearm control efforts. After witnessing the increasing rates of armed
violence, Hu Xueyan (胡雪岩 1823-1885), a notable businessman of the late Qing, asked
“[Wouldn’t] it be foolish for the government to stamp out civilians’ guns, if it was incapable of
banning outlaws or bandits’ guns?”3 Shen Jiaben and Hu Xueyan’s recognition of the
government’s impotence in exercising authority over violence captures a new facet of social
reality that has been largely ignored in the existing historiography. In contrast to the High Qing
period (1680-1820) when the strong and centralized government had the capacity to secure a
monopoly on coercive power, the general social turmoil accompanying the prevalence of private
guns in late Qing local society helped shift the government away from clinging to its monopoly
on guns.
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Shen Jiaben, Current Criminal Law of Great Qing (Current criminal law of the great Qing),
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Hu Xueyan, Hu Wenzhong quanji (胡雪岩全集 Complete collection of Hu Xueyan), juan 55:3.
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The Qing government never launched a national program of firearm registration as many
modern states did. The absence of such statistics in the Qing dynasty makes any estimation of the
level of firearm dissemination tentative. However, it is clear that as accelerating domestic
rebellions, protracted military conflicts, and the process of local militarization dominated the
decades of the 1850s and after, the circulation of firearms among non-state actors increased. The
Taiping rebellion, arguably the most destructive peasant insurrection in human history to that
time, kicked off successive popular uprisings in the late nineteenth century, in which the rebels
armed themselves against the Qing troops with a mixture of obsolete Chinese weapons and
imported Western firearms against the Qing troops. The chaotic social order, by consequence,
led to a proliferation of local militia or other forms of self-defense forces in local society, which
acclimated ordinary men (and even some women) to the use of firearms. Village-based militias
(團練 tuanlian), for instance, organized by local gentry, learned to use modern guns or rifles
manufactured by foreign countries against potential threats. The presence of armed militia and
individuals, however, failed to make society safer. Local gazetteers and newspapers were still
filled with evidence of gun-provoked violence or lurid reports of armed banditry. The diffusion
of firearms in local society thus not only deteriorated social and political stability in the late
Qing, but also spurred more ordinary people to pursue comparable or more powerful weapons
for self-defense. Village elites, too, who had enhanced their status through the holding of
degrees, started exercising their power through the procurement of guns in their functions in
local defense.4

4

For example, the Qian family of Wuxi City, a great literary elite lineage in the Jiangnan region,
wasted little time to purchase foreign guns and trained local people to use them in the early
twentieth century. See Jerry Dennerline, Qian Mu and the World of Seven Mansions (New
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1988), 71-73.
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This chapter traces the dynamic process through which the state adjusted its stance
towards private weapon ownership in accordance with the changing social and political reality of
the mid to late Qing periods. Previous studies have examined thoroughly both military logistics
in the High Qing period and the late Qing’s military transformation efforts, with their focus on
weapon use in military operations. Nevertheless, the social and political implications of powerful
gun ownership by non-state actors remains unclear. As my research proves, the military use of
these weapons during the Qing period had been very much interwoven into the broader social
fabric, forcing the state to take steps to maintain the monopoly on violence. Shen Jiaben’s
proposal leads us to ask some important questions about the state’s stance over private gun
ownership. First, what were continuities and changes of firearm control policies from the mid to
the late Qing? Second, how did social ecology, geography, political considerations, and other
factors help shape the circulation mechanisms of civilian guns? Third, how did private gun
ownership affect the relationship between state and society?
Drawing on both central government documents and local sources, this chapter
introduces the manifold ways in which the state was increasingly unable to maintain its
monopoly on violence. Its novel approach was to adjust to the new social and political reality.
This chapter argues that through most of the Qing period, the private gun’s diffusion in local
society, to a large extent, was determined by the state’s stance between two ideologies: the
reliance on social power exercised through a permissive policy towards private gun ownership to
defend the localities, and the resolute maintenance of its monopoly on the most advanced
weapons. The state’s regulation and control over its armed civilians appeared as a dynamic
process, hovering between the two ideologies until the end of the Qing dynasty. In several
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important ways, the late Qing’s shifting policy towards armed civilians also left a legacy to the
Republican period.
Regulating Private Weapons before the Age of the Gun
Unlike the modern era, in which explosive small arms were widely circulated, most
ordinary people before the late nineteenth century who needed tools to fight, hunt, and protect
their property always sought weapons that were made from cold steels and other easily
accessible materials. The late Ming official Chen Renxi (陳仁錫 1581-1636), in his A
Compendium of Contemporary Regulations of the Ming Dynasty (皇明世法錄 Huang Ming shifa
lu) noted that civilians’ weapons included swords, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and
cudgels.5 It is extremely rare to find direct evidence in which armed civilians articulated their
motivation for weapon ownership and the channels through which they acquired weapons. What
can be arguably addressed here is the social and institutional foundations that made the
circulation of cold steel weapons possible in late imperial China.
Those who armed themselves with locally forged weapons did so for both practical and
institutional reasons. Practically speaking, the state’s exclusive monopoly over the use of
violence and force prevented civilians from acquiring sophisticated and advanced weapons,
compelling them to seek easily-accessible arms. Successive governments developed a highly
centralized and state-controlled mechanism for weapon production. During the Ming dynasty,
artisans and their families working in the state-run arsenals were constantly and closely
monitored. They were not allowed to leave their work places without governmental permission.
Placing these weapon artisans under strict surveillance resulted from the hereditary occupational
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Chen Renxi, Huang Ming shifa lu (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1965), vol 44. 13a-13b.
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household system (戶籍 huji), under which ordinary men and women were primarily categorized
into three groups: military (軍籍 junji), civilian (民籍 Minji), artisan (匠籍 jiangji), and saltern
(鹽籍 yanji). As historians Ray Huang and Wu Han’s works have suggested, the restrictions on
artisans were the most complicated. They were supposed to be permanently confined to their
district of registration, and their sons and close relatives were required to take over their
positions.6 Though the hereditary occupational system was finally abolished in the early
eighteenth century, most ordinary people had no means to master weapon-making techniques.
The secrecy of arsenal operations kept non-military individuals from obtaining and copying
military weapons produced by the state. Meanwhile, it was also hardly possible for them to
access the knowhow and expertise to produce these weapons, which were seen as the symbol of
the state’s coercive power. The methods of crafting sophisticated weapons, especially the
explosive firearms, could be found in numerous military texts, such as the Exploitation of the
Works of Nature (天工開物 Tiangong Kaiwu), the Treatise of Armament Technology (武備志
Wubei Zhi), and the Essentials of the Military Classics (武經總要 Wujing Zongyao). All the
military classics, however, were banned for reading in the Ming. They were ultimately buried
when the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1796) initiated the compilation of the Complete Library of
Four Treasuries (四庫全書 Siku Quanshu). In most occasions, the general public had no way to
access and even to possess firearms and advanced powerful weapons. It was the state that always
played the pioneering and leading role in the efforts at practicing weapon making technology.
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Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (New
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The state’s acquiescence to an armed populace was another reason for the possessing of
cold steel weapons. In comparison with firearms, which were subject to harsh regulation by the
Ming and Qing governments (which will be discussed below), the state rarely restricted or
prohibited civilian possession of primitive and less sophisticated weapons. This is particularly
reflected in the Great Ming Code (大明律 Da Ming lü):
In all cases where some persons among the people possess, without authorization,
prohibited military equipment such as armor for horses or men, shields, tubes of fire,
catapults for throwing fire, banners, and signaling devices, for one such item, they shall
be punished by 80 strokes of beating with the heavy stick. For each additional item, the
penalty shall be increased one degree more than that for possessing them without
authorization…. [The possession or manufacture of] bows and arrows, lances, swords,
crossbows, fishing forks, and pitchforks is not prohibited.7
According to the Code, the state attempted to make a clear division between “military”
and “civilian” weapons. Military equipment (軍器 junqi) referred to those lethal arms for regular
troop use exclusively, which included both superior cold steels and firearms, while civilian
weapons were inferior cold steels and weapons without firepower or firing capability. Under the
Code, civilians were allowed to manufacture, circulate and carry a variety of weapons that posed
less threat than military weapons.
The different treatments towards the use of military and civilian weapons in the legal
provisions, in fact, indicated the state provided some sorts of justification for the civilian
possession of cold steel weapons. The prerequisite was that their action of arming themselves
would not challenge the state authority. As an excerpt from the Official History of the Ming
Dynasty (明史 Mingshi) illustrates, the Ming government took an armed populace for granted,
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The translation comes from The Great Ming Code/Da Ming lü, trans. Jiang Yonglin (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2005), 133-134.
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and saw civilian mastery of less sophisticated arms as an integral part of regional identity and an
effective way to defend the localities:
Village troops (鄉兵 xiangbing) could be conscripted in terms of their specialization to
assist the regular troops…. [Many recruited villagers] were adept in using wolf brush (狼
筅 lang xian) and trident (叉 cha). During Chongzhen’s reign (1611-1644), village troops
from Chuan and Liao [of Zhejiang Province] were widely conscripted to suppress
wandering bandits. Besides these recruited strong men, there were also many armed
villagers who were not drafted. Peasants in the Song County of Henan Province were
good at using maohulu, and were good at fighting in mountainous regions. The counties
next to Song, including Lushi and Lingbao contained many mines. The owners employed
many village braves, who were called jiao’nao or dashou. Village braves in Shandong
were good at using long poles, while people in Xuzhou armed themselves with arrows….
The dart was widely employed in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, especially in the war at sea.
These braves had successfully defeated Japanese pirates during the Zhengtong reign.
Those salt merchants organized paramilitary forces, who armed themselves with firearm
cannon, powerful crossbow, and cart to fight against bandits.8
The reasons for the state’s tolerance of the existence of private weapons in society were
twofold. First, as discussed above, the primitive and less sophisticated weapons in local society,
in the eyes of government officials, could not challenge state military power. Second, the state
believed that the armed populace, if properly trained, could constitute an invaluable source of
military force when the social security was at stake.
An armed populace was embodied in the practice of local government during the Ming
and Qing dynasties. Of the major scholar-officials in the Late Ming, one statesman who strongly
advocated arming local villagers was LüKun (呂坤 1536-1618), a high ranking official with a

Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., Mingshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 91:2252. The Ming
founder established the weisuo 衛所 system to guard provinces. Each wei 衛 or “guards”
consisted of a guard unit of 5,600 men, which was then divided into five battalions. As a
hereditary system, these weisuo armies were scattered along the frontiers and at strategic spots.
The system declined starting from the mid-sixteenth century. The state gradually relied on
xiangbing (village troops) for local defense. As a paramilitary apparatus, the xiangbing was
formed locally and also subject to state surveillance. See Frederic E. Wakeman, Telling Chinese
History: A Selection of Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 178.
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long career in both local and provincial governments in north China provinces and central
government.9 Recognizing the widespread presence of weapons, Lüproposed to take advantage
of the armed populace, who would be beneficial to the state’s social control. His proposal on the
mechanism for local security was explicitly recorded in his Record of Practical Government (實
證錄 Shizheng lu), and revealed a reliance on collective defense that was built upon a
neighborhood basis. Lüsuggested that
[A]fter the autumn harvest was gathered in October and before the spring sowing in
March, all local adult residents in the village were expected to take their family owned
spears, swords, bow and arrows, short cudgels, rope whips and many others to receive
military training under guidance of professional instructors to chase bandits and
outlaws.10
Lü’s efforts to exploit the military potential of armed civilians was consistent with the
state promotion of the bao-jia 保甲 system, a neighborhood-based collective defense mechanism
that was adopted from the Song dynasty (960-1279). Once the Ming Empire was consolidated,
the bao-jia was readily adopted by the Ming rulers, who endowed the system with the new
function of mutual surveillance. Under the system, selected peasants were organized into militia
units and made to learn the use of arms. These units were headed by the local rural elite and also
supervised by the government. The quasi-military organization, appearing as a state-sanctioned
militia with local policing functions, as historian Philip Kuhn has argued, was designed to repel
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For a detailed biography about of LüKun, see Joanna F. Handlin, Action in Late Ming
Thought: The Reorientation of LüKun and Other Scholar-Officials (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983).
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bandits and outlaws, as well as to strengthen the state’s total control over the country through
developing collective defense corps.11
Another parallel self-defense force that was independent of the bao-jia system was the
crop-watching association described by Qi Biaojia (祁彪佳 1602-1645), a late Ming playwright
and local official. In times of famine, bandits became rampant and widespread crop loss was
hard to control. According to Qi, each village organized its police force to guard crops at harvest
time. Training in the village, crop-watching militiamen who were armed with cold steels always
offered paid service for landowners against bandits. The corps were organized voluntarily by
local elites. As historians have painstakingly documented, the Chinese imperial state possessed
limited capability for local governance, leaving a power vacuum to be filled by indigenous
gentry.12 The existence of such private armed forces attests to what sociologist Fei Xiaotong (費
孝通 1910-2005) claims about China’s “two-track politics,” in which social forces in various
forms had sprouted outside the bureaucracy.13 Appearing in the form of independent self-defense
corps, the crop-watching associations, continued to exist throughout China until the Republican
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decades (1912-1949), when the collapsing social order required more powerful collective
defense forces.14
Arming and Disarming: The Issue of the “Bird Gun” before the Late Qing
The Ming-Qing state’s authoritarian rule, under which the monarch exercised disciplinary
power and empowered ordinary people to defend themselves through individual or collective
means were inseparable aspects of the state’s social control mechanism. As we have seen, the
Ming and Qing governments did not jealously defend their exclusive monopoly on the
production and possession of certain types of arms, which were officially defined as “civilian
weapons.” Allowing law-abiding civilians to be armed with less sophisticated weapon not only
would not challenge state authority, but also assisted the state to maintain local order.
Maintenance of an effective monopoly of powerful weapons through enforcement of the law
against private possession of military weapons and reliance on armed populace for local defense
were crucial to the imperial state’s control over its territory.
Nevertheless, the model of what I term “control/reliance” began to be challenged when
the bird gun was introduced into China and diffused in society. Under this model, the state rarely
took serious efforts to measure the degree of civilian weapon ownership. State intervention in the
possession of private weapons happened only when offenders used lethal arms to conduct crimes
or rebellious activities. However, with the diffusion of the bird guns, the government consciously
tightened its control over civilian weapons, taking deliberate measures to minimize the potential

Qi Biaojia, Qi Biaojia ji 祁彪佳集 (The Collection of Qi Biaojia) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
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threat to political stability brought about by the large numbers of unregulated guns in society,
whose prowess equaled or even exceeded those of military weapons.
The Diffusion of the Matchlock Gun into Chinese Society
The matchlock gun’s arrival in China can be dated to the Jiajing 嘉靖 period (r. 15211567) of the Ming dynasty.15 When the exotic weapon crossed the sea, Chinese gave this blackpowder muzzle-loading matchlock weapon a special name, the “bird gun” or “fowling piece” (鳥
槍 niaoqiang).16 As many military historians writing from a global perspective have suggested,
the introduction of guns and other firearms indicate that China was never insulated from Western

During this period, China’s southeastern coast was constantly plagued by hordes of Japanese
pirates. The Ming writer Lang Ying (郎瑛 1486-1566) in his compendium the Classified Essays
Seven Times Revised (七修類稿 Qixiu leigao) speculated that the matchlock was probably
introduced into China by these Japanese armed pirates, who were arrested in Zhejiang province
and then instructed local arsenal artisans to manufacture the gun. A contemporary Japanese
source by Minamiura Fumi recorded that the Japanese learned the craft in manufacturing
matchlock from Portuguese travelers in the year of 1544, who landed off the coast of
Tanegashima, an island to the south of Kyushu, with a purpose to conduct formal trade with
Japan. For the introduction of matchlock into China, see Lang Ying, Qixiu leigao (reprint,
Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1963), 18:228. For a systematic study of the Japanese piracy during this
period, see Kwan-wai So, Japanese piracy in Ming China during the 16th century (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1975). According to So, many of these pirates or known as
wokou were southern coastal Chinese, joined by some Japanese. He argues that one major reason
of piracy was the population pressure during the Ming dynasty. Recent study by Gang Zhao also
highlights the advent of the Europeans in the formation of piracy. See Gang Zhao, The Qing
Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2013).
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military technology when the “Military Revolution” was initiated in the sixteenth century.17
Although the introduction of firearms had radically transformed the way of fighting, the
matchlock or bird gun was never adopted as the predominant weapon on the battlefield before
the late nineteenth century. The primary reason lay in technological restraint in the Chinese
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For the Military Revolution Theory, see Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military
Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Nevertheless, Parker’s Military Revolution Theory is not without critics. First, Parker’s
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Kenneth M. Swope, “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed during
the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592-1598,” Journal of Military History, no.1 (2005): 11-42.
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context.18 During the Qing dynasty, the state’s hesitation over the adoption of bird guns for
military use was also contingent on cultural and logistical factors.19 Although the Qing imperial
state engaged in a consistent effort to strengthen its military establishment, due to the bird gun’s
high manufacturing cost and inherent shortcomings, the new weapon remained subordinate to the
cold steel arms in military practice until the late nineteenth century. As one Japanese general
staff estimated at the end of the 1890s, only three-fifths of the Green Standard soldiers were
armed with bird guns, whose casting technique would date back to the Ming Dynasty, while the

18

When the gun first landed China, the weapon, owing to its portability and long range accuracy
was readily recognized by the renowned Ming general and strategist Qi Jiguang (戚繼光 15281587). In his military manual Miscellaneous Records (練兵實記 Lianbing Shiji), Qi exclaimed
that “the newly imported matchlock, serving as a supplement to the conventional weapons,
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ineffective use of the musket was the nature of the military challenges that Chinese armies
encountered. In comparison with bird guns and other light arms, Chinese warriors favored
cannons because they always loomed large in siege warfare. Chinese towns and cities were
always surrounded by high and strong walls and moats, which were designed not only to mark
the boundaries of administrative units, but also assumed the function of protecting the residents
against invaders. In comparison, the bird gun has its shortcomings, which were in particular
embodied in its loading time and accuracy on horseback. Late Ming military theorist Zhao
Shizhen (趙士楨 1554-1661), in his Treatise on Firearms and Their Use with Illustrations (神器
譜 Shenqi Pu), informed us that “muskets are effective on wagons, on boats, and on foot, but it
was impossible to ensure accuracy on horseback.” The complicated firing mechanism also kept
soldiers from loading quickly. The bird gun held a burning or slow match in a clamp on the end
of the curved arm known as the serpentine. To fire the gun, one had to pull the end of the
serpentine, which then ignite the priming powder in a flash-pan, which engendered flame
travelling through the main propellant charge. This ignition system, though had revolutionized
the manufacturing technology of modern weapons, had many obvious flaws− wind and rain
could extinguish the match or disperse the priming powder away from the pan. Qi Jiguang, an
enthusiast of bird gun, also could not help but recognize its drawbacks. In practice, he did not
dare to arm his soldiers with bird guns extensively, but regarded them as supplements to other
weapons. See Qi Jiguang, Lianbing shiji, in Zhongguo bingshu jicheng 中國兵書集成
(Collections of Chinese military books) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1994), vol. 19, 644; Ray
Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1981), 170-71.
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rest still used spears or swords.20 The state’s indifference towards small arms affected the degree
of its circulation in society. Without mastering the production technique of advanced weapons,
civilians’ attempts to upgrade their weapons seemed impossible.
Evidence of banditry, insurgency, and other forms of rebellious activities are
indispensable to measure the spread of arms among the population. Such armed activities
consistently drew official attention, which therefore made then part of the historical record.
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Achieving competency in shooting a bow and arrow, like the hairstyle of Manchu males and
Manchu language, appeared as one of the major means of preserving Manchu ethnic identity.
The firm adherence to the cultural tradition, in turn, hindered the extensive use of bird guns
among the elite Manchu cavalry forces. The Manchus, once the semi-nomads and warlike people
scattered beyond the Great Wall, similar with the Ming warriors, did not fully integrate the bird
gun within its military apparatus, nor did the Qing engage in developing small arms technology.
The primary military forces of the Qing army were the Eight Banners, which, as the emperor’s
hereditary military units, played a central part in consolidating the Qing power and maintaining
the Manchu identity. Even though musketry became an established part of military training for
Banner garrisons from the early Qing dynasty, archery’s predominant position had not been
shaken, as the early Qing emperors saw horsemanship and archery as essential in preserving and
consolidating a distinct Manchu cultural identity. The Yongzheng 雍正 emperor (r. 1723-1735)
more than once commanded that the Manchu banners should not allow their archery skills to
languish. Besides the Banner troops, the Qing also created the all-Chinese Green Standard Army,
the central body of regular troop dispersed throughout the empire to police the interior provinces.
Unlike some of the elite Manchu cavalry forces, the Green Standard Army soldiers were given
the rights to bear bird guns during the Yongzheng period. Although bird guns were adopted in
warfare and routine drills, the weapon was not elevated to a predominant role in military
practice. In the second Jinchuan campaign 第二次金川戰役 (1771-1776), one of the
vainglorious Emperor Qianlong’s self-proclaimed “Ten Complete Military Victories” (十全武功
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normal arrows was 478,500. For the Eight Banners and Manchu identity, see Mark C. Elliot, The
Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2001). For Yongzheng emperor’s view on musketry, see Zhao Er’xun 趙爾巽,
et al., Qingshi Gao 清史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1928), juan 130, 422. For the use of bird
guns in the second Jinchuan campaign, see Ulrich Theobald, War Finance and Logistics in Late
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Evidence also shows that these restless individuals and groups were always at pains to acquire
the most advanced weapons for their violent ends. Nevertheless, many criminal cases and
rebellion records suggest that the qualitative gap in weapon technologies between the Qing
troops and rebels in local society was still insurmountable. During the Qing dynasty, bird guns
and other firearms were not common among outlaws, bandits, and rebels as they were in the
modern period. For example, the Conspectus of Penal Cases (刑案會典 Xing’an huilan), the
largest collection of Qing criminal cases serving as legal guide for local magistrates, involved
few bird gun homicide cases before the nineteenth century. Criminals always used swords,
knives, daggers, and other nonexplosive weapons.21 The Lin Shuangwen Uprising (林爽文起義
1786-1788) was another prime example to look into how the rebel force, which was composed
largely of Ming loyalists and peasants, equipped the rebel army against Qing troops. In the early
1780s, Lin joined the Heaven and Earth Society (天地會 tiandihui), which was characterized as
both a secretive folk religious sect and a criminal organization in Taiwan.22 Within a short time,
the secret society, organized by Lin grew to some 50,000 men, many of whom were former Ming
loyalists, peasants (mostly unattached single men), and local bullies.23 In 1786, Lin’s followers
with anti-Qing resentments started a rebellion and occupied most of Taiwan within a short time
period. However, these insurgents were quickly suppressed by the government in 1786, mainly
owing to the Qing’s well equipped and disciplined troops. According to a memorial presented by
21
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Li Shiyao (李世堯 ?- 1788), the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, the government
deployed 8,468 bird guns and many other weapons for the suppression.24 In comparison, the
insurgents were mostly armed with swords, knives, arrows, and spears. Although some of them
obtained bird guns and other firearms, these weapons were in short supply for fighting against
well-equipped Qing armies. These armed rebels, though ferocious and militaristic in nature, did
not shift away the state monopoly on advanced weapons.
There are both institutional and social reasons that affected the bird gun’s relatively low
degree of circulation before the late nineteenth century. The foremost reason for bird gun’s
relatively low degree of circulation at the time certainly lies in the restrictive bird gun control
policies. Although bird guns were marginally useful in military campaigns, their greater lethality
than primitive cold steel weapons made the government suspicious over the use of them by nonmilitary individuals. In the meantime, the diffusion of bird guns in society before the late
nineteenth century was highly uneven, dependent on local conditions and the accessibility of bird
gun sources. This was particularly true in some regions where outlaws were less rampant, and
civilians’ armed self-defense was less needed. In such areas, gun-related cases rarely appeared in
the local magistrate’s archives. As Susan Naquin in her research on eighteenth- century
Shandong has suggested, the ordinary people’s indifference towards powerful weapons was due
partially to “the existence of the civil order [in eighteenth- century China] that made self-defense
unnecessary.”25 Naquin’s argument may have been valid in North China or prosperous Jiangnan
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regions, which, according to William Skinner, were garrisoned well by the Green Standard
soldiers.26
This view, however, naturally tends to minimize regional differences, assuming an
unconditional judgment that bird gun ownership was not common elsewhere. Depending on
geographic location and social conditions, regions differed greatly in how readily the bird gun
circulated among civilians during most of the Ming and Qing dynasties. Considerable empirical
evidence suggests that the carrying of bird guns was by no means a marginal activity to ordinary
people in violence-prone regions. Rather, the use of the bird gun became an integral part of local
social life in some coastal provinces. In such areas where gentry activity was either weak or
absent and the state was unable to provide sufficient support, ordinary people were more likely to
own firearms, especially the bird guns to protect themselves from becoming victims of banditry.
William Rowe’s recent research on Macheng 麻城, a county in northeastern Hubei province
which was notorious for endemic banditry, reveals that bird guns appeared among civilians in
large numbers at least during the seventeenth century.27 The use of bird guns was also
continuously reported in many feud-afflicted areas of coastal provinces. For example, owing to
scarce resources, expanding population, and unstable social ecology, constant lineage feuding
became endemic in Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Zhang Jixin (張集馨 1800-1878), the
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prefect of Tingzhanglong 汀漳龍 in Fujian province, noted in 1842 that bird guns had been
widely used in lineage feud strife in southern Fujian for years.28
As we can see, people living along the Southeast Coast and borderland areas had
encountered the bird gun earlier than those living in other areas. Bird gun users before the late
Qing were mostly anonymous peasants, who armed themselves for hunting, self-defense, or even
committing violence. Clues about the civilians’ use of firearms can be obtained from
contemporary eyewitness descriptions. The famous Cantonese scholar Qu Dajun (屈大均 16301696), writing in the early Qing dynasty, noted that “bird guns were commonly found in
Guangdong. In the hill areas, men learned to use them from the age of ten, and Xinhui County
was known for making them.”29 Existing related documents did not uncover how Guangdong
people came to learn the gun technique originally. What has been confirmed is that by Qu’s time,
southern Guangdong, in comparison with other Chinese regions, had more opportunities to come
into contact with the outside world, given its geographic adjacency to Macau, which had been
under Portuguese control since the mid-sixteenth century. Thereafter, Macau not only displayed
its pivotal position as the hub of Asian trade before the late Qing, but also served as a conduit
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through which some Chinese people living in the Pearl River Delta could witness product
innovation in the West, including cannon and quick-firing guns. 30
When the Portuguese arrived in China in the early sixteenth century they were armed
with matchlocks. In his detailed analysis of Macau’s fortification and weapons, historian Richard
Garrett finds that frequent coastal attack from pirates offered the Portuguese settlers a great
incentive for the development of firearms in Macau, which later became an important source of
armament to Japan, China, and other countries in Southeastern Asia.31 Portuguese adventurer
Antonio Fialho Fereira, who travelled to Macau in 1640, noted that “a great quantity of powder,
many matchlocks, and arquebuses, which likewise made there, and are sold very cheaply albeit
that they are amongst the best in the world.”32
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Figure 8: Macau in China. SOURCE: https://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/timeline.htm#maps.
Macau’s role as the primary source of foreign armament had been consistently in place
until the mid-nineteenth century. Firearm trafficking and gunrunning in Macau along with their
impact on social order, despite appearing sporadically, always elicited a great deal of official
attention during the Qing dynasty. In the ninth year of his reign (1804), the Jiaqing 嘉慶 emperor
(r. 1796-1820) issued an edict to the Macau sub-prefectural magistrate on the prevalence of
firearm trafficking from Macau to Guangdong. The emperor complained that “contraband trade
flourished in Macau. Profit-driven barbarians from the West in Macau sold saltpeter, sulfur, and
military weapons openly without checking their clients’ identity. Firearms falling into the hands
of civilians seemed inevitable.”33 Recognizing rebels and bandits might arm themselves with
contraband weapons, the Jiaqing emperor urged local magistrates to interrogate Chinese buyers
seriously, if caught, about the origins and use of their firearms. To uphold social order, he also
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required local officials to submit annual reports with respect to any firearm-involved incidents in
Macau and surrounding vicinity.
The Jiaqing emperor was hardly the first statesman who voiced complaints about the illicit
firearm trade. Five years later, a similar complaint came from Peng Zhaoshun (彭兆順 1758-?),
the Magistrate of Xiangshan 香山 County, who was famous for stamping out pirates activities
along the Guangdong coast during the Qianlong-Jiaqing period.34 In his memorials and private
writings, Peng had more than once expressed the frustration with the uncontrollable gun-running
activities that led to a general breakdown in public order. Although the Qing government enacted
strict firearm laws to ban non-military people from owning and distributing firearms of any
kinds, officials quickly found their efforts at stamping out gun trafficking were undermined by
manufacturers and dealers in Macau, who were free of central control, owing much to the
pluralistic polity, and by Guangdong civilians with powerful desire of arming themselves for
violent purposes. After the Portuguese established a settlement on the Macau peninsula in 1557,
the Chinese government rarely claimed jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the
islands. Recent research by Par Cassel suggests that the Qing government only claimed
jurisdiction “in cases where Chinese had been killed by foreigners.”35 Such a pluralistic legal
order prevented Chinese governments from suppressing gun-running activities in foreign
settlements, through which foreign weapons found their way into Chinese coastal regions.
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Nor were bird guns in China ever exclusively smuggled from Macau and other coastal areas.
Rather, private guns scattered in societies for the most part were locally produced.36 The bird gun
became a favored weapon in some violence prone regions because it was relatively easy to make
without less sophisticated techniques. In a period marked by “esteeming literacy while despising
martiality” (重文輕武 zhong wen qing wu), bird gun owners were traditionally either illiterate or
semi-literate, including hunters, peasants, or other outlaws. It can be assumed that the
construction method was not complicated, and could be transmitted through oral narratives.
Given what has been addressed about the government’s monopoly on the manufacture of any
types of firearms, it remains unknown in what exact ways the details of bird gun technology got
diffused. As suggested above, the Ming government carried out the “status system” strictly,
under which the artisans in state arsenals were constantly and closely monitored. The system
became loose after the sixteenth century, and was ultimately abolished by the Yongzheng
emperor to establish a society with “commoner equality.”37 It can be assumed that those artisans,
who mastered the skill of producing bird guns in state arsenals, were no longer treated as slaves
during the Qing period. One criminal case filed in the Xingan huilan, reveals that Wang Si, a
native inhabitant of Beijing, worked for an iron shop to manufacture bird guns for the state
arsenal. He took this occasion to sell numerous bird guns to his neighbors and instructed them to
make firearms privately.38 Once these artisans were no longer under tight control, as Wang Si’s
case shows, it was entirely possible that these artisans transmitted gun making techniques. By the
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end of the nineteenth century, the bird gun was not regarded as an exotic import, but rather a
weapon that could be forged indigenously, though its diffusion was not prevalent nationwide.
Disarming Civilians: Bird Gun Control during the Qing Dynasty
As addressed above, the Ming government did not place severe restraints on the civilian
possession of cold steel weapons, mainly because the state had the capability, resources, and
confidence in maintaining its monopoly on power and violence. In its legal code, the Ming
government did not enact any statutory provision to prohibit or limit possession of guns. This
was probably because the relatively low degree of bird gun circulation was not worthy of
political attention. However, the state’s policy towards civilian possession of arms, especially
bird guns, began to move to another direction during the Qing period. Alarmed by the bird gun’s
lethal power and its potential to impair central authority, the Qing rulers in the mid-nineteenth
century moved to strengthen the regulations regarding the bird gun’s use and circulation. As this
section will show, the state’s attitude towards private possession of bird gun was by no means
static, but was a dynamic process, which was contingent on the social situation and political
deliberations.
As aliens, the Qing emperors were deeply distrustful of Han Chinese, which prompted
them to ensure that elite Manchu forces had better weapons than Chinese soldiers and populace.
During the Qing period, the type of gun that qualified individuals carried was determined by
their political status. The Qing emperors were by no means insulated from the changes in gun
technology initiated in the West.39 In the early seventeenth century, a more advanced musket
with flintlock mechanism was invented, transforming the traditional matchlock musket which
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employed a flammable wick to ignite the powder. The flintlock musket arrived in China first and
foremost as a gift from Western travelers or foreign envoys. As suggested by the Qing’s royal
collections, the Qing emperors, being aware of the rapid development of gun technology in
Western Europe, deliberately maintained the use of flintlock muskets for royal use exclusively.
The most advanced guns were labeled as “for imperial use (御用 yuyong)” indicating these guns
were reserved for the exclusive use of the emperor. 40
With respect to the guns for military use, the allocation was highly hierarchical. Recent
work by Ulrich Theobald and Yingcong Dai on the Qing’s war expenditure and logistics suggest
that the eight banner garrisons which were stationed at the capital were allowed to be armed with
the most advanced bird guns to guard the emperor and his noble family. What followed were
other Manchu banner soldiers scattered among local provinces, who armed with less powerful
guns. The last category was the Green Standard Troops, who were poorly equipped with obsolete
matchlocks.41 Though skill in archery remained an essential part of Manchu identity, as
addressed above, they still made efforts to retain their exclusive rights over the most
sophisticated and developed military equipment.
Just as with the cautious policy on military use of bird guns in military use, the control of
bird guns among civilians became an inseparable aspect of Manchu rulership that guaranteed its
legitimate power over Chinese subjects. The Qing rulers, for the most part, granted people the
right to arm themselves with civilian weapons. Nevertheless, the definition of “civilian weapon”
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during the Qing changed over time. As the Manchus entered the Great Wall in 1644 and settled
down in China proper, the alien rulers learned the lessons passed down by the Ming dynasty.
Having witnessed the rise of a highly-militarized population in the areas like the northwest,
where armed peasants on many occasions joined rebel armies, the early Qing rulers soon banned
any non-military individuals from possessing weapons.42 In 1648, the Board of War ordered the
local magistrate to confiscate all manner of weapons owned by peasants. In the meantime, the
state placed people under surveillance with the adoption of the bao-jia system. Under the
community-based system, village residents were under tight administrative control. The chief of
each bao unit was responsible for reporting any private weapons to local government in his
jurisdiction.43
The early Qing policy with respect to private arms reflected the anxieties of alien
conquerors especially when their attempts to establish solid control could be hindered by a
highly militarized population. The policy did not last long, as less than a year later it had been
replaced by a new order, requiring local magistrates to return all the confiscated weapons to their
owners and also ensure their rights to possess them.
Recently we have heard that the people have no weapons and cannot repel aggressors.
Bandits on the other hand can profit, and the good people have to endure bitter and
poisonous [misfortunes]. Now we think that the weapons and armor which the people
originally ought not to have had, and which were strictly forbidden in the past, such as
muskets, fowling pieces, bows and arrows, knives, spears, and horses, ought now to be
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retained in their possession and not forbidden. Return to their original owners those
[weapons] which were initially turned over to the officials.44
This imperial edict issued in the sixth year of Shunzhi’s 順治 reign (1644-1661)
indicated the state’s stance over private procession of weapons changed greatly from what it had
envisioned. One striking difference was the Qing government’s definition of civilian weapons,
which included not only cold steel weapons as formulated during the Ming period, but also bird
guns. The order also distinguished the “good people,” from “bandits.” The former group, which
belonged to the bao-jia units were again granted the right to own guns for self-defense.
Thereafter, the state did not place any particular restriction on the proper use of the bird
guns, but regarded putting some kinds of weapons in the hands of peasants as a potential way to
guard the localities against bandits and potential rebels. Huang Liuhong 黃六鴻, a district
magistrate of the early Qing and the author of the Complete Book of Happiness and Benevolence
(福惠全書 Fuhui quanshu), the largest magistrate handbook in existence, advocated the arming
of peasants for local defense. In his book, Huang urged that village braves’ important role in
guarding localities would be strengthened by instructing them to shoot with bird guns.45 Though
the bird guns were not widely diffused among these village braves, who were still primarily
armed with cold steel weapons, Huang’s suggestion indicated that arming qualified individuals
in local society with bird guns was permitted at least in the early Qing.
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Huang’s stance rested on two assumptions. First, when local peasants armed themselves
with bird guns, they had the power to deter or fight against bandits, whose weapons were much
weaker. Second, these peasants who received proper military training would not join the bandits
against the state and disturbed local communities. These two assumptions, however, became the
Qianlong emperor’s major worries decades later. This is shown in an edict issued by him in
1777. In this year, Guotai (郭泰 ? -1872) , the governor of Shandong province and one of
Qianlong’s most favored officials, presented a memorial to the emperor, requesting approval to
train village braves with bird gun shooting for collective defense. Qianlong rejected his request
by arguing that
The village braves were used to arrest robbers and bandits, and guard local barns. They
were supposed to assist regular troops and played similar roles. However, they were
ordinary peasants, and possessed many different characters from soldiers. If they became
skilled at shooting with bird guns, and then conducted illegal activities, that would be
disastrous for local society…. For instance, if Wang Lun and his followers mastered bird
guns, we would not suppress them so easily. 46
The same year that Guotai sent his memorial, Gao Jin (高晉 1706-1779), the governorgeneral of Liangjiang (covering the provinces of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui), put forth his
proposal to the emperor that the imperial military examination should be revised to examine
candidates on bird guns, which would be more pragmatic than swinging swords.47 Qianlong was
enraged and firmly rejected his idea. Fearful that village braves with bird guns in their hands
might endanger local security and be harder to suppress, Qianlong once again ordered his
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provincial officials to replace the existing firearms with bows and arrows. The emperor sharply
denounced Gao Jin for his ignorance of the bird gun’s potential risk:
If bird gun shooting becomes a component of military examinations, military talents will
practice shooting frequently, which might give rise to the illicit production and
trafficking of gunpowder and lead shot. Both are contraband in society. The growing
number of ordinary people who are capable of shooting in a single county will
undoubtedly generate a great deal of influence over local society.48
Why did the Qianlong emperor issue an order radically departing from the policy adopted
by the Shunzhi Emperor, who regarded arming the common people as an effective way to repel
bandits? The Wang Lun rebellion, as Qianlong mentioned in his 1777 edict, made the emperor
reassess Qing policy on the use of bird guns by peasants. Wang Lun was the leader of the White
Lotus in Shandong Province. As a sect master skilled in meditating and healing, he quickly
gathered several thousand followers and rebelled in 1774, to create a religious community. After
successfully occupying several cities in Shandong province, the insurgents were suppressed by
the well-equipped Qing defenses within a month.49 General Shuhede (舒赫德 1710-1777), who
was in charge of the suppression, wrote a memorial to Qianlong:
The quick suppression of the Wang Lun Uprising not only benefited from the brave and
skillful warriors in the battle, but was also due to the factor that insurgents were poorly
equipped. Most of them were not armed with bird guns. It thus could be argued that the
possession of bird guns mattered a lot and deserved our attention. If we do not take steps
to prohibit these private guns, I am worried it may incur serious influence in the future. I
think all the merchants and peasants should not be allowed to own guns. Local
magistrates should confiscate all the bird guns in their jurisdictions…. In so doing, there
will be no illegal bird guns in local society, which will avoid rebellious activities in a
long run. 50
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Shuhede in his edict presented his anxiety over the potential threat posed by the bird gun
owners in local society. In 1781, the forty-sixth year of Qianlong’s reign, the emperor approved
Shuhede’s suggestion and issued an imperial edict forbidding the private manufacture of bird
guns. He proclaimed that:
The private manufacture of bird guns in local society has always been a prohibited
behavior for ordinary civilians. Provincial Commanders (dufu), however, did not take this
issue into serious consideration in their daily affairs, leading to the emergence of this
phenomenon. As a result, some outlaws might take this occasion to conduct illegal
activities, rather than using guns for self-defense purpose or weeding out the wicked
criminals. Thus, I order all provincial commanders to investigate this issue in your
jurisdiction to guarantee that no artisans manufactures or sells bird guns. If private
possession of bird guns is detected, their guns should be confiscated. Provincial
commanders also need to report all the cases to the emperor annually.51
Qianlong’s edict shows his genuine concern over the prevalence and ready availability of
bird guns in local society and their threat to public security. The year after Qianlong issued the
edict, provincial commanders continuously sent memorials to the emperor, reporting how the
bird gun regulation policy was implemented, regardless of whether any private guns were
detected in their respective jurisdiction. For the most part, local magistrates always asked the
chief of each bao-jia unit to report any bird guns found in their jurisdictions. For the confiscated
bird guns, local government would pay a minimum amount of money to their owners. They also
notified local artisans that making bird guns was prohibited. According to the annual statistics
reported by provincial governors through the palace memorial system, more than forty-four
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thousand bird guns were confiscated from the forty-sixth year to fifty-ninetieth year of
Qianlong’s reign. 52
Provinces

Amounts of Confiscated Guns

Year

Sichuan

16,987

1782-1792

Jiangxi

14,500

1782-1793

Fujian

4500

1782-1792

Yunnan

927

1782-1783

Shaanxi

800

1782-1786

Henan

40

1782-1793

Hunan

100

1782-1793

Guizhou

2,100

1782-1784

Hubei

350

1781-1792

Zhili

120

1782-1787

Table 1: The Confiscation of Bird Guns (1781-1787)
Under Qianlong’s order, the ordinary people were deprived of the right to self-defense
with bird guns. The early Qing’s effective gun control policy depended on distinguishing
between “good people” and “bandits,” and between “civilian weapons” and “military weapons.”
Under the bao-jia system, the “good people” were permitted to own “civilian weapons,”
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including bird guns, for self-defense. The Wang Lun Uprising set off an alarm about the danger
of the existence of an armed populace in local society. The 1781 edict on bird gun control not
only indicated the government’s firm intent to guard its monopoly on the production and
distribution of powerful weapons, but also reflected the rulers’ anxiety when encountering a
militarized population who had potential against his legitimate control.
The Introduction of Foreign Guns in the Late Qing
While the number of bird guns in circulation appeared moderate during Qianlong’s reign,
authorities still banned civilian gun ownership to prevent popular insurgent movements. Until the
early twentieth century, the Qing government had no intent to mitigate the prohibition. The strict
control measure had, to some extent, limited firearm ownership before the late nineteenth
century. The state’s indifference towards the application of advanced firearms in the military also
circumscribed ordinary people’s opportunities to upgrade their weapons.
Even in Guangdong, for example, where a militarized society was being formed, local
militia and peasants still used a mixture of cold steels and antiquated bird guns up to the midnineteenth century. When the British troops attacked Guangdong in May 1841, local peasants in
Sanyuanli 三元里, a market town near the port city, displayed resolute determination and
bravery to resist the invasion of the imperialists. A contemporary account by Lin Fuxiang (林福
祥 ?-1862), a local gentryman who recruited villagers to defend the town, revealed that ordinary
men and women largely turned iron agricultural tools such as swords, axes, plowshares, and hoes
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into weapons.53 Concerning the firearms, as a British military officer noted with contempt, only a
slight number of less accurate matchlocks could be found among Chinese villagers.54
However, the balance between state power and popular force was destabilized and
ultimately toppled from the late nineteenth century when the Qing dynasty entered a period of
decline. As China suffered from both Western imperialist penetration and domestic unrest, the
gradually decreasing power of the state eventually made the strict gun control impossible. As the
ruling elites realized the need to modernize China’s defense industry, many non-state groups or
ordinary individuals started pursuing foreign guns or replacing their outmoded bird guns with
modern ones for purposes of self-defense or committing violence. As this section will describe,
the political decentralization and chaotic social order of the late Qing allowed the government to
reexamine its stance towards private gun ownership in the new social situation.
Orthodox and Heterodox Camps: the Circulation of Foreign Guns in Local Society
For many late Qing ruling elites, China’s vulnerability to foreign invasion from the 1840s
onwards was viewed in terms of the tremendous gap in weapon power between China and that of
the West. While the small arms technology in the West was advancing rapidly, undergoing what
has been dubbed the “breech-loader revolution,” China’s efforts to augment its armed strength
had diminished in the midst of stability and prosperity from the eighteenth century. 55 In the
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Opium War (1839-1842), the British army outfitted with modern warships and artillery easily
defeated Qing army troops which were armed largely with obsolete weapons. The humiliating
failure did not set off alarm bells for the Chinese bureaucrats that prompted a fundamental
military reform, though some statecraft scholars like Wei Yuan (魏源 1794-1857) called for
“learning the barbarians’ techniques to subdue them.”56 A little over ten years later, China’s
military failure in the second Opium War (Arrow War) once again demonstrated the unparalleled
development in military capabilities between China and the West. The Mongolian general
Sengge Rinchen (僧格林沁 1811-1865), who failed to resist the attack of the Anglo-French
alliance troops at the Dagu Forts, lamented that even the banner garrisons in Tongzhou (a suburb
of Beijing) were rarely armed with firearms, and were powerless to deter the mighty enemies.57
Responding to the embarrassing defeats after 1842 when Western imperialism accelerated the
political encroachment on Chinese mainland, and to the domestic popular movements including
the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1854) and the Nian Rebellion (1851-1868), Qing statecraft literati
who saw possession of advanced weapons as a guarantee of military efficacy advocated military
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modernization.58 As numerous scholars have pointed out, the significance of these initiatives
which appeared for the first time in China’s military annals, lay not only in providing the Qing
officials with the weapons to fight rebels or defend themselves, but also in their pivotal roles in
the introduction of Western science and modern technology.59
After the mid-nineteenth century, as some reform-minded officials vigorously
implemented military reform, the state’s monopoly over the most advanced weapons, of which
the imperial government used to be proud began to be loosened. As China became gradually
integrated into the global arms network, some modern firearms either imported from abroad or
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manufactured domestically occasionally appeared in local society. In Eastern Guangdong, for
instance, which was famous for its frequent lineage and village feuds, local inhabitants quickly
adopted Western-type rifles, which were brought in from nearby Hong Kong or Macau in
committing communal violence.60 The presence of the foreign gun was gradually not regarded as
a novelty in some urban areas as well. One prominent example was the armed escort companies,
known as biaoju 鏢局, which had developed during the Ming and Qing dynasties to provide
security services for wealthy individuals and merchant caravans. By the end of the nineteenth
century, Beijing dwellers were accustomed to seeing these escorts, who were also expert martial
artists, wandering in the street with foreign guns in hand.61 Serious offenders like bandits or
rebels with intent to injure others, too, actively acquired guns to facilitate crime. Late Qing
officials were well aware of the potential threat posed by these illegal gun owners. Gun shooting
was not an item to be tested in imperial military examination from Qianlong’s reign onward. The
frequent report on the armed banditry allowed the naval commander Zhang Peilun (張佩俊
1848-1903) to comment, “if offenders have armed themselves with foreign guns, can the military
candidates (武生 wusheng) who were just adept at bow and arrow beat them?”62
Apart from regular troops and modern police forces, gun carriers during the late Qing
were comprised of a variety of people, including but not limited to gentry-led militia forces,
ordinary peasants, urban dwellers, rebels, and bandits. It is also difficult to determine which
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types of guns these people carried. When gun-involved violence appeared in late Qing
newspapers or government documents, the brand or other details of the weapons were seldom
identified; rather they were roughly classified into “native” (土 tu) or “foreign” (洋 yang). The
match-loading gun transferred from Japan during the Ming dynasty had already been
indigenized, and was called the bird gun or local gun (土槍 tuqiang), while the new Western gun
was given the prefix “yang”, which served to denote their superiority over the traditional ones.
However, as Sherman Cochran suggests, Chinese people’s distinction between “Chinese” and
“Western” was very broad and inexplicit.63 Similarly, though some major modernizers like Li
Hongzhang had an intimate knowledge of foreign weapons and their respective performance,
most civilian gun carriers lacked such expertise, labeling them simply as general foreign guns, no
matter their place of production.64
The emergence of armed forces in local society during the late nineteenth century
confirmed what scholars like Philp Kuhn have characterized about the militarized nature of
Chinese local society. As suggested by Kuhn, the nineteenth-century militarization of local
society “could be visible within both the orthodox, gentry-dominated Confucian culture and the
various heterodox, secret-society dominated sectarian subcultures.”65 The village tuanlian
militia, which was always tied with other militia nearby and developed into regional army
embodied the orthodox side of militarization. Bandit bands, secret societies, or “communities in
arms” such as the Taiping rebel armies constituted the heterodox aspect of militarization. In a
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general sense, the primary distinction between the two modes of militarization is that militia
forces had no intent to challenge state authority, though their existence objectively decentralized
state power, while the latter behaved to disrupt social order and stability. Borrowing Kuhn’s
theoretical framework to categorize late Qing private gun ownership in the shadow of increasing
militarization, it can be assumed that gun carriers could also be detected within both the orthodox
and heterodox camps.
When massive social unrest, ranging from the unremitting popular movements, frequent
banditry, to the foreign encroachments, became chronic problems from the mid-nineteenth
century, the Qing government’s central authority and capability to maintain local order were
gravely damaged. As the Taiping and Nian rebellions reached their climax in the 1860s, the
government again emphasized the role of popular power in stabilizing social order, as
exemplified by the local gentry-led private defense organizations.66 Known as tuanlian or
“grouping and drilling,” the quasi-official armies and their other administrative functions in local
society indicated the devolution of central power and the emergence of militarism, which allows
scholars like Franz Michael to use “regionalism” to define the late Qing’s political structure.67
One of the tuanlian militia’s distinct features compared with the Banner and Green
Standard armies were the adoption of Western weapons. In the rural areas, tuanlian were mostly
organized by influential local landlords, who were responsible for recruiting mercenaries,
building fortifications, acquiring weapons, and training militia members to defend the localities.
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The tuanlian’s private and semi-independent nature made the leaders better able to seek
advanced weapons, as long as they received local magistrate approval. In the regions that had
easy access to the weapons market and purchasing power, foreign guns were more likely to be
adopted by tuanlian members. For example, in the early 1900s, a gentry association in
Guangdong’s Xinning County wrote the local government demanding approval to purchase
firearms for organizing militia. The request was promptly granted, allowing the militia leaders to
purchase 1550 foreign guns from nearby Hong Kong. In the coastal provinces like Guangdong,
the wealthy gentry probably had little difficulty procuring foreign guns from Hong Kong and
Macau. As Guangdong Governor Guo Songtao lamented in 1880, “foreign guns were sold
without any restrictions.”68
Militia forces also surged in newly emerging commercial cities like Shanghai, Suzhou,
and Tianjin to preserve local peace in the crisis of war and social unrest. Following in the
footsteps of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps (上海商團 shanghai shangtuan) which was
established in 1853 to defend the Shanghai International Settlement, Chinese merchants
organized a militia in the city’s Chinese district in 1907. The militia, as Elizabeth Perry and
Bryna Goodman’s works point out, substantially remedied the government’s manpower shortage
to quell the opium den crisis (1910) and rice riots (1911).69 The local government thus was not
afraid to trust the militia with powerful arms. Once receiving permission from the governorgeneral of Liangjiang, Shanghai Daotai Cai Naihuang supplied the militia 120 “seven-nine”
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rifles and 5000 bullets, and also issued a license to purchase guns. As one memoir suggests,
almost all the militia members had guns in hand at the militia’s inception.70 Almost
simultaneously with Shanghai, Suzhou merchants Ni Kaiding 倪開鼎 and Hong Yulin 洪毓麟
organized the Suzhou Merchant Sports Association (蘇商體育會 Sushang tiyu hui), which later
evolved into the militia corps (蘇州商團 Suzhou shangtuan). In early 1907, the Association was
allowed to purchase 50 Mauser rifles and 10,000 bullets from Shanghai’s foreign trade
companies.71
The militia forces, the above mentioned armed escort companies, and ordinary armed
civilians were overwhelmingly defensive in nature, and their gun ownership was visible to the
government, while armed outlaws posed explicit threats to social order and state power. The
rebel forces, ranging from the tremendously destructive Taiping rebels to the heterodox secret
societies and bandits, all actively sought to purchase or smuggle foreign weapons, though some
of these groups were anti-foreign zealots. The primary motive of their actions was essentially to
bring about radical changes in political and social spheres, while the foreign gun acquisition and
possession could facilitate that end. For instance, when the Taiping Army reached the Suzhou
and Shanghai area in 1860, the military commander Li Xiucheng (李秀成 1823-1864) was very
taken with foreign guns and cannons. Though the major weapon-supplier countries adopted a
neutral stance towards the Taiping and prohibited producers from selling military weapons to the
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army, Li was able to get his favored ammunition through an underground channel from
Shanghai. As the North-China Herald noted in 1860:
[I]t may be scarcely credible to honest folk in Shanghai that during the whole time the
firing was going on from the allied troops, Europeans from among us, one or two of them
received as, at least, respectable persons, were actually engaged at various places up the
two rivers selling the insurgents gunpowder and arms; the gunpowder under the name of,
and packed like Chinese snuff!72
A few years earlier, the Small Sword Society (小刀會 xiaodaohui), a branch of the
underground Heaven and Earth Society, staged an uprising and captured Shanghai in 1853. The
rebel leaders took advantage of Shanghai’s position as a major port of weapon smuggling,
acquiring flintlocks and gunpowder from Western traffickers. In his memorial to the court, the
governor-general of Liangjiang Yi Liang (怡良 1791-1867) expressed his deep anxiety regarding
the rebel’s acquisition of more advanced guns. “The ruffians bought brass caps and flintlocks
from vicious Westerners. Without firing match and powder, these guns were not vulnerable to
the rainy condition.”73 The rebels’ adoption of foreign guns had promised to diminish the Qing’s
military advantage. As Yi Liang depicted the battle scene, “when the rebels attack the city wall,
their bullets, falling like rain, were a lot harder to avoid than shells, which caused a lot of
injuries.”74 In the 1850s, most Chinese armies were still armed with a mixture of cold steels and
inferior matchlocks. Whereas, the secret societies like the Small Sword Society were able to get
some better arms, which increased the difficulty of suppression. The uprising had not been
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utterly subdued until two years later, following joint operations by the Qing military and the
Western powers. As we have seen above, one reason for Qianlong’s quick suppression of the
mid-Qing rebellions initiated by Wang Lun in Shandong and Lin Shuangwen in Taiwan during
the eighteenth century lay in the fact that the weapons of regular troops were far superior to those
of their antagonists. Comparatively, what can be drawn from the armed rebellions of the late
Qing is that the state’s monopoly over advanced weapons began to dissolve. The late Qing’s
frequent ensuing receptiveness to foreign technology imports, including foreign firearms, added
to the complexity of the state’s firearm control, which lasted until the fall of the dynasty in 1911.
If we scrutinize other forms of what Philip Kuhn termed the heterodox camps of military
force, the outlaws with no revolutionary agenda constituted another important category of
firearm carriers. These outlaws were largely comprised of robbers spread through both urban and
rural areas, Robin Hood-like gangsters hid in the mountainous regions, and some spontaneous or
casual criminals who committed violence with pre-supposed motives. Like other agrarian
societies, the activities of these outlaws became an imperative part of China’s social ecology
which ran through the whole Qing dynasty. In the criminal documents or other official written
records, the government used the general term bandits (賊 zei) to identify them. These men and
women, who depended on the use of violence to achieve their purposes, were typically eager to
pursue the new, more powerful weapons. Through their illicit activities, their weapon choice, and
acquisition channels were shown, which provides particular perspective to gauge how military
innovation penetrated into local society.
Even though there are no official statistics available on firearm-related crime in Imperial
China, instances of armed conflict were observed in many different textual forms. During the
Qing dynasty, most severe criminal cases were reported to and handled by the local magistrates
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first, who then were obliged to report some issues that were considered of primary significance
to the central bureaucracy.75 Most cases involving large-scale violence, armed conflict, or
homicide were considered extremely serious incidents, which were required to be reported to the
central government. The local officials, who were normally subject to multi-layer oversight were
unlikely to hide the problems.76 The ministry officials in the capital would send some
representative ones to the emperor. Besides these regular memorials (known as tiben 題本), the
energetic emperors from Kangxi onward had increasingly used the “secret palace memorial”
system to get across local information from his inner circle of trusted officials, including local
officials, inspecting censors, and even retired officials.77 After the death of one emperor, the
annalists would organize tons of memorials and edicts, including the ones related to violence and
firearm-relate crime into chronological order, which were then published in the Veritable
Records of the Qing (清實錄 Qing Shilu) for later reference.78 During the whole Qing dynasty,
most cases involving large-scale violence, armed conflict, or homicide were considered
extremely serious incidents, which were required to be reported to the central government. The
local officials, who were normally subject to multi-layer oversight were unlikely to hide the
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problems.79 Certainly, these records were by no means completely comprehensive but
represented a considerable amount of information about the gun-related cases nationwide
through which the penetration of private guns and its social consequences might be assessed. 80

Table 2: The Frequency of Armed Robbery in Late Qing
The incidence of armed robbery and banditry gave an explicit indicator of the circulation
of firearms in society. Several points emerge from this trending chart. First, among the heterodox
groups, the bandits or robbers lagged behind in adopting advanced weapons. Before the 1860s,
no criminal case involving the use of a foreign gun was reported, whereas the insurgent forces
like the Taipings or Small Sword Society had already acquired some sophisticated weapons from
munitions dealers. The diffusion of foreign weapons among bandits or robbers had occurred
coincidentally with the Qing state’s military modernization efforts. Second, from the 1860s
onward, the number of criminal cases involving foreign guns far exceeded the number of birdgun related crimes. Although the flow of the reported cases to the central bureaucracy was not
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huge, these cases to some extent indicate that aggressive outlaws exhibited a penchant for
foreign-style arms. With the coming of quick-firing guns, there were indications that the lowquality bird guns gradually were replaced by more advanced ones. The proliferation and use of
foreign guns by these outlaws after the 1860s exemplified what historians have argued about the
endemicity of violent conflict in Chinese society, which was not limited to the major uprisings
and rebellions.81
The Unstable Relations between the State and Orthodox Armed Forces
The foreign invasions and persistent civil unrest from the early nineteenth century
appeared as the catalysts for the spread of Western firearms. The government found itself in a
difficult position to restrict the heterodox camps from obtaining the powerful guns from an
underground production and distribution network. As we have seen above, the fierce Taiping
rebellion and the widespread peasant revolts which plagued the Qing Dynasty from the midnineteenth century allowed the government to delegate power to orthodox local elites who were
encouraged to organize armed self-defense forces. One significant departure from the earlier
strict control of firearms was that these collective defense forces were sanctioned to use firearms,
either low-quality local guns or foreign guns, to defend their own interests when the state was
unable to perform its police functions. These burgeoning militias, either gentry’s rural tuanlian
scattered throughout the country or Merchants’ Volunteer Corps established in the major
commercial cities, were all under official supervision. The Chinese term “official oversight and
popular management (官督民辦 guandu minban)” was suitable to describe the relationship
between the militia and the government. As mentioned above, the orthodox local elites who had
no means to stockpile the needed weapons always resorted to local and provincial governments’
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assistance, who might either agree to borrow or sell them the surplus or obsolete firearms, or
approve their request to purchase foreign weapons through intermediaries in foreign concessions.
For example, in 1907, the Suzhou militia leaders wrote to the city’s merchants’ association,
expressing their eagerness to practice shooting in military drills.
Without practicing shooting with rifles, the militia must be deficient, nor could our spirit
be kindled… Now some obsolete firearms, which were no longer used by the Army, sat
idle in the Arsenal Bureau. These old guns would be adequate for the militia to drill...
Only then could the merchant corps worthy of the name be established to protect the local
community and public welfare.82
After deliberate consideration, the Jiangsu provincial government approved the militia
leaders’ request to borrow forty-two quick rifles. Another similar organization in Wuxi, a major
commercial hub adjacent to Suzhou, chose to purchase Mauser rifles and bullets from Shanghai’s
foreign corporation (洋行 yanghang), upon approval by the provincial government.83
Obviously, given the semi-independent nature of local genty-led militias, their acquisition
of firearms was contingent on a host of social and political factors, including the affordability
and accessibility of weapons, the necessity of advanced arms in defense determined by local
governments, and the consistency of official sponsorship. First, like the bird gun’s initial
diffusion trajectory, the foreign gun’s circulation was remarkably impacted by the new weapon’s
uneven distribution between the coastal and interior provinces, and between peaceful and
violence-prone areas. As seen in cases mentioned above, wealthy regions or the areas with better
access to weapon sources always spawned well-equipped militias and vice versa. A good
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example is the militia of Shawan, a township in southwestern Canton. By the early 1910s, as one
internal document shows, the militia was equipped with fifty Mauser rifles (single-shot), seventy
muti-shot rifles, thirty Mauser-type gingals, and ninety traditional bird guns or gingals.84 At
about the same time, some militias of northern provinces took advantage of Tianjin’s position as
the area’s primary gateway for the flow of foreign goods to purchase foreign arms. Local gentry
of Zhili Province’s Linyu County 臨與縣 successfully raised money to purchase two hundred
Mauser rifles and other small arms in Tianjin to arm the militia against constant banditry.85
Comparatively, in some inland provinces, the relatively advanced weapons among militia troops
hardly appeared in common use. One such case is that of the militia in Shangcai County of
Henan Province. As the magistrate of this chronically poor county, Xu Shouzi (徐壽茲 18521917) was deeply aware that the region’s endemic banditry stemmed from disrupted social
conditions. He advocated organizing highly trained militia by local gentry in each village against
gangs of bandits. Regarding weapon use, Xu approved the production of traditional bird guns or
gingalls locally, while ignoring some local gentry’s request to procure more expensive foreign
guns, for his was anxious about the financial burden incurred as a consequence of weapon
acquisition.86
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Second, we should also bear in mind that these gentry-led local militias were encouraged
and mobilized only when the state had a pressing need to maintain social order. That means the
state viewed an armed militia as an extension of state power, while simultaneously being wary of
such force. The milita’s potential for thwarting centralization endeavors was not ignored by
major statesmen. Yuan Shikai (袁世凱 1859-1916), for example, himself exhibited deep distrust
of local gentry and indigenous forces. Rather, as Stephen MacKinnon points out, he was
dedicated to training the New Army in Tianjin, fully employing a top-down initiative during the
late decades of the Qing dynasty.87 As many historians have evidently proven, the militarization
of local society after the mid-nineteenth century was not persistent, as many militias were not
supported by the government or dissolved naturally after the defeats of the Taiping and Nian in
South China.88 When the local order was undermined by the Boxers and foreign powers in the
late 1890s, the Qing court’s initiative to meet the new challenges paralleled what they had done
in the 1850s and 1860s, through forming and training militias in North China to defend the
country.
The inconsistency of government policy and the lack of trust towards of militia activity
had prevented the popular forces from obtaining the equivalent weapons as the regular army
units. The Qing state’s attitude towards militia weapons was explicitly expressed in the May
1899 imperial edict, which tended to restrict local militias’ access to advanced firearms:
Recently, robbery has frequently been reported in many provinces. Thus the
neighborhood mutual support is urgently required. With respect to the expenditure, all the
localities should not create a burden to the common people. As for the weapons, the use
of guns of new foreign type would not be recommended, if not under special
87
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circumstances. Other ordinary foreign guns and bullets are not necessary. Currently, local
guns and traditional gunpowder are not uncommon in many inland provinces. They
would provide effective defense against restless robbers.89
The 1899 edict which directed local officials to deliberate on the issue of civilian
weapons when mobolizing people for local defense indicated that the state painstakingly sought
to maintain its monopoly over the sophisticated weapons. Comparatively speaking, the late Qing
government’s stance over legitimate weapon ownership resembled its policy over bird guns
during the Qianlong reign, as the state adhered to the principle of maintaining its monopoly over
the most advanced weapons, although it delegated certain defense responsibilities to local power
holders after the mid-nineteenth century. According to a Tianjin Dagongbao 大公報 report in
1909, two years before the fall of the Qing, the Anhui provincial government rejected one local
magistrate’s request to purchase fifty breech loading rifles and plenty of bullets to arm the local
militia. The provincial Bureau of Weapons explained that “these new-style guns were
exclusively reserved for the regular army units.” Eventually, the militia was entitled to purchase
the less powerful muzzle-loading Mauser rifles.90 Under such political circumstances, the militia
forces normally had no legal channels to obtain state-of-the-art weapons, but adopting traditional
arms or outdated surplus guns of foreign-style, as we have seen in many cases.
Conclusion
In 1894, American diplomat Thomas Jernigan (1847-1920), who had traveled extensively
in China as a hunting enthusiast, marveled that matchlocks were still in use among the Miao
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people, a major ethnic group living in Southwest China. Jernigan, who himself carried a firstclass W.W. Greener rifle, openly derided the backwardness of China’s firearms:
The Chinese sportsman of the present day is, in every essential equipment, as far behind
the western sportsman as China is behind western nations in civilization. He shoots with
an old pattern muzzle-loading matchlock gun which he calls niaoqiang. The barrels may
be from four to six feet long, sometimes longer, and is mounted on a stock something like
an old fashioned horse pistol.91
Jernigan was correct in his assertion that China was falling too far behind the West in
firearm technology, as the single shot breech-loading rifle, the later magazine repeating small
arms, and many other military innovations had become widely used in Europe and America since
the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Jernigan’s 1894 observation was unilateral and
oversimplified the complexity of weapon dissemination in all of China. The Miao society, as
revealed in Jernigan’s report, had experienced a unique historical trajectory that defined its
firearm diffusion patterns.92 The remoteness and inaccessibility of the region blocked the Miao
people from experiencing military technological change that was being underway in many other
provinces from the second half of the nineteenth century.
As the late Qing government found it hardly possible to implement an effective gun
control policy, the model of “control/reliance” gained official attention again. Starting from the
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1860s as the Chinese state faced major rebellions across much of its territory, the government
sought to mobilize people to defeat rebels and maintain order. The state believed that these
armed groups or individuals would become another extension of state power. In 1910, two years
before the fall of the Qing dynasty, the government proposed the new version of the criminal
law, which, unlike the Great Qing Code, loosened the state’s grip on private firearms, proposing
that any ordinary individuals were permitted to own either bird guns or foreign guns for selfdefense purpose as long as they had their weapons registered.
This chapter examines the manifold ways in which the Qing state was gradually impotent
to maintain the monopoly of violence and made an adjustment to the new social and political
situation. As the whole country was plagued by civil disorder, the existence of armed populace,
in the eyes of the state, constituted an extension of state power in local society, as long as their
activities could not challenge state authority. Through an overview of the history of gun control
policy during the Qing dynasty, this article illustrates that the Qing’s authoritarian rule, under
which the monarch exercised disciplinary power and empowered ordinary people to defend
themselves were inseparable aspects of the state’s social control mechanism. As we have seen,
the state did not jealously defend its exclusive monopoly on the production and possession of
certain types of arms, which were officially defined as civilian weapons. Maintenance of
effective monopoly on the most lethal weapons through enforcement of the law against private
possession of military weapons and reliance on the armed populace for local defense were
crucial to the imperial state’s control over its territory. However, “civilian weapon” was not a
fixed concept. For example, alarmed by the bird gun’s potential to impair central authority, the
Qianlong emperor believed that it was imperative to strengthen the regulations regarding bird
gun’s use and circulation. During the late Qing, carrying a private firearm was once again
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allowed to defend localities, but under strict surveillance. This chapter argues that the Qing’s
policy on private weapons was determined by the stance between two ideologies: the resolute
maintenance of their monopoly over violence, and the reliance on social power to defend the
localities. Therefore, the state’s stance over the armed populace was by no means stationary but a
dynamic process, which was contingent on the social situation and political deliberation.
Did the late Qing’s gun regulation policies help the government achieve its aims? Local
governments indeed implemented policies of gun registration and licensing in the 1910s. For
example, the police department of Beijing allowed the city’s escort companies to purchase
foreign guns, which were all engraved and licensed.93 Local government also encouraged the
formation of militia forces equipped with rifles, which were expected to take up some police
functions in local society. Nevertheless, the rise of armed forces in local soceity, either orthodox
or heterodox camps, helped create a social milieu, in which military power became essential in
the pursuit of power.94 Putting guns in the hands of “good civlians,” was an effective way to
defend localities, but it failed to play a role in defending the state, which collapsed in 1911.
The last decade of the Qing dynasty was dotted with rebellions and revolutions initied by Sun
Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會 Tong menghui). When these revolutionaries
were planning revolts, they raised money overseas and then purchased a large amount of
firearms mainly from Japan, which was extremely active in firearm smuggling in the early
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twentieth century.95 Sun in particular encouraged the armed people to support his endeavors. For
example, he actively recruited armed bandits to take part in the revolution. Once the new regime
had been established, Sun Yat-sen’s government, like his late Qing predecessors, had to deal
with the problem of armed individuals and groups in local society. This subject will be discussed
in the next chapter.

See Feng Ziyou 馮自由, Geming Yizhi 革命逸史 (Miscellaneous events about the revolution),
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~ CHAPTER THREE~
Perilous Equilibrium:
State Power and Indigenous Armed Forces in Early Republican Guangdong, 1912-1924
Introduction
Sparked by a revolt of New Army troops in Wuchang in October 1911, revolutionary
events throughout China were spiraling out of control, which ultimately toppled the Qing
dynasty. However, social instability and political fragmentation did not come suddenly to an end
with the founding of the new Republic. Indeed, local militarization and the proliferation of
weapons in local society were still present in China, even when the central government tried to
maximize its control over localities.1 In the midst of political turmoil and social unrest in the
1910s and 1920s, one thing was clear: no single political entity possessed the power to claim the
exclusive use of violence in China. The crisis of authority reached its peak in the years following
the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916 when regional warlords manipulated their military power to
establish control over independent territory. While various warlords were struggling for power,
Sun Yat-sen was dedicated to organizing the National Revolutionary Army 國民革命軍 to fulfill
his dream of unifying China through the Northern Expedition. Headquartered in Guangdong
Province, Sun established a provisional revolutionary government, formed an alliance with the
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Communists, and founded the Whampoa Military Academy.2 His goal was to build a
revolutionary government that would gain popular support.
Nevertheless, following a series of setbacks before his ongoing Northern Expedition, Sun
came to realize that the mobilization of social forces to support his revolution did not run
smoothly. One major group of dissenters to his national objectives was the merchants in Canton,
who in the early twentieth century organized the influential self-defense force known as the
Canton Merchants’ Corps (廣州商團 Guangzhou shangtuan). By the summer of 1924, the Corps
grew to a force of over 50,000 people, most of whom were either shopowners or mercenaries
hired by local merchants. Initially, Sun Yat-sen believed that the wealthy and well-equipped
merchants were an important social force to be reckoned with. However, the merchant
community in Canton, having military backing, was not favorably impressed by Sun’s social
policies and gradually defied his political authority. Ultimately, the irreconcilable conflict
between Sun’s Guangdong government and armed merchants was exposed with the Canton
Merchants’ Corps Incident (廣州商團事變 Guangzhou shangtuan shibian) in the October of
1924. When the leaders of the Merchants’ Corps purchased arms and ammunition from Belgium,
Sun became suspicious of their anti-government activity, and ordered to confiscate the shipment
upon its arrival in Canton in August 1924. Over the next two months, negotiations failed to result
in settlement and the conflict escalated dramatically to an armed fight. The Canton merchants
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staged an uprising on October 15, which was brutally suppressed by Sun with his Soviet-trained
army.3
The bloody conflict in October 1924 was an accumulation of long-term discontent
between indigenous armed forces, represented by the Canton merchants, and Sun Yat-sen’s
Guangdong government. The social and political chaos following the collapse of the Qing
accelerated the spread of local militarization throughout China. This incident in Canton provides
us a prime example of how the early Republican government, despite its frailty, tried to
monopolize armed force and how the already militarized local society responded to the agenda of
claiming legitimacy of political power. As discussed in chapter two, the late Qing government
adopted the model of “reliance/control” to manage its relations with the armed individuals and
groups. This approach continued to be adopted by the early Republican government, which
chose to cooperate with armed forces in local society when the state was weak. For example, the
Merchants’ Corps played an increasing role in maintaining local order. Since its inception, the
Corps was able to keep neutrality with shifting political powers, including Sun Yat-sen’s regime,
who sometimes relied on the Corps to maintain social order.4 However, this cooperative
relationship had a prerequisite. As this chapter will argue, Sun Yat-sen’s shifting stances towards
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armed merchants indicated that the early Republican government frowned on private armed
forces lest they threatened the government’s monopoly on power.
Previous studies on the Merchant Corps Incident, though offering in-depth analyses on
the complexity of merchant community and the KMT’s efforts for local control, have seemingly
downplayed one important bone of contention in the controversy: the confiscation of arms
ordered by the Merchants’ Corps.5 Though the clash between two bodies had been brewing for
5
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Sun and his revolutionary alliances met the challenges imposed by the social and political
environment of Canton. It is argued that Sun’s economic initiatives and the presence of extraprovincial mercenary forces together helped shatter the city’s tranquility, which aggravated the
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years, it was the incident of arms confiscation that made the hatred reach its climax. After the
suppression of the Corps, Sun Yat-sen ordered his son Sun Ke (孫科 1891-1973) who was
appointed as the mayor of Canton in 1922, to meet warlord Zhang Zuolin (張作霖 1875-1928),
head of the Fengtian Clique 奉天系. Wondering what the Merchants’ Corps was, Zhang was
deeply puzzled why these prosperous merchants also obtained weapons passionately and
opposed the government.6 Zhang’s query to Sun raises another theme addressed in this chapter.
What role did the Merchants Corps play in Canton city and Guangdong province? How did the
merchant community build its relationship with Sun Yat-sen and his government? Why did the
Merchants Corps obtain weapons? In order to show how Sun dealt with the armed merchant in
Guangdong, it was inevitable to identify the armed force itself. Through a detailed examination
of the social circumstance of modern Guangdong, this chapter also suggests that the social
ecology manifested in the proliferation of guns in Guangdong society made the notion of “selfdefense” overwhelmingly acceptable, which promoted the formation of the Canton Merchants’
Corps.
The case study of Guangdong illustrates the general trend in many other provinces of the
early Republican period. The 1911 Revolution did not bring political stability and social
tranquility to China. As discussed in the Introduction, the proliferation of private guns during this
period emerged in reaction to both internal social pressure armed banditry, intensified lineage
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feuding, and persistent military conflicts and external condition: the easy availability of firearm
sources. In the meantime, the diffusion of guns into local society not only helped support the
formation of militia forces, but also fostered the conditions under which ambitious individuals or
groups strengthened their power through the acquisition of weapons.7 Such social circumstances
were especially obvious in Guangdong.
In this southern province, various political entities who claimed themselves the legitimate
ruler dipped in and out in early Republican period. Immediately after the 1911 Revolution
ending the Qing Dynasty, the province was under control of Chen Jiongming (陳炯明 18781933), a loyal follower of Sun Yat-sen. In 1914, Chen and Sun were chased out of Guangdong
by the Old Guangxi Clique army, allied with President Yuan Shikai, who then appointed warlord
Long Jiguang (龍濟光 1867-1925) from Guangxi, who ruled most of Guangdong until late 1917.
At that time, Long was pushed out of the province after his defeat with Sun Yat-sen and his
alliance. Sun then established an anti-Beijing regime in Canton, which served as headquarters for
his famous Constitutional Protection Movement 護法運動 (1917-1922). Sun’s revolutionary
initiative was backed by his old ally, Chen Jiongming, who, however, broke their alliance and
refused Sun’s plan of national reunification in 1922. Sun was forced to flee to Hong Kong, but
within the same year, he returned and chased Chen from Guangdong with the help of the Yunnan
and Guangxi Armies (known as guest armies, 客軍 kejun). Sun then established a new regime
that “ushered in a new era of radical, nationalistic politics in Guangdong under the leadership of
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the Guomindang (GMD).”8 With the aid of Soviet advisers and the newly formed Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), Canton once again became the headquarters of Sun’s campaign against
Beijing warlord’s government.9
This chapter provides new perspectives on the incident and the conflicts underlying the
arms confiscation by taking an in-depth look at the government’s stance towards the possession
of weapons by non-state actors through the lens of social and institutional history. In order to
explain why the merchants of Canton organized private armed forces that grew to a Corps of
more than 20,000 men, this chapter first sets Canton in a broad social and political context of
Guangdong province, which paves the way for an exploration of the formation of private armed
forces, and an analysis of the role these forces played in local society. This chapter then presents
a detailed study of the Corps itself and investigates how the conflicts escalated surrounding the
seizure of arms. Placing the incident in the broad context of the government’s stance towards
private gun ownership and armed militia forces, this section argues that the early Republican
government frowned on private armed forces lest they threaten the government’s monopoly of
power. Utilizing government documents, newspaper reports, private writings, and juridical cases,
the research thus not only enriches our understanding of the complexities of revolutionary
agenda and local reality during the early Republic, but also provides deeper insights into the
dynamic mechanisms through which government coexisted with armed individuals and groups.
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The Social Ecology of Gun Violence in Guangdong
The Violent Setting of Guangdong
If seen from the viewpoint of a satellite at night, the border of Guangdong Province in
South China today is remarkably visible as the acid artificial light of the region’s prosperous
cities brightens the land. As China’s economic showcase of reform and modernization today, the
specialty of Guangdong Province lies not only in its advanced economy, but also in its unique
cultural traits and historical trajectories. Even in the early twenty-first century, Guangdongese or
guangdongren 廣東人 saw themselves as ethnically different from other Chinese people in the
north. Geographically speaking, the Nanling Mountains rising from western Jiangxi province and
then stretching to Guangxi separated Guangdong from the rest of China. The mountains in the
north and the Pearl River Delta in the south together helped shape a distinctive culture and social
morphology. According to G. William Skinner’s geographical system, most of Guangdong falls
into the Lingnan macroregion.10 Its distinctiveness is directly apparent in the multitude of
languages spoken in the province. Apart from Mandarin Chinese as an official language, a
majority of the population speak Cantonese, along with sporadic Hakka and Min speakers.
Regarding this region’s social structure in history, unlike North China, where ownercultivators predominated villages and the influence of lineage was less prevalent, sophisticated
kinship organizations were predominant in Guangdong and assumed significant social roles in
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local society.11 Due to its geographical location, the region was opened up to the outside world
much earlier than other inland provinces during the Ming and Qing dynasties. It was through
Macau and Canton that foreign religions, ideas, and exotic commodities, though remaining in
small scale before the mid-nineteenth century, were introduced to China.12 After the First Opium
War (1839-1842), Guangdong’s contacts with the West were even more pronounced as a result
of geographical proximity to Hong Kong, a British colony since 1841. The bustling Pearl River
Delta area, in particular, had taken advantage of the geographical environment and frequent
international contacts, shaping a particular Lingnan culture that embraced diversity,
entrepreneurship, and compatibility.

British anthropologist Maurice Freedman first used the term “lineage” as a description of the
communal organization form in Southeastern China. Freedman was echoed by James Watson
who define the lineage is “a corporation in the sense that members derive benefits from jointowned properties and shared resources; they also join in corporate activities on a regular basis.
Furthermore, members of a lineage are highly conscious of themselves as a group in relation to
others, whom they define as outsiders.” See Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization in
Southeastern China (London: Athlone Press, 1958); and Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien
and Kwangtung (London: Athlone Press, 1966); James L. Watson, “Chinese Kinship
Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research,” China Quarterly, No. 92
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Figure 7: Guangdong Province in China
The special features of the cultural cycle offered excellent soil for the formation of a
rebellious and revolutionary spirit. From the late nineteenth century onwards, political
movements that transformed modern China, ranging from the major anti-Manchu activities
before 1911 to the Nationalist Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in the 1910s and 1920s, mostly
began in Guangdong. It was also in Guangdong that Hong Xiuquan and his followers made their
preparations for the Taiping Rebellion, which, as China’s most destructive nineteenth century
war, almost toppled the Qing Empire. Local officials of the Qing government often lamented that
Guangdong’s proximity to Macau and Hong Kong, both of which were centers for ammunition
smuggling, became contributing factors in the rise of rebellious movements and secret
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societies.13 As the imperial central power weakened in the mid-nineteenth century, the pace of
local militarization also accelerated, bringing about widespread local armed forces such as
militia (tuanlian) organized by local gentry, organized armed banditry, and other individuals
armed themselves for either defensive or aggressive purpose. This situation did not cease with
the fall of the Qing dynasty, as the new Republican period was marked by political instability
and chaos.14
Starting from the nineteenth century, a number of sociopolitical factors facilitated the
proliferation of various types of guns in Guangdong society, which included the erosion of
imperial power, the subculture of violence, the proximity to the source of weapons, and the
increasing demand for weapons by non-military individuals and groups. The difficulties of
estimating the number of guns scattered in local society are unavoidable, because, unlike regular
soldiers whose guns were registered, armed outlaws were always on the move and striving to
avoid detection. Anonymous individuals or groups who had guns for self-defense, in the absence
of an effectively enforced gun registration policy, were always invisible to the government.
However, some witness reports and social surveys provide a glimpse of the pervasiveness of
privately-owned guns in society. In 1912, when the Qing dynasty was on its deathbed, Zhang
Mingqi (张鸣歧 1875-1945), the last governor-general of Liangguang, argued that “bandits and
secret societies spread like prairie fire…. Their sophisticated weapons, procured from Hong
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Kong and Macau or provided by revolutionaries, were even better than military weapons.”15
Another observation comes from an editorial that appeared in the Hong Kong-based Chineselanguage newspaper Huazi ribao (華子日報 Chinese Daily), which in 1924 noted that “[A]mong
all Chinese provinces, guns may be the most commonly found in Guangdong. Besides soldiers
on service, Merchants’ Volunteer Corps (商團 shaungtuan), village militias (鄉團 xiangtuan),
bandits, and many ordinary individuals all owned various types of firearms. The number of guns
now in Guangdong may be as many as four million.”16 One year later, Japanese businessman
Chōdo Shibuya conducted an investigation on Guangdong’s local armed forces, estimating that
the number of modern rifles carried by militiamen might reach to 128,000.17 It should be noted
that this number did not include other inferior traditional firearms and handguns. Another
contemporary source showed that at least 200,000 guns were carried by peasants in Nanhai
County, while in Fanyu and Shunde County, the number might be over 180,000.18 So-called selfdefense guns, these weapons were registered and visible to the local government. Though the
statistical reports could be taken as no more than a rough summary, they at least attested to the
popularity of guns in Guangdong society.

“Duyuan Zhang juzou yuesheng feifeng shenzhi qingxiang chuli yuanbian rengqing fenbie
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Even before the coming of Western-style weapons to Guangdong, the province was
known for its residents’ use of weapons. Civilian weapons in Guangdong, which originally
constituted a mixture of cold steels and traditional muskets were becoming more complex and
diverse after the mid-nineteenth century. As noted in chapter two, many coastal residents of the
province were well acquainted with firearms from the early Qing period. The famous Cantonese
scholar Qu Dajun (屈大均 1630-1696), writing in the seventeenth century, noted that “[G]uns
were commonly found in Guangdong. In the hill areas, men learned to use them from the age of
ten, and Xinhui County was known for making them.”19 Bird guns were widely used in hunting,
lineage feuding, and temple sacrifice during the Ming-Qing period. As small arms technology in
the West was advancing rapidly by the mid-nineteenth century, producing more efficient breechloading rifle and repeating small arms, individuals or groups who demanded guns in Guangdong
gradually switched from traditional bird guns to these modern weapons of various brands and
types. For example, several newspaper reports described in the late 1890s that some factory
workers even armed themselves with foreign guns in fighting their colleagues when conflicts
arose or when chasing robbers.20 As civilian gun possession became widespread in the early
twentieth century, the selections of guns became more diverse and powerful. Another statement
issued by the Guangdong government in 1926 suggested the broad diversity of firearms owned
by non-military individuals, while the traditional bird guns only constituted a minor portion of
civilian weapons. It was shown in this official statistic that the small arms scattered in local
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society included not only traditional bird guns, and, more predominantly, foreign guns or rifles
manufactured by Mauser, Colt, Browning, Mannlicher, and Lee, and also their Chinese copies.21
The Social Impact of the Proliferation of Guns
The widespread use of firearms, either foreign guns or traditional bird guns, reflected
and reinforced a social milieu within which an atmosphere of violence and insecurity flourished.
Myriad violent acts, as we shall see, including armed banditry and lineage feuding prevailed in
Guangdong society in the absence of effective state control. An official report in the 1920s was
not exaggerating when it claimed “the proliferation of privately-owned guns appeared as a big
social problem in Guangdong.”22
Lineage Feuding
During the Qing Dynasty, Guangdong had long been a region of turmoil and instability,
as ethnic disputes and inter-lineage feuds became ever more routine, engendering a subculture of
violence and conflict. The central government was less forcefully felt there. In his finely wrought
study of collective violence in a Chinese county, William Rowe, writing about Hubei Province,
ascertains that “China has been as violent as most other human societies, and perhaps more
violent than many.”23 Such assertion is very apt to describe the social ecology of Guangdong.
Literati in Guangdong’s history had never hesitated to speak of the violent character of the
people and the role of violence in social life. The influential Confucian Philosopher Ding Jie (丁
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杰 1738-1807) commented that “the ethos of feud originated from Min (闽 Fujian Province),
progressed in Yue (粤 Guangdong), and boomed in Chao (潮 Eastern Guangdong).”24 As the
mid-seventeenth century gazetteer of the Xinhui County 新會縣 recorded, “[A]fter Wanli’s reign
(1572-1620), people grew gradually unscrupulous. Powerful and aggressive local landlords
tyrannized the local communities… In almost ten years, litigations over the mountain rights
boomed. Lineage feuding and even mass killings became widespread.”25 The gazetteer account
and scholar’s reflection on Xinhui’s feud was just the tip of the iceberg when discussing the
social violence of Guangdong. As many contemporary writings suggested, the foremost
manifestation of the society’s violent component was the endemic feuding, which took forms of
organized violence and made many parts of the province a truly turbulent place.
Due to the lack of complete records, it is hardly possible to measure how many intralineage feuds took place from the beginning of the Qing dynasty. What can be analyzed here is
the historical causation and motivation of violent practices. The Han people in Guangdong,
including the Cantonese, the Hakka, and the Chaozhou all migrated originally from the North at
different times throughout history. Its special historical formation helped harbor some strongly
developed lineages, under which the agnatic or exogamous groups were held together by both
cultural and economic bonds. During the prosperous eighteenth century, Guandong was subject
to pressures from increasing population density and tenancy, which made the competition for
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control of scarce resources intense.26 As Harry Lamley and Thomas Buoye’s studies on lineage
feuding in Guangdong show, that the impetus for violent conflicts came essentially from the
contention over property rights such as land, mountain, and water boundaries, which resulted in
collective and lineage-based action.27 Often, the local officials, who either hesitated to get
involved between rival lineages or attempted to gain advantages from the strife, provided limited
restraints. Starting from the eighteenth century, lineage feuding and violent disputes consistently
unsettled Guangdong society, the people of which seemed inured to the presence of interpersonal
conflicts.
The confrontations always took the forms of armed affrays, in which plenty of weapons,
either cold steels or firearms, were widely used. Long before the nineteenth century, the
inhabitants living in the coastal areas carried either farm tools or a variety of old-style firearms,
including swords, spears, and bird guns or jingals.28 When the Qianlong emperor issued the
aforementioned edict in 1777 that led to the confiscation of bird guns throughout the country, the
Guangdong provincial government collected 11,251 bird guns.29 Even though the number might
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not tally with the actual amount, it is indicative of the abundance of private guns in local society.
When informed that some guns were used for ritual purposes at the temple sacrifices, the local
authorities quickly returned them.30 Of course, these returned bird guns, still made for handy
weapons in lineage feuding. Governor-General Nayancheng (那彥成 1764-1833), who quelled
the secret societies in Guangdong, discovered in 1805 that many lineage groups even sold their
lands or estates to buy arms from either Macau or underground gunsmiths.31 Although these
witness accounts could not offer an accurate picture of bird gun circulation in Guangdong, it can
be assumed that the guns were evidently common before the nineteenth century, and were an
inevitable component of social life in Qing Guangdong.
A tremendous transformation took place from the early nineteenth century onwards when
the introduction of Western-type rifles and other firearms made armed affrays more frequent and
more brutal. The acquisition of powerful weapons was often a crucial point for maintaining
power dominance against their rival lineages. Foreign guns’ involvement in the large-scale feuds
probably started in the well-known Hakka-Punti Clan Wars from 1855-1867, a devastating
conflict taking place to the west of the Pearl River Delta between the Cantonese-speaking natives
(Punti), and the Hakka.32 The bloody battle raged in 1857 when the Punti brought large numbers
of foreign “fast guns” through Hong Kong, where “guns were freely sold” before the outbreak of
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the Sino-French War.33 The huge gap in weapon power between both sides had a great effect on
the outcome of the clan war. Zhang Zhidong (張之洞,1837-1909), Governor-General of
Guangdong-Guangxi, reported in 1885 that “Weapons from abroad can be bought anywhere, and
so Western guns, banners, and knives are available in every village.”34 Thereafter, the ready
accessibility of guns and unrest led to an arms race of sorts, incentivizing other lineage groups to
purchase even more powerful guns, or replace their traditional Chinese weapons with ever more
lethal foreign guns. Starting from the late nineteenth century, local newspapers picked up these
foreign gun-involved strives and gave them prominent display. 35
The founding of the Republic did not bring social stability to Guangdong. Instead, the
constant warfare, the frequent banditry, and the collapsed government authority made lineage
members believe the acquisition of powerful weapons was essential to maintaining dominance.
One example from Puning County 普寧縣 is the Fang surname lineage. In the early 1910s, the
Fang family “bought five or six hundred foreign guns, which initiated the lineage’s climb to
military power in the County.”36 A few years later, lineage feuds happened in Qingyuan County
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of Northwestern Guangdong, in which each lineage “carried more than ten thousand foreign
rifles.”37
The use of these weapons would have two major consequences for lineage feuds. First,
the adoption of modern rifles that possessed greater accuracy and range of fire profoundly altered
the way of fighting among rival lineages. Previously, the lineages that were equipped with bird
guns’ always fought on the appointed fields to ensure their enemies came into the gun’s short
range arc of fire. Starting from the nineteenth century, the introduction of quick-firing armed
men more frequently positioned themselves at more hidden and protected positions. Some
villages became heavily fortified by solid walls and watch towers, some of which were equipped
with cannon batteries.38
Second, the feud affrays escalated when the lineages hired skilled marksmen to fight
against their rivals. As Shenbao reported in 1892, the Chen surname lineage had a long-standing
dispute over water rights with the neighboring Li lineage in a county close to Canton. The fierce
competition over irrigating water gave rise to armed feuding. Both lineages hired bandits or
rebels (斗匪 doufei) who were skilled in the use of guns as proxies in the surname affrays.39 The
participation of professional mercenary bands, as shown in many similar cases, indicated that the
armed conflicts were not limited between the rival lineages, but escalated into large-scale
warfare, which “detached from local lineage and surname groups.”40 The mercenaries (銃手
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chongshou), in most cases were roving bandits or pirates who were desperate for profit and
trained in the use of modern firearms as well as traditional bird guns. In the aftermath of the
mercenaries’ violent actions, the numbers of feud-related incidents were undoubtedly increased
and the extent of their damage, became severe. John Scarth, a British businessman who
frequently traveled to Guangdong from the 1850s marveled about the increasing numbers of gunrelated feudings in almost every single village of Guangdong.41 In 1915, a feud broke out
between two rival lineages in suburban Canton, both of which readily recruited hundreds of
armed bandits. The fighting leading to numerous casualties was out of government control when
“gunfire licked the heavens.” Stray bullets injured passengers waiting in the adjacent train
station, and even jeopardized the safety of the running train.42
Armed Banditry
For centuries, banditry had been one of the paramount threats that the people in
Guangdong had to encounter. In eastern Guangdong, in particular, it was said that, “The bandit
numbers in Guangdong are the largest under heaven” (粵東盜匪甲天下 Yuedong daofei jia tian
xia).43 During his post as the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, Zhang Zhidong in
his memorial to the court in 1885 complained that “In Eastern Guangdong, seas and rivers
intersect the mountain-chains. People there were fierce and violent. Bandits abounded in greater
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numbers than in any other provinces.”44 From the late 1890s, media never stopped reporting the
frequent occurrence of robbery, killing, and torture, portraying Guangdong as the cradle of
banditry. In 1897, Shanghai’s Shenbao commented that “The bandits in Guangdong are the most
sneaky and unscrupulous among the provinces.”45 The estimate of bandits numbers are varied,
ranging between 10,000 and 30,000 in the early twentieth century.46 Accurate figures are
difficult to come by without further information about how the numbers of bandits were
calculated by different groups. These estimates at least indicated that the banditry and its
associated violence became enduring facets of social life in modern Guangdong.
Bordering upon Hong Hong, a major hub for weapon diffusion, bandits in Guangdong
armed themselves with foreign guns much earlier than in Northern provinces. Shanghai’s
Shenbao commented in 1894 “Why are the Guangdong bandits unscrupulous like this? One
reason lies in the fact that they have easy access to military weapons, which even pose with
advantage against the official army.”47 The number of bandit-held guns soared following the end
of the 1911 revolution. Before the revolution, the revolutionary organizations led by Sun Yat-sen
and other anti-Qing groups were lumped together as the Revolutionary Alliance. Before and after
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1911, thousands of bandits were recruited by the revolutionaries to overcome the deficiency of
troops. These bandits were known as people’s armies (民軍 minjun), which proved fatal in
enhancing Sun’s military power in Guangdong. Recruiting bandits, most of whom knew how to
master guns, helped “cut short the laborious process of recruiting and training.”48 The
Revolutionary Alliance always distributed numbers of firearms to these bandit armies. In the
name of revolution, many of the minjun could thus justify their acquisition of weapons and the
recruiting of peasants as bandits. However, as an irregular army, these recruiting bandits could
only be used to fulfill some immediate tasks when necessary. After the military campaign, as
Phil Billingsley has pointed out, many of these minjun returned to their outlaw world,
contributing to the severity of banditry in local society.49 In 1912, the newly established
government which lacked the resources to maintain the health of its troop disbanded the minjun
immediately after the Revolution. Nevertheless, successive governments of Guangdong were not
able to collect the weapons once carried by the dismissed army. Canton’s Minsheng Ribao 民生
日報 reported in 1912 that these bandits in minjun “always carried their guns away with them,
while very few were confiscated by the regular army.”50 Many of these dismissed soldiers either
continued their banditry or other “heterodox” activities with their guns, or even sold their
weapons to other bandits.51 The end result is that these minjun members who carried off their
guns contributed to the diffusion of guns in local society.
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How many guns were in the hands of bandits? An official document estimated that at
least 170,000 guns were held by bandits by 1927.52 In the 1920s, Socialist He Xiya 何西亞
discovered that these bandits had organized into larger gangs based on geographical region.
These well-organized gangs became major consumers of guns and other firearms. In 1926, the
Canton Municipal Police learned that eight major gangs operating around the Pearl River Delta
region owned more than seven thousand guns, most of which were modern rifles and pistols.
Some bandits were even equipped with cannons and machine guns.
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Bandit Head

Region

Number of Bandits

Number of Guns

Wu Sanjing

Shunde, Nanhai

More than 1,000

More than 1,000

Waizui Yu

Shunde, Fanyu

800

1,000

Liu Lian

Shunde

600

800

Hu Ba

Shunde

500

600

Chen Jin

Dongguan

200

Revolver 60-70; rifle
200

Zhujing Hai

Shunde

800

1,000

Liu Fazai

Dongguan

300-400

4 machine guns; 45
revolvers; rifle 300

Chen Damao

Dongguan

300

Rifle 200; revolver
30-40

Modawang Zhang

Dongguan

1000

1000 rifle; 100
revolver

Table 3: Bandits and their Arms in the Pearl River Delta53
Almost the same time, Japanese businessmen Chōdo Shibuya conducted another
investigation of the sixty-three bandit groups in Guangdong. His fieldwork report detailed not
only the geographical diffusion of banditry, but also the type and quantity of weapons they used.

“Geshu Tangkou Diaocha 各屬堂口調查” (The survey of different bandit groups), Guangzhou
Minguo ribao, November 2, 1926.
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According to Shibuya, all the bandits in these gangs were armed with at least one firearm, which
mostly consisted of rifles and even included machine guns and cannons.54
Gang Heads

Numbers of Bandits

Numbers of Weapons

Yuan Guangzhao

3,800

17 machine guns, 3 cannons,
and more than 3,000 rifles

Mai Bao

200

2,000 small arms

Lin Cai

400

450 rifles, 9 machine guns

Lin Yunmin

500

500 rifles and pistols

Lei Gongquan

600

700 rifles and pistols

Table 4: Bandits and Their Arms in Guangdong in 1925
Continuous warfare, unbridled banditry, and widespread lineage feuding were all
important manifestations of social violence, which were deeply rooted in Guangdong society.
Historians unanimously ascribe the origins of these violent acts to the complex social
circumstances, such as natural disasters, unbalanced resource distribution, and population
increase. All these factors, as historian Joseph Lee asserts, gave rise to “a wide range of
heterodox practices,” and helped create “a regional subculture of fear, dissidence and insecurity.”
The absence of effective government control from the late Qing, and, more remarkably, the
introduction of powerful firearms made the already violent situation even worse.
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Circulation Mechanism
Nowhere were guns more easily accessible than in Guangdong. The analysis of these
guns’ profound social implication requires an investigation of how these weapons were
introduced and circulated in Guangdong society. Because most weapons flowed through
clandestine channels, a detailed grasp of the whole trade and diffusion network cannot be
documented with any precision. However, as the web of gun circulation thickened, the active
participants of the network left historical traces in newspapers, criminal cases, and witness
reports, providing a lens through which to glimpse the gun’s circulation mechanisms. In some
circumstances, these modern firearms got scattered in a way that shared many characteristics as
other commodities did that is to say, by formal trade or official distribution to the sanctioned
populace. Authorized militia forces largely obtained firearms through an officially approved and
orthodox channel. Comparatively, bandits, violent lineages, and other unauthorized individuals
who had no means to obtain guns from government and thereby objectively encouraged
smuggling and trafficking across society, joined with weapons manufacturers and dealers to form
an underground circulation network.
Orthodox Sources
As we have seen in chapter two, the late Qing government did not seek to jealously
defend its monopoly on the production or use of weapons. Ushering in the period of social
instability, many Guangdong officials saw putting guns in the hands of the law-abiding people as
an effective method to defend localities, where state presence was always negligible. The
Guangdong government had allowed the import of massive firearms by the approved militia.
Existing sources suggest that obtaining the official permission to buy weapons was not difficult.
For example, in 1903, the Guangdong Logistic Bureau (廣東軍需局 Guangdong Junxuju)
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approved the request submitted by Xinning County to procure 1550 rifles from Hong Kong to
support the organization of a militia.55 The early Republican Guangdong governments continued
to give permission to the officially sanctioned militia units to obtain necessary firearms. The
Canton Merchant Association whose behavior later appeared rebellious in the eyes of Sun Yatsun, had no difficulty to get approval to buy large numbers of firearms from foreign countries.
Sun’s new regime established in 1924 approved the Corps’ request to purchase 4850 foreign
guns and more than one hundred millions bullets from overseas sources.56 The Merchant Corps
declared that “the request to order firearms had been consistently approved by the Guangdong
government before. When Long Jiguang was the provincial governor before the 1920s, they
bought guns through local foreign trading companies. During Chen Jiongming’s period, their
request had never been rejected.”57
In addition to procuring guns from overseas sources, the government in many cases also
sold the firearms to the indigenous militia forces directly. The state-owned Guangdong Arsenal
was established in 1873 as one of the consequences of the Self-strengthening Movement, and
continued to operate in the Republican period. We have little evidence to indicate how
extensively the arsenal’s weapons armed the regular soldiers, but there is some evidence that
successive rulers of Guangdong were largely dependent on non-Chinese sources.58 The less
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sophisticated weapons manufactured by the Arsenal found their ways to the local militia forces.
In 1915, the county magistrate of Gaoyao 高要, on the behalf of local elites who were actively
organizing militia forces, submitted his request to the provincial government to obtain traditional
five thousand bird guns and two hundred bullets for each gun. In the same year, as a local
newspaper reported, “almost all the counties send their officials to Canton to purchase guns of by
the hundreds and thousands.”59 In 1924, the Guangdong Arsenal set a statute, which allowed the
local militia forces to order guns directly from the arsenal, only if they obtained the approval
letter from the provincial government.60 The new statute largely simplified the procedure, under
which local militia forces no longer awaited approval from various levels of government to
purchase weapons on their behalf. After that, as the Republican Daily News reported, many
militia leaders poured into the arsenal to select the weapons they preferred.61 However, the
provincial government always took their request into cautious consideration. As suggested in
chapter two, though local armed forces were seen as extensions of state power, they also suffered
from scepticism from the government, which feared their monopoly over deadliest form of
weaponry would be challenged. For example, in the June of 1924, Datang 大塘 township applied
to purchase more than one hundred modern rifles. Because the amount of firearms owned by
militia were all registered and were visible to the government, the government rejected their
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request, for it was aware that the town “had plenty of guns already, and additional firearms were
not applicable.”62
Heterodox Sources
Smuggling from Hong Kong and Macau. As addressed in Chapter two, Macau during the
Qing dynasty was as a major source of firearms for Guangdong. Macau’s position was still there,
and Hong Kong, due to its status as a British colony, became another important site that
facilitated firearm transition. In 1904, the governor-general of Liangguang Cen Chunxuan (岑春
煊 1861-1933) sent a memorial to the court, in which he was extremely worried about the illicit
firearm transaction in Hong Kong. “The eastern region of Guangdong was known as a cradle of
banditry. When the place was open for foreign trade, commercial ships came and brought in so
many foreign guns. These bandits and outlaws had no difficulty obtaining these powerful
weapons.”63 The firearm transaction generated a huge amount of profit. In the late Qing, “an
ordinary Mauser was worth only 40 taels of silver. The bandits who got the guns in Hong Kong
or Macau resold them for a hundred taels each.”64 In the early Republic, a foreign Remington
rifle could be bought in Hong Kong for only ten or more yuan, Once it was resold in the interior,

“Qingling tuanqiang xu chaming banli 請領團槍須查明辦理” (The request to purchase militia
firearms must be investigated), Guangzhou minguo ribao, June 18, 1924.
62

. “Yuedu Dianzhi Waibu 粵督電致外部” (The telegraph to the Military of Foreign Affairs
from the Governor of Guangdong), Dagong bao, July 6, 1905.
63

“Siyun Bokezhe Fenfen Bujue 私運駁殼者紛紛不絕” (The Smugglers of Mausers would not
stop), Huazi ribao, June 14, 1913.
64

152

the price could rise to one hundred yuan. Thereafter, many outlaws and even ordinary peasants
poured into Hong Kong or Canton’s foreign concessions to stockpile guns for huge profits.”65
The existing sources from Guangdong Customs suggest that the local government was
not able to stamp out the illicit firearm transactions. In 1913, the Guangdong customs
commissioner received tons of reports indicating gun smuggling occurred frequently from Hong
Kong to Guangdong. However, the Customs thought investigating these cases was the authority
of local police, rather than the Customs, which, as suggested by its working documents, never
sought to deal with these smuggling cases.66 However, due to the constant civil war and the
breakdown and government change in early Republican Guangdong, both the local police and
government never took serious actions in investigating these smugglers. As a local newspaper
reported in 1925, the guns could be sold and transferred in Guangdong freely without any
restrictions. Even though the policy of forbidding firearm smuggling was written in the law, as
the Guangdong Gongbei Customers claimed, “these policies were futile, because it was hard to
implement.” Jing Rao, a local official, complained that “most of the guns carried by the bandits
were even better than the military weapons. Almost all of them were bought in Hong Kong and
Macau.” As shown above, local militia forces had to obtain governmental approval before their
weapon procurement. However, many criminal cases that some militia forces even sought to
these illegal weapons once their request was rejected by the government. For example, in 1914,
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the Customs found large numbers of firearms on a ship. Later, it was investigated that these
firearms were bought by militia in Nanhai and Sanshui counties.67
Starting from the mid-nineteenth century, Hong Kong was an especially convenient inlet
for arms transaction, with countless sources like Winchester, Victors and many others for both
wealthy individuals, Merchant Corps, rural militias, and outlaws to approach. As one
correspondant reported in the English newspaper, the China Weekly Review in the early 1920s,
“[A]rms smuggling facilities in China have been so perfected that business is transacted in arms
almost in the same convenient way as other commodities.” “Any general who wants to buy can
always get in touch with an agent [in Hong Kong], and there are so many foreigners and Chinese
engaged in smuggling both in the treaty ports and in interior towns that one wonders how China
can ever get her house in order.”68
Transfer from Military Weapon to Civilian Weapon. Ready access to weapon was
facilitated by the frequent civil warfare of early Republican Guangdong. Defeated or deserting
soldiers in the period’s frequent battles often carried their guns away with them; other soldiers
simply abandoned their firearms on the battlefield, which were then picked up later by local
people. The result was a steady diffusion of weapons into local society. In the late Qing period,
revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing always regarded Guangdong as their site that
launched anti-Manchu revolutions. Most of their weapons were imported from Japan through
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Macau.69 After the revolution, most guns found their way into the hands of bandits. The late
Qing official Zhang Jinfang in Guangdong’s Jiangmen 江門 county recalled “the rebels’major
inlet of firearms was in Macau. Once the gun came through, they were obtained by bandits.” 70
When Sun-yat-sen established his Guangdong revolutionary government in 1911, he
organized the bullies and other armed forces scattered in local counties. These armed forces,
were encouraged to participate in Sun’s revolutionary army. Sun also sent them much-needed
weapons. After the battles, these minjun were quickly dissolved. However, as many witness
accounts suggest, these armed members carried their guns away with them. As the local
newspaper recorded, “very few guns were turned in after the 1911 revolution.”71 No further
sources exisited speculating on the future of these armed individuals who once helped strengthen
Sun’s revolutionary initiatives. Some of them joined the local militia or merchants corps, while
many of them sold their weapons to other outlaws.
Even after the 1911 Revolution, the social disorder was not calmed down immediately.
Many defeated or deserting soldiers did not turn in their weapons. In 1917, the acting
Guangdong government issued an order requiring local government to collect these guns. “Our
province in the past few years witnessed ceaseless warfare, the regular troops lost large amounts
of guns, many of which found their way into the hands of non-military individuals.”72 Because
guns and bullets were regarded as invaluable commodities, many civilians, worked to obtain
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guns for self-defense or profit. In 1919, one of the branches of Long Jiguang’s army, was
defeated by other local predatory warlords. But the defeated soldiers sold their guns to Li
Fulong, a bandit leader in Eastern Guangdong, while many soldiers just simply joined the bandits
with their guns. In 1925, Chen Jiongming’s army was defeated by Sun Yat-sen’s army. Peng pai,
a communist cadre, was ordered to collect weapons left by Chen Jiongming’s defeated army. As
Peng later remembered, many of these guns were lost or just collected by local peasants. He only
received 300 rifles on the battlefield.73 In the meantime, many soldiers also engaged in illicit gun
transactions. The Guangzhou Minguo ribao reported in 1924 that it was common for ordinary
soldiers to sell their weapons directly to the peasants or even bandits. Even some military
commanders also helped transfer the guns manufactured by the Canton arsenal to other nonmilitary people and earn huge profit because the price difference. 74
The Manufacture of Small Arms in local villages. While many guns transferred from the
military or smuggled from Hong Kong or Macau found their way into local society, a large
number of inferior guns were manufactured in local workshops. Before the 1920s, many guns
circulated by civilians or bandits were low-quality local guns or bird guns. It is difficult to find
sources the exact number of these guns made by people themselves. Many newspaper accounts
proved the existence of such guns. In 1924, the local government of Gaoyao County found that
there was a workshop manufacturing guns in a village and collected thousands of bird guns as
well as many inferior foreign guns. In the same year, a military militia leader of Nanhai County
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operated one such small workshop and produced hundreds of machine guns. Two years later, the
local official of Shunde County also found out the county had “at least seven such workshops.”75
Even in Canton, where there was no difficulty obtaining advanced foreign guns through
foreign trading companies or nearby Hong Kong, privately operated manufacturers were found
there. According to a local newspaper report, on the south side of Canton, an arsenal hired lots of
workers, whose duty was to make various types of guns. “Each worker was able to get 2 yuan for
each gun he made.”76 In the meantime, some small trading agencies connected the gun
manufacturers with their potential consumers. As for the consumers, the Guangdong police
found that many consumers were bandits and other outlaws. All of these accounts suggest that
gun manufacturing and circulation became an active and profitable business in Guangdong
during the early Republican period.
The Formation of the Canton Merchants’ Volunteer Corps
Militia Forces in the Formation of Modern Guangdong
As suggested above, the particularity of Guangdong’s social ecology gave rise to a
provincial subculture of violence and insecurity, which led to a proliferation of local militia
units. These defensive forces, as we already know, were organized by the local gentry but under
official supervision. The formation of local militia force was nothing new to Guangdong society.
As Frederic Wakeman aptly puts it, during the First Opium War between the Qing and British
Empire, the Guangzhou gentry organized militia operating independently of the Qing
government to rout the British invaders bravely. It was during the Taiping Rebellion in the late
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1850s that the wheel of local militarization accelerated, as local elites and government engaged
in a joint effort to forge local militia that defended local communities.”77 Unlike what Edward
McCord argues in his seminal work on modern Hunan province, the militarization of Guangdong
society of the late nineteenth century remained a constant condition that lasted into the early
Republican period.78 The erosion of social order and the rise of popular movements made the
formation of collective -defense necessary. By the early 1920s, the militia units of Guangdong,
including both rural militias and urban Merchants’ Corps were widespread in various counties.
According to one official statistic, the total number of militiamen by 1927 reached approximately
3,000,000 79
What were the major contributing factors to the flourishing of militia and militia-like
units in modern Guangdong? Li Fulin who himself used to be a bandit and later joined Sun Yatsen’s entourage, was appointed the Commissioner of the provincial militia bureau in 1924. In his
inauguration address, Li attributed the proliferation and rapid expansion of militia units to three
major reasons: political turmoil and social unrest, the existence of a large wealthy population,
and the easy availability of firearms.80 Of the major militia units, the Canton Merchants’ Corps
was arguably the most influential and ambitious forces in the province, which was not only
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embodied in its consequential roles in public life, but also was shown its fierce conflict with Sun
Yat-sen’s revolutionary government. An exploration of the intriguing role played by this armed
group offers an invaluable understanding of the complexities of the coexistence and competition
of social power and government during the early Republic.
The Founding of the Canton Merchants’ Corps
When the tension between Canton merchants and Sun Yat-sen’s Military government
was at its height in 1924, which erupted into the aforementioned bloody suppression, Xu
Chongzhi (許崇智 1887-1965), the Commander-in-Chief of the Guangdong troops proclaimed
that “The Merchants’ Corps in Guangdong steadily became a full-fledged force since its
inception. The considerable quantities of guns owned by the Corps were less common in other
provinces, and even rarer in most other countries.”81 After the Merchant’ Corps was brutally
repressed in 1925, official discourse and nationalist scholars unanimously regarded the Corp’s
consistent behavior of acquiring firearms as a military conspiracy to impede Sun’s revolutionary
objectives.82 While the “Canton Merchants’ Corps Incident” itself has been adequately studied,
comparatively less attention has been paid to the formation of the Corps and the social roles of
these armed Canton merchants in urban space. If Mary Rankin was correct that these voluntary
associations became a “political force” in the early Republican period possessing the potential
for mobilizing local resources, then a detailed study of the merchants and Corps activism and
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their dynamic relationship with various ruling entities will provide insight into the origins of the
later bloody conflicts.83
Starting from the seventeenth century, Canton’s position as an important port and trading
hub buzzing with frequent commercial activities has been unchanged. The city’s status as a
major metropolis and provincial capital with official presence was evident in many ways from
the mid-Qing dynasty. It was the seat of the governor-general of two provinces, Guangdong and
Guangxi. It also housed the magistrate of Guangzhou prefecture and the governor of Guangdong
province during the Qing dynasty. Also, the Manchu and Chinese bannermen were stationed in
the garrisons located in the suburbs of the city. The city experienced its greatest economic
prosperity under the “Canton System,” which was strictly controlled by the Qing government
and was operated by sophisticated Hong merchants, who conducted an enormous import and
export trade before the mid-nineteenth century.84 Though Canton’s position as China’s sole trade
center gradually gave way to Shanghai after the Opium War, it continued to function as the
dominant commercial center in the wealthy Pearl Delta Region.85
The frequent and matured economic activities in Canton gave rise to a class of merchants
who organized various voluntary associations, notably guilds to contribute to charitable or
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philanthropic projects. Before the early twentieth century, Canton merchants took parts in local
affairs through the Seventy-two Guilds ( 七十二行 Qishier hang) and the Nine Charitable
Institutions (九善堂 Jiushantang), which supported the operation of charity schools or hospitals,
and directed other charitable services.86 The local government seldom intervened in the
merchants’ economic and social activities in Canton, both because they assumed auxiliary
functions and because they were politically weak. In 1904, two years after the Qing court
launched the New Policy Reform, the Canton Chamber of Commerce, an officially authorized
merchant association, was created to promote local economic development and to provide a
platform for merchants to cooperate. Nevertheless, the Canton Chamber did not play the leading
role that integrated various merchant organizations as expected. As Edward Rhoads suggested,
its quasi-official nature and the dominant role of gentry officials in the organization would make
merchants reluctant to participate in it.87
From the turn of the century onward, Canton merchants seemed eager to extend their
independent and autonomous activities beyond the commercial and local charitable affairs.
William Rowe and Frederic Wakeman’s depiction of Hankou, a major commercial and
transportation hub of Central China, as “a major entrepot completely under the official thumb of
the government,” may not be applicable elsewhere.88 Beyond the philanthropic realm, the
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restless political situation created many new possibilities for Canton merchants to express their
political sentiments. Organized by the Nine Charitable Institutions, the Seventy-two Guilds, and
the Chamber of Commerce, local merchants autonomously set up the Canton Boycott Society in
1905 against the American discriminatory treatment of Chinese immigrants one year before. As
part of the nationwide Anti-American Boycott, the movement in Canton marked urban
merchants’ unprecedented participation in politics and indicated an expression of national
consciousness among the emerging urban bourgeoisie.89 In 1907, an independent organization,
the Guangdong Merchant Self-Government Society (粤商自治會 yueshang zizhihui) was
established by a group of politically minded Canton merchants. Unlike the traditional guilds or
merchant associations, the Society possessed a political agenda manifested in its active role in
promoting nationalism and later in the Qing court’s constitutional program.90
As the merchants became highly organized and politicalized in the early twentieth
century, they started to expand their functions at the expense of the local government. The
frequent banditry and rebellions in which heavily armed individuals and militant groups loomed
large disturbed local order and safety. In 1911, merchants presented a petition to local
government for the establishment of the Canton Merchants’ Volunteer Corps, as Shanghai did a
few years before.91 However, the Qing government, which had been frustrated by the
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Huanghuagang Uprising 黃花崗起義 one year earlier, frowned on the appearance of armed
forces in the urban area and rejected their petition. As the storm of the revolution surged in
Guangdong in the same year, the Canton merchants who were now resentful of the late Qing
reform, became enthusiasts for the Revolution and provided heavy financial support.92
The founding of the Republic brought favorable changes in many areas to the merchants.
In 1912, the president of the Merchants Association Chan Lim Pak (陳廉伯 1884-1944) applied
to the Beiyang government in Beijing again for the permission to organize militia with privilege
to carry guns for the maintenance of social order. The newly-established government seemed far
more responsive to the needs of the merchants than the Qing government, and approved their
request but also formulated regulations. Cen Bozhu (岑伯著 ?-1916), a well known Cantonese
silk merchant and insurance agent, was elected to serve as the first commander in chief of the
Corps. The formation of the Canton Merchants’ Voluneer Corps was defensive in nature and
aimed at protecting merchants’ properity and maintaining local order. As stated in the Corps’
mission statement in 1912, “The Republic is founded now, which prioritizes the local selfgovernance. This is the responsibility of local society, which required cooperation between
government and civilians. Expanding people’s politial power and strengthening people’s
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physical power are essential to stamp out bandits internally, and to resist imperialism
externally.”93
When the Corps registered in 1912, it quickly recruited more than 1500 members. The
expense of purchasing weapons and uniforms and other administrative spending would be shared
by participating merchants.94 Many sources of the time suggested that the training and activites
of the Corps were strictly regulated. The well-known journalist Hin Wong’s report provided a
glimpse into how the personnel were recruited and drilled:
The regimental quarters are scattered through the ten principal police districts of Canton
and battalion quarters in important places within the district. All regimental quarters have
their own homes or barracks and their total real property and common equipments in the
several quarters are valued at nearly a million dollars. In order to become a member of
the Corps, a candidate must become a recruit for at least six months of special drill and
training taking place ususally in the mornings so as to be of convenience to the business
men who have work during the day. Before one may become a recruit, he must satisfy the
chief instructor that he is more than 20 and below 45 years old, recommended by two
firms which will be responsble for his contribution of some $300 for his initiation fees,
uniform, and arms, and must be able to pass a mental and physical examination intended
to test his ability to undertake the training successflly. When a recruit is able to pass all
tests and attend all the lectures and practice provide for in a course of instruction of six
months, he will be given a certificate entitling him to become a regular member of the
corps and receive his arms. As a rule the management of a business firm or office usually
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pays for an keeps the arms, allowing its representative to take them out when required for
duty. A few firms have as many as thrity men in the Corps.95
A member of the Corps recalled decades later that the recruitment was open to the public
and the selection criteria were relatively low. However, the entrance restrictions still existed as a
high entry fee and two endorsements from local merchants were required to ensure the morality
of the members. Thus, most Corps members were hired by participating merchants and joined
the Corps on the behalf of their employers. A uniform, official badge, and two firearms,
including one rifle and one short pistol were purchased by the Corps. All the members were
allowed to purchase one additional gun at their own expense.96 After joining the Corps, they
were required to participate in military training, including shooting twice per week.
The purchase of the firearms was coordinated by the commanding officer. Neither rifles
nor pistols were of standard specifications because the supply of weapons came from a mixture
of sources. Compared with militia forces in other inland provinces, the Corps in Canton
possessed the advantages of both the ready accessibility of arms supply and affordability of highquality weapons. As they did routinely, the Corps had to gain permission from the ruling
government. As declared by the Corps during the dispute with Sun Yat-sen, most ruling
governments never denied their request. The purchase of large-scale weapons was mostly
dependent on non-Chinese sources, while only on rare occasions did the Corps purchase from the
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warlords or local government. Foreign arms dealers in Hong Kong where firearms were freely
available ensured the supply of arms.97
The popularity of the Corps among Canton dwellers and merchants was particularly
prompted by its active role in maintaining public order and civic life. Amidst the social chaos
and political turbulence of the early Republican period, the Corps was particularly welcomed by
the participating Canton merchants who believed their interests and properties would be
protected when the power shifting governments failed to bring social stability. Politics in early
Republican Canton were quite complex because various actors fought to claim their political
legitimacy. After the failure of Sun Yat-sen’s “Second Revolution” in 1913, Yuan Shikai, the
nominal president of China based in Beijing, obtained control over Guangdong, and appointed
Long Jiguang as the military governor of Guangdong. His troops in Canton had brought nothing
but disaster upon the people. To consolidate his control over the city, Long ordered his troops to
implement a “city-cleansing” campaign to exterminate the defeated Guangdong Army (yuejun 粵
軍). However, as many Canton newspapers reported, people’s complaints surfaced about the
abusive behaviors of Long’s five thousand soldiers, who not only plundered and looted
merchants’ properties but also seriously disturbed public order. A local police officer represented
this chaotic social situation and the impotence of the Canton police in his poem:
New and fragile the Republic was born,
Harnessing the lawless became a heavy duty.
Crime and violence occurred day and night.
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But few fugitives escaped from justice.98
Even the Canton police department, which was established in 1902 and survived the early
Republic, was not able to contend with the ruthless and violent warlord soldiers.99 Right after
Long Jiguang and his soldiers took over Canton in 1913, he immediately ordered the execution
of the chief of police Chen Jinghua (陳景華 ?-1913), a major opponent to his leadership. The
Canton police thereafter became a puppet force controlled by the warlords.100 The impotence of
the police objectively amplified the influence of the Corps which, with their more sophisticated
guns in hands, played an increasingly important role in protecting the merchants and their
shops.101 As a Canton merchants later recalled, the Corps members had committed to patrolling
the streets in the major commercial district. As another Corps member wrote, bandits and other
urban outlaws who were armed with guns, dared not to rob or attack merchants’ factories, with
the better-armed Corps’ members standing guard outside the stores and factories.102
In addition to the designated function as the defender of merchants’ properties, the
Canton merchants, now with military power in hands, strengthened their traditional roles in
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organizing disaster relief or maintaining social order. In 1915, for example, the city had a flood
inundating the greater part of the city. Because of its thorough organization and its possession of
arms, the Corps members were able not only to undertake relief measures, but also to protect the
citizens from being encroached upon by outsiders who would not hesitate to take advantage of
their neighbor’s misfortune.103
Another factor contributing to the Corps’ high recognition among the city’s residents was
that it also provided patronage to local religious sites. In the early 1920s, when Sun Yat-sen was
in search of money to finance his revolutionary government and mount the Northern Expedition,
he decided to expropriate the property of local temples in Canton, which provoked outrage and
fierce resistance among religious adherents.104 Local elites who set up and managed the temples
sought help from powerful organizations to defend their temples. For example, in September of
1923, an intense confrontation happened between the patrons of the Twin Temples of the
Chicken Market (雞欄孖廟 jilan mamiao) and the government, which planned to sell the temple
to another owner for commercial use. Annoyed by the government’s expropriation activities, the
owners of the temple then designated it as the quarters of the second division of the Merchants’
Corps, hoping the Corps’ intervention would deter government from selling their temple.105
When the new owner, bolstered by local government now, prepared to take over the temple, the
leaders of the Merchants’ Corps immediately intervened, who were determined to defend the
temple with their manpower and weapons. The Canton merchant community on the next day
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threatened to launch a strike and to form a military alliance with other city’s Corps if the
government refused to compromise. The stalemate lasted several days, and was not settled until
Liao Gongchao (廖公超 1890-?), the general of the Yunnan Army, mediated the conflict by
purchasing the temples from the government and then donating them to the merchant
community. In the early 1920s Guangdong, as Shuk-Wah Poon aptly puts it, the use and
expropriation of temple property to further revolutionary activities were quite common, which
“inevitably led to clashes of interest between the political regime and these communal
groups.”106 The Merchants’ Crops which had expanded dramatically to a force that exceeded
20,000 armed members and was armed with sophisticated imported weapons, became an
indispensable social power, serving as both protectors of local community and challengers of the
government authority. 107 An equilibrium between the Corps and political regime was on the
verge of collapse.
Breaking the Equilibrium between the Corps and Government
The Conflicts between the Merchants Corps and Government
In late 1923, Sun Yat-sen successfully took over most of Guangdong province and made
Canton the headquarters of his planned Northern Expedition. The Canton people seemed
accustomed to seeing different militarists move in and out of the city and province: commercial
activities continued to develop though against the backdrop of political instability, while the
Merchants’ Corps functioned well in maintaining civic order as designed. In the eyes of Sun and
his alliance, the Canton merchants and their well-equipped Merchants’ Corps were important
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social forces to be reckoned with. These wealthy merchants’ dominant roles in most civic
organizations were visible, and the financial resources in their hands were indispensable in state
building. On 14 January 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen gave a passionate speech at a joint meeting of
representative members of the Canton police force and the Merchant Corps, in which he
underscored the potential for collaboration and partnership between the two forces. While
recognizing the awkwardness that his government was unable to monopolize police force in the
city, Sun advocated a concerted effort to maintain order in Canton:
“You gentlemen of the merchant corps and the police have come together in one place in
welcome. In the future, the Merchants’ Corps and the police must work together to
maintain order in Canton. The police are a government organ. The merchant corps is a
civic organ (renmin di diguan). Today is the first day the merchant corps and the police
have met formally face to face. That is, it is the first day the government and the people
are joined. Gentlemen, since this is the territory of the revolutionary government, both
(parties) ought to enter into an open and honest (relationship). The party of the revolution
is using Canton as its fountainhead. As a new Chinese republic is constructed, the
government and the people must work together. The people of Canton municipality must
cooperate with the government.”108
As discussed above, the Canton Merchants and their Corps were able to maintain a
political neutrality from the 1910s to the early 1920s with the shifting militarists, who rarely
intervened in the internal affairs of the merchant community. When Sun’s armies returned to
Canton with the help of the Yunnan and Guangxi troops in 1923, Sun, like many of his rivals,
recognized well-equipped merchants would be an important force to cooperate. However, a
couple months later, Sun, in a radical turn, blamed the merchants bitterly and accused them of
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“colluding with imperialism and confronting government authority.”109 As discussed above, Sun
came to believe that the merchant community, with its prominent social and economic power,
was defying the revolutionary government’s authority. In August, Sun Yat-sen’s Canton
government seized the merchants’ weapons purchased from a British company. The incident
caused the confrontation to escalate, which finally brought both sides into the aforementioned
armed attack in October of that year.
How would the cooperative relationship between the government and the Canton
merchants anticipated by Sun become undone in 1924? What are the essential reasons for the
conflicts that led to the above-mentioned strikes and bloody armed confrontations in October? A
rich literature has dealt with the reasons for the conflict. Historians like C. Martin Wilbur,
Stephanie Po-yin Chung, and Michael G. Murdock, in their works on Sun Yat-sen’s early career
and Canton merchants, attributes three reasons for the controversy.
First, Canton merchants from the beginning did not have a penchant for Sun Yat-sen’s
Nationalist Revolution. In 1923, Sun Yat-sen returned to Guangdong, with the help of the extraprovincial mercenaries, and successfully chased Chen Jiongming, who had previously allied with
Sun. The extra-provincial mercenaries were composed of soldiers from Yunnan and Guangxi
provinces. The commanders of the “guest armies,” in the eyes of Canton merchants, did not
benefit Guangdong, but levied heavy taxes on the merchants to support their troops.110 As
suggested by the British Consul-General in Canton, the guest armies extorted a large amount of
tax money from the province. In 1923, “a sum of $100,000,000 was wrung out of the City in the
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shape of taxes both regular and irregular… the balance of $70,000,000 having been levied by the
non-Cantonese troops, chiefly the Yunnanese, who remitted the money to their province.”111
The social and financial burden brought by the coming of the troops from other provinces
made the Canton merchants recall the chaotic period when Guangdong was under the heel of a
Yunnanese warlord in late 1910s. Comparatively, Canton merchants preferred Chen Jiongming,
an enthusiast for anarchism and democratic federalism, whose Guangdongese troops dominated
Guangdong from 1920 to 1923. Unlike Sun who was chasing the dream of China’s unification
under a central government, Chen conceived provincial autonomy as the direction of China’s
future that would facilitate citizen’s political participation.112 In 1920, Chen initiated a “Canton
for the Cantonese” movement, commanding all the troops and gunboats to prevent invasion of all
extra-provincial troops. His rejection of Sun’s proposal to use the wealth of Guangdong to
subsidize his effort for national unification was particularly welcomed by the merchant
community.113 Nevertheless, Chen’s defeat by Sun and the “guest armies” in 1923 shattered their
dream of provincial autonomy. Canton now once again became the headquarters of Sun’s
Nationalist Revolutionary Army against the Beijing warlord’s government.
Second, the merchants’ interests were threatened by the economic reforms launched by
Sun’s new regime. For a long period after the founding of the Republic, the Hong Kong dollars
issued by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank had been the major popular medium of exchange
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in Canton. Though the early Republican government issued official paper notes, the currency
values were unstable due to the deteriorated social and political situation. In early 1924, Sun’s
new regime launched its program of standardizing currency, forbidding the use of foreign
currency in Guangdong. Guangdong merchants had expressed concerns that the establishment of
a new provincial bank, the introduction of a new currency with an uncertain reserve, and the
prohibition of Hong Kong currency might adversely affect the mercantile communities.114 In the
meanwhile, heavy taxation was introduced by Liao Zhongkai (廖仲愷 1877-1925) in May 1924.
He ordered the levying of a fifty percent sales tax on land transfers and also introduced several
new taxes. The problem of “unifying financial administration” was launched, under which
excessive consumer taxes were levied on almost every transaction, “from foodstuffs to
brothels.”115 What happened following the merchants’ resistance to the government’s
expropriation of local temples occurred again. However, the confrontation appeared more
intense. In response, Chen Lianbo, now the commander in chief of the Merchants’ Corps,
contacted other Corps in the nearby cities and formed a federation of Guangdong Provincial
Merchants’ Corps.116 The merchant community again threatened a general strike, which was now
reinforced by a Federation of Merchants’ Corps. It seemed Sun Yat-sen and his government at
this point had not been prepared to trigger a head-on confrontation. To reassure the public and
the merchant community, the government was forced to make compromise and rescind the tax.
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Third, Sun’s pro-Communist stance was evident given he received both material and
military aid from the Soviet Union and formed an alliance with the newly founded Chinese
Communist Party.117 One major purpose of the Nationalist Party’s re-organization was to
broaden its social support base as crucial to struggle for national unification and independence.
In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Nationalist Party, Sun announced the
necessity to mobilize peasants and workers as the main force in the revolutionary campaign.
After the meeting, the government established the Department of Workers, Department of
Peasants, Department of Youth, Department of Women, and Department of Propaganda, all of
which served as coordinating media for mobilizing the masses. Nevertheless, the role of
merchants and their activism in the urban area did not receive sufficient attention. Sun’s prosocialism and pro- agriculturist stance “was usually interpreted by some merchants and the
enemies of the KMT as the means of the KMT to oppress the merchant class.”118 In 1923, the
Canton Merchants’ Association was established. Sun Yat-sen then conferred a banner on the
Association, symbolizing the government's recognition. However, the merchants refused to
accept it.
It was against this background that the conflicts between the Merchants’ Corps and Sun’s
government led to the bloody confrontation a few months later. By mid-1924, the Canton
Merchants’ Corps was increasingly moving beyond their presupposed function of maintaining
civic order in the city. Rather, the well-equipped militia forces provided the Canton merchants
the condition under which they would obtain local power and challenge government authority. A
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number of confrontation activities, such as the disputes over the Twin Temples in 1923 and the
economic reform in 1924, all verged on military conflicts, which later appeared to be the
prologue to the bloody “Merchants’ Corps Incident” in October 1924. For several decades,
historians have analyzed the irreconcilability between merchants’ activism in Canton and Sun
Yat-sen’s revolutionary blueprints. They have focused on the economic and social reasons
behind the conflicts, but offered little attention to explain how these Canton merchants
challenged the government authority. When the government was not the sole holder of the
monopoly of violence, the merchants, who were backed by military power, sometimes forced the
government to compromise.
The Merchants’ Corps Incident
In May of 1924, Chen Lianbo and other leading merchants in Canton managed to build
an alliance with militia forces of other commercial cities, forming the Federation of Guangdong
Merchants’ Corps. Chen then moved in a significant manner to strengthen the Corps’ military
presence by procuring a large consignment of arms. To secure the procurement, the Merchants’
Corps succeeded in obtaining a permit in advance by paying the government a license fee of 100
yuan per gun (50,000 yuan in total). For decades, successive Guangdong governments regarded
the issuance of gun licenses as a significant mean to raise revenue, if militia refused to procure
weapons from the government directly.119 A few days later after their request was approved, a
Norwegian Freighter SS Hav shipped more than 9,000 small arms and some cannons from
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Europe to Canton. These imported small arms included 4850 rifles, 4331 Mauser pistols, 660
revolvers with a huge quantity of ammunition.120
Nevertheless, it turned out that the procurement was not progressing smoothly. It was
financed by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; Chen Lianbo was comprador of
the bank’s Canton branch. The arms were purchased through a German trading company in
Hong Kong, and were secured in Belgium. Thereafter, they were shipped by a Norwegian
freighter from Amsterdam to Canton, where they were consigned by the German firm of Saunder
and Wielder.121 However, the procurement was in light of the Arms Embargo Agreement of
1919, which was imposed by major Western powers aiming to reduce the internal fighting and to
restrict foreign intervention. In this case, there would be no legal restrictions for the purchase,
because governments of Norway and Germany did not sanction the 1919 Agreement.122 The
cargo was initially to be shipped to Hong Kong, a colony of Britain, which sanctioned the
Agreement. However, the embargo seemed to be widely violated.123 The Hong Kong official
possessed little passion to adhere to the embargo. When the cargo was on the way to Hong Kong,
Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, the governor of Hong Kong, refused the order from the British
government to stop the freighter in Hong Kong waters.124 It was shown later the freighter
deviated from the predetermined voyage route, and arrived in Canton on August 8.
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Upon its arrival in Canton, Sun Yat-sen immediately ordered Chiang Kai-shek to
intercept the freighter and confiscate all the arms. Such a huge numbers of firearms offered Sun
Yat-sen and his adherents adequate reason to suspect that Chen Lianbo was preparing a military
conspiracy to expel his “revolutionary government.” The merchants’ community was furious
about the seizure and once again, threatened a general strike until they received their weapons. 125
In a meeting between Sun Yat-sen and the Canton merchants, Sun explained to them that the
total number of arms far exceeded the amount stated on the permit.126
On October 10, 1924, celebrations were being held in most Chinese cities to
commemorate the thirteenth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. Known as
“Double Tenth Festival (雙十節 Shuangshijie),” the national holiday was established in 1912 to
celebrate the victory of the Wuchang Uprising (武昌起義 Wuchang qiyi) which overthrew both
the Manchu monarchy and Qing dynasty in 1911. This year’s celebration in Canton, however,
was shrouded in bloody conflict, rather than joy. Crowds of locals already jammed the fair-like
festivities in the early morning. When thousands of people, mainly composed of young students,
workers, and military cadets paraded in the city streets with their banners and flags, what awaited
them were not bursts of applause from the audience, but lethal bullets shot by armed individuals
of the Canton Merchant Corps. As the parade demanded the right to march through the spot
where the Corps was unloading their weapons, the exasperated Corps members refused their
request, which was likely to intensify their conflict. Someone among the Corps started shooting
at those bare-handed paraders, who at this moment were exposed to heavy gunfire on the street.
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According to one official statistic, the deadly attack had left eight people dead, including one
who was disemboweled, and hundreds wounded.127
History is always filled with contingency and surprise. The first shooter in the Corps
would never predict that his shots triggered a large-scale armed conflict between the Canton
merchant community and Guangdong government led by Sun Yat-sen. Right after the street
conflict, the Canton Merchants Association issued a general strike announcement, claiming that
Sun and his voracious government had been trampling Guangdong people’s interests, and calling
for further military action against Sun’s tyrannical rule in Guangdong.128 The armed conflict and
the threat from the Canton merchant community seemed to have enraged Sun, who then decided
to reassert his and his Nationalist Party’s political authority in Canton through a high-handed
policy to suppress and pacify the merchants’ armed force. Sun immediately organized a
revolutionary committee and also ordered his vice Generalissimo Hu Hanmin (胡漢民 18791936) to place Canton under martial law.
On the other side, the merchant community never ceded its anti-Sun activities. Not only
did the Association refuse the intermediation initiated by some civic organizations and the city’s
General Chamber of Commerce, but it went so far as to patrol in the market to punish any noncompliant merchants. The merchants’ confidence in confronting the government was by no
means unrealistic. In 1912, merchants in Canton established the Corps as a private militia force
equipped with imported weapons. By early 1924, the Corps had recruited more than 20,000
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members in and around Canton, each of whom had undergone at least six months of drills and
were armed with at least two guns.129 During the conflict, the leading merchants warned that
their armed Corps members had the prowess to expel any “outside power” and to maintain social
order in Canton. The belief that his government authority was being challenged, as well as the
fear of merchants’ potential conspiracy with his rival Chen Jiongming whose forces had fled to
eastern Guangdong after their military struggle in 1922, made Sun determined to suppress their
anti-government activities through coercive military means. The tension escalated on October 15
when Chiang Kaishek (蔣介石 1887-1975) moved the cadets of the newly established Whampoa
Military Academy (黃埔軍校 Huangpu junxiao) to Canton, which put the Merchants’ Corps in
jeopardy. Merchants’ rebellion was forcibly suppressed on the same day, leading to the death of
thousands of people, including Corps members and merchants, together with huge property
losses. As the China Weekly Review reported:
Canton has been horribly red… a Red Army of 40,000 terrorists red-washed 35 wards
and streets in the Western Suburb with the blood of aged and young who were too weak
to endure the rage of a Red Sun which pierced through them in the form of daggers and
bayonets and kerosene oil, the power of which has left a monument of hundreds of
blackened walls standing over debris, once the glory of 1600 homes and shops worth
more than $25,000,000 but now a grave of 6000 innocent men, women, and children who
perished.130
The Corps were quickly disarmed after the conflict, and their leaders declared
unconditional surrender. The commander of the Corps fled to Hong Kong and never came
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back.131 After the Incident, Sun’s reputation fell to a low ebb in Canton, and criticism of his
revolutionary government increased among Canton residents. The commercial situation in
Guangdong deteriorated over the next few years. Merchants were reluctant to expand their
business in Canton, where they believed the government provided no guarantee of their safety
and property.132 Though the suppression of the Merchants’ Corps made many Cantonese hate
Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary government, Sun recognized the importance of military power
and the danger of the unregulated popular forces. Soon after the suppression, Sun left Canton for
his national unification campaign. What he left to Canton was a disarmed merchants community,
a strengthened military, and a group of bureaucrats committed to achieving his national dream.
Conclusion
The case study of Guangdong allows us to examine the complexity of how the early
Republican government coexisted with armed populace in local society. As suggested in this
chapter, Sun Yat-sen, in the beginning, confronted the fact that a well-regulated force would be
reckoned with. His latter action of military suppression indicated that he consciously maintained
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a balance between the armed people and the government, which determined the government
policy towards private gun ownership could not be static and consistent.
This inconsistency could be drawn in some speeches of Sun Yat-sen in Guangdong. On
July 28, 1924, amid a swarm of Canton peasants who newly joined the Nationalist Party (GMD),
Sun Yat-sen, gave a passionate speech about the mobilization of peasants, in which he
particularly encouraged them to empower themselves with guns in a situation in which they
suffered from oppression and exploitation. Sun cited both the Hong Kong Seamen’s successful
strike a few days earlier that forced the Western capitalists to make a concession, and the Canton
merchants, who founded the well-equipped Volunteer Corps right after the 1911 Revolution and
made themselves the most prominent force in Guangdong society.133 He said, “you peasants
traditionally lack solidarity and have no recognition of the importance of organizing self-defense
units. To throw off the oppression, you (peasants) must unify and form cooperatives. Ablebodied young men (壯丁 zhuangding) should be selected for conscription into the self-defense
units. If so, the government could provide support and assistance by selling you guns at a
reasonable price. Once you are armed and render an effective force, you will be the country’s
first-class masters (主人翁 zhurenweng).”134
Sun Yat-sen’s speech championing the militarization of the Guangdong ordinary peasants
ran counter to his attitudes towards the Canton merchants a few days later. In September 1924,
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Sun openly denounced the merchants of Canton as defectors and bandits, who defied government
authority and sometimes forced the government to compromise with their military power.135 At
the time, Sun was about to stamp out the armed merchants and to exert government authority
over offenders. However, in the early month of that year, Sun indeed highly appreciated the role
of the Merchants’ Corps in the city when his newly established government had not monopolized
armed forces. In a speech to a joint meeting of the local police agency and the Corps, he used a
different rhetoric by applauding the Corps which would be reckoned with in his state-building
efforts.136
Sun Yat-sen, as historian David Strand puts it, was heavily committed to public speaking,
and “was often obliged to use words” to “achieve his political goals.”137 It appeared from Sun
Yat-sen’s three consecutive speeches that he expressed three utterly different and mercurial
attitudes towards the armed civilians. Even his attitudes to one specific group (the Canton
merchants in this case) was inconsistent. He encouraged and facilitated the peasants to arm
themselves; appreciated the Merchants’ Corps in maintaining order in Canton; blamed the Corps
later and then fiercely suppressed them. This chapter is a study of the inconsistency and
fluctuation towards the armed forces in the early Republican decades. In order to show how
governments’ different and changing ways of dealing with armed civilians affected the dynamic
of state-society relations, this chapter investigates both conflicts and collaborations behind the
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Canton Merchants’ Corps Incident, a unique aspect of Sun Yat-sen’s coercive rulership that
clearly illustrates the dynamic gun control politics.
Sun Yat-sen’s suppression of the armed merchants left a political legacy to the later
Republican decades. With the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, the
successor of Sun, endeavored to reintegrate Chinese society. Of all the policies in the way of
claiming the state monopoly on violence, Chiang’s Nanjing government immediately enacted a
law forbidding the formation of Merchants’ Corps in major commercial cities. He also made
regulation policies towards private gun ownership. However, the important element of local
militarization continued to exist, which appeared as the obstacles to his gun control agenda,
which will be addressed in the next chapter.
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~ CHAPTER FOUR~
Regulating Guns and State-building in Republican China
Introduction
After the suppression of the armed Canton Merchants in October 1924, the KMT and the
National Revolutionary Army (NRA) left Guangdong province to fulfill the Nationalist
unification agenda. In the summer of 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, now the Generalissimo of the NRA
took his troops into Beiping, indicating the Northern Expedition had been officially concluded.
China seemed to be entering a new era. The newly founded Nationalist government, now based
in Nanjing was unequivocally committed to penetrating the penetration of state power into local
society. Drawing lessons from the Canton Merchants’ Incident and recognizing the potential
threat from armed urban Corps, the Nanjing government enacted a law, seeking to restrict the
development of merchants’ Corps in major commercial cities.1 Several other attempts were made
to maintain social order and increase government power and authority over local society. Private
gun ownership and its regulation were an integral part of the state-building project undertaken
during the Nationalist era (1927-1949). Chinese officials followed gun policies adopted in the
late Qing and early Republic in claiming that regulation rather than total prohibition was the best
way to deal with private gun ownership.
That is to say, like their predecessors, the Nationalist era officials believed that the most
effective gun policy would be placing guns in the hands of “good people (良民 liangmin),” who
would use them in self-defense, while keeping them out of the hands of those who could threaten
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social order or the government’s agenda. When the founding of the Nanjing government in 1927
made the extensive state-building efforts possible, the central government set out its policy
regarding private gun ownership. As will be addressed below, gun registration, licensing,
stamping out gun trafficking gradually became standard practice in both urban and rural areas.
The purpose of this chapter is not only to review these regulation policies, though their
importance was evident to assess Republican China’s state-building efforts.
One goal of this chapter is to review these policies, which is essential to an assessment of
Republican China’s state-building efforts. Another goal is to explore how gun regulation was
implemented in local society. In many cases, things did not happen as envisioned. One such case
was that of Bie Tingfang (别廷芳 1883-1940), the ad hoc “local king” in Henan province’s
Ningxiang County, where he organized a militia force and operated primitive arsenals to
manufacture guns and ammunition. In July 1938, Chiang Kai-shek arranged a meeting with Bie
in Wuhan, the temporary capital of China at the time. In the meeting, Chiang praised him for
organizing collective-defense forces in which ordinary civilians armed themselves and offered
him a medal of honor. To even Bie’s surprise, his status as “local king” was then officially
recognized. After the meeting, Bie’s initiative of arming local peasants, who used their guns to
defend the communities was officially recognized. 2
Another case happened in 1939 when China was undergoing the trauma of the second
Sino-Japanese War. Chiang telegraphed Yan Xishan (阎锡山 1883-1960), a former warlord who

Neixiangxian Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui 內鄉縣文史資料委員會, Neixiang wenshi ziliao: Bie
Tingfang shilu 內鄉文史資料: 別廷芳實錄 (Local History of Neixiang County: Special Edition
on Bie Tingfang) (Neixiang: Zhonagguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi, Neixiang xian
weiyuan hui, 1985), 63-4. For a detailed introduction about Bie Tingfang’s activities in Henan,
See Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in Modern China.
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still maintained de facto control in Shanxi province. Chiang issued a stern warning to Yan not to
confiscate any guns from peasants to “endure harmony between government and the masses.”3
If we examine these two cases from the lens of privately-owned guns, it becomes clear
that the government in certain circumstances made concessions when regulating the armed
populace. From the late 1910s, Bie Tingfang organized unsanctioned militia forces in Neixiang
Country, which provided essential backing for his ambition of controlling local society. To
bolster his military strength, Bie and his followers not only seized weapons from other militia
forces, and also operated a number of community based arsenals to manufacture rifles and
pistols.4 Bie’s private manufacturing of guns was obviously not officially sanctioned, according
to the gun regulation law. Yet, this did not prevent him from receiving government recognition.
Bie’s domination in local power structure and active role in protecting local communities forced
the government to forge a compromised relationship with him. The firearm regulation was not
consistently implemented in wartime China. If the law prevented the rebels, bandits, and other
outlaws from owning any firearms, Chang’s order to Yan Xishan in 1938 suggested that the state
made compromise by adopting a lax attitude towards armed civilians, no matter their status as
law-abiding civilian gun owners or not.
These cases are two ordinary examples among many that illustrate the government’s
policy could be negotiated and compromised with respect to certain circumstances. Then, how
do we understand the inconsistency of the government’s policy towards private gun owners? As

3

Academia Historica, 002-090300-00205-210.

Nanyang Diqu Difang Shizhi Bianzuan Bangongshi 南陽地區地方史誌編纂辦公室, ed.
Nanyang Diquzhi 南阳地区志 (Gazetteer of Nanyang County), vol 2 (Zhengzhou: Zhengzhou
renmin chubanshe, 1988), 3.
4

186

Edward McCord puts it, the local strongmen “might stand as obstacles to state penetration of
their communities, in return for political support they could also perform as state agents for this
penetration.”5 The focus of this chapter is not to repeat what previous studies have fully
demonstrated that state’s endeavors to penetrate local society. Using previous scholarship as
baseline, this chapter seeks to examine how the proliferation of guns in local society generated
political responses, as a new angle to scrutinize the dynamics between state and society. My
findings indicate that although the National government were deeply committed to state-building
between 1927 and 1949, it did not claim absolute monopoly of violence, but adopting a
regulatory approach to cope with the private gun ownership. Nevertheless, as I will argue below,
its policy was inconsistent when the strong local society, partially as a result of the proliferation
of guns, precluded effective regulation, which forced the government to make concessions.
A focus on the nexus of state and armed populace in gun regulation can yield new
perspectives of the Chinese society during the Nationalist era. The Nationalist government’s
regulatory approach towards private gun ownership allows us to examine how a weak state
viewed its relations with the strong society. As discussed in the chapter two, Chinese
government, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, adopted a “reliance/control” model to
resolve its relationship with local power. When China was confronting both external threat and
unfavorable domestic conditions, its regulation became contingent and lax. The exploration of
the history of regulating guns allows us to see that modern China was concerned with
establishing a balanced relation with local society. This chapter starts with an introduction about
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how the private gun ownership was regulated during the Republican period, and then discusses
the difficulties in carrying out the regulations.
Regulating Private Gun Ownership in Republican China
From the mid-eighteenth century until the early twentieth century, the Chinese
government had no interest in enacting specific legal provision empowering people to own guns
in defense of themselves and their communities. As the second chapter suggested, prior to the
late nineteenth century, the Qing authorities believed that there was an explicit link between
firearm ownership and the increasing risk of uncontrollable violence and insurgency. Only after
China experienced a successive series of foreign defeats and domestic rebellions from the late
nineteenth century, did the governments see putting guns in the hands of ordinary people as
being the extension of state power. The prerequisite was that armed civilians were properly
trained and regulated. At the same time, the state also sought to control the supply of guns and to
stamp out their use by the ones who were regarded as threats to public order and central
authority. The policy of gun licensing or registration proposed by Shen Jiamen in 1908, for
instance, was meant to decrease the danger of violence and to prevent any rebellious or
revolutionary actions. Despite the fact that the Qing dynasty collapsed shortly after these
regulatory approaches were proposed, they laid the basis for the successive governments to deal
with the issue of private gun ownership.
The approach of what I term “control/reliance” continued to be adopted during the
Republican period. The persistence ascribed to the common political and social circumstances
that both the late Qing and Republican governments faced. The decline of the central grip forced
the successive governments to cede central power to local individuals and groups, so that they
could help the central authorities to maintain local order and to defeat the uprisings. At the same
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time, the state also made efforts to guarantee that the empowerment should not challenge the
state authority and legitimacy. The major aspects of the regulatory efforts, which aimed to place
gun in the hands of the right people, were as follows.
The Surveillance over Militia’s Guns and Ammunition
Not only the organization and operation of both rural and urban militia forces, but their
use of weapons were also subjected to government supervision. Two years after the founding of
the Republic, the Beiyang government in Beijing issued the Self-Defense Militia Decree (地方保
衛團條例 Difang baoweituan tiaoli), the purpose of which are two-fold. First, the newly founded
government offered legitimacy to self-defense forces and acknowledged their policing function.
Second, it aimed to consolidate all local defense forces into one controllable policing body. The
Beiyang government also expressed special concern over the militia use of firearms. As required
by the decree, “all of the militiamen’s guns should be registered to provincial government.” It
also added that “if new firearms were indispensable under special circumstances, the request
must be approved by provincial governors.”6 The decree did not mark any significant departure
from the late Qing in terms of firearm regulations. However, in a few months, the Beijing
government issued another order to provincial governors, prohibiting any people or groups from
acquiring guns from local governments. This marked a radical shift in gun policy, as the state
was worried about an armed populace had potential to bring threat to local society. The state also
concerned with the high possibility that militiamen transferred their guns to bandits resulted in a
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grip on firearm supply. Late in the year 1914, the Beijing government ordered explicitly to ban
any people from acquiring guns from local governments.7
Nevertheless, the Beijing government’s effort at centralization of militia forces was
doomed by the unwillingness to cooperate of the provincial authorities, who were seeking
provincial autonomy as opposed to Yuan Shikai’s central control. Yuan’s order banning local
government from providing firearms to militia forces was often ignored. One example of local
government working to support the formation of the armed militia can be seen in the Fengtian
province of Manchuria, which was under the control of warlord Zhang Zuolin. The Fengtian
government initially passed the order to local counties, but soon after, the ban was lifted. The
new order strongly encouraged militia forces to acquire enough weapons against malicious
bandits:
It is reported that the new militia groups are being formed, but the guns and ammunitions
are not adequate in defense of the local communities. The government now requires that
any respective militia should acquire weapons from government to prevent banditry, if
not already prepared.8
The local government sponsorship of the armed militia occurred in many other places as
well. In the Quzhou County of Zhili Province, “owing much to the support of local gentry, who
provided fund to procure modern guns, county magistrate immediately recruited militia units and
worked out the structure of the new force.”9 As discussed in chapter three, successive
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Guangdong governments barely rejected the request from local magistrates who organized local
militia forces with the assistance of elite.
The effectiveness of such regulation and control efforts, however, lay in the coercive
power of the state. The practice originated in the late Qing became institutionalized in the early
Republican period. The establishment of the Republic in 1912 failed to bring unity and stability
to an already fragile society, which had suffered from a successive series of foreign defeats and
domestic turmoil. But instead, warlordism emerged as the fall of the Qing dynasty made the
major check on regional autonomy vanished. Scholarly research on the emergence of warlordism
has concluded that military prowess was crucial in establishing and maintaining warlords’
dominant status in their respective sphere of interests.10 Thus, the extent of their acquisition of
weapons became the basis of their military dominance. Once they secured the positions of
power, respective warlords made efforts to create firearm laws.
During the early Republican period, the consistent civil conflicts among warlords and the
decentralization of political power made it difficult to regulate military weapons. Warlord in
their respective ruling areas created a series of laws or regulations of the weapons carried by
their soldiers. However, due to their ruling power never ceasing to change, these regulations
were also subject to change. Nevertheless, most warlords acknowledged the potential threat
posed by the runoff of their weapons. The provide a consistent view about the regulations upon
military weapons, this section uses the regulation in the Manchuria as a case study, because the
region remained politically stable from the 1910s to the early 1930s, when the Japan came to
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establish the Manchuguo. During this period, the whole region was controlled by the Zhang
family and their gun control policies remained stable as well.
In late 1916, the Fengtian provincial government noticed that “the frequent banditry
forced local attached armies to apply guns, rifles, and bullets to defend the threats. However,
they failed to report the procession of any broken or surplus guns. The military weapon should
be carefully monitored. Otherwise, the danger will follow.”11 The government ordered all the
counties to report meticulously about their broken and unused weapons to avoid these weapons
to be used by outlaws.12 The government also recognized that some soldiers pawned their
weapons secretly for profits, which led the government to make laws against such phenomena. A
case like this was reported in the Shengyang based Shengjing shibao in 1919. “Zhang Zuoxiang,
the garrison commander, admonished that most military weapons were owned by the country,
the private transfer of which was illegal. However, some ignorant soldiers pawned them for
profit. This is unreasonable. From now on, on the behalf of military government, all the pawn
shop should not accept weapon.” In the 1923, the commander in chief enacted another harsh
laws prohibiting the military individuals from transferring their weapons by all means.13
In other provinces as well, the military leaders feared the diffusion of firearms from
military camps to the local society. Once caught, these military weapons were confiscated
immediately, and any concerned individuals should suffer from strict punishments. In 1917, the
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army garrisoned in Baoding 保定, the provincial capital of Zhili, found that an ordinary soldier
stole two rifles and wanted to sell them to local merchants. His behaviors were found by
detectives, who arrested both transaction sides.14 The soldier later was sentenced to death. Even
though local governments made their respective laws in regulating military weapons, the case of
illegal transfers occurred endlessly. As we addressed before, these regulations were always
futile.
During the late Qing period, as we discussed in the second chapter, local militia had to
submit application to local government before purchasing weapons. Local magistrate always
reviewed their applications carefully before making any decisions. In 1910, one militia of the
Xiangshan County of the Guangdong Province made request to local magistrate for rifles and
other firearms.15 The magistrate approved first but suspended their order, due to their application
letter did not indicate the numbers of militia members. In 1911, the Guangdong Bureau of
Ordnance formulated a detailed order, which requires that in a formal application, it should
include the reason of organizing armed militia, the members of the force, and the source of
financial support. According to the order, “thereafter, all the militia forces in the counties had to
prepare sufficient fund and recruit militia members before submitting application to the
government. The gentry who are usually responsible of organizing militias should assure that the
weapons would not be borrowed or transferred. The request must be sent to the county
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government, which will review its militia members and other requirements. All of these details
will be reviewed carefully before issuing any licenses.”16
After the 1911 revolution, the governor-general of Manchuria issued an order to all the
prefectures and counties, saying that “the central government in Beijing now ordered that the
militia forces organized by gentry must be carefully inspected. The purposes of militia forces are
to defend localities. However, there are some flaws in the systems. In the future, the militia
forces could not purchase any types of weapons without government approval. In doing so, the
rebels and bandits would not have any chance to get guns.” 17
When the central government sent this order, the Qing court was not collapse yet.
However, the Qing court recognized the dangers of the existence of armed people in society.
Besides the unregulated militia forces, the Qing government was worried about the social turmoil
will be again destroyed its ruling foundation. The gun control was tight again to reclaim its
monopoly over the violence. The tight control over arms, however, did not stop the revolutionary
enterprise. In the early 1912, the Qing dynasty collapsed. In 1913, the Fengtian government was
required to regulate the guns owned by the militia forces.
“As for the weapons for the militias, it has been prohibited already. However, it is heard
that local government did not take it seriously. The establishment of militia and merchants’ corps
were sanctioned by the government. Even from the late Qing, there was no law prohibiting the
organization of militias. However, these militia forces were not good in quality at all. Some
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disorganized militias might post threat to local order. The distribution of guns to militia had no
standard regulations. Thereafter, all the provinces should set up definite law the regulating the
procurement of firearms. All the procurement must be submitted to the central government for
careful review.”18
It seems that the new policy that tightened the procurement of firearms indeed made the
acquisition of firearms difficult. According to an editorial that appeared in the Shengjing Shibao
in 1913, “In Jilin province, the local paramilitary forces now needed foreign guns to defend the
localities. In the previous days, they could get the weapon from the government through local
council, but now they had to apply a special permit from local and above government. After
approval, they would be eligible to get them.”19 In the meantime, the Fengtian government also
issued an order that requiring all the local council to carefully review the request from militias.
After receiving the request, local council was asked to submit the request to local government
and military sections. The Fengtian governor Zhang Xiluan also ordered his subordinates to
consider the militias’ qualities before issuing any firearm permits. As addressed in these
accounts, the government in the Manchuria recognized that militia forces had a penchant to have
advanced guns from the government. However, these laws and regulations suggest the local
officials were resolute to maintain their monopoly over the violence.
The early Republican government did not destroy any law established by the late Qing
government, especially about the firearm control laws. The Beiyang government in 1914 enacted
a law entitled “Regulations on Local Self-Defense Forces,” in which it clearly stated that “all the
“Junxieju Shenzhong Junxie 軍械局慎重軍械” (The Bureau of Ordance is cautious about
military weapn), Shengjing shibao, January 21, 1913.
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militia members who had guns or other firearms had to obtain the license from local government
and to have their guns seared. In a situation that additional weapons are required, application
must be submitted to local government in advance.”20 Such law had nothing difference with the
order made by the late Qing government, as suggested in the second chapter. The state saw the
militia as an extension of the state power, which was difficult to penetrate into local society.
However, the firearm control took an opposite turn a couple months later. In November
1914, the Beiyang government issued an order again to prohibit the distribution of firearms to
local militia forces. According to the order, “in recent days, some reports suggest that militia
members become bandits with their guns, or lend their guns to bandits. We have to stamp out
this phenomenon, otherwise, the consequence would be disaster.” 21The central government then
issued a letter to all the provinces, requiring that ordinary people would no longer get guns or
bullets from the government.” In 1917, the Beiyang government set up a guideline of organizing
the merchants corps, named “The Organization Guideline of Merchants Corps,” in which
regulated that “the guns or other firearms owned by the merchants corps had to be distributed in
terms of the number of corps members. The local government must send relevant document to
the provincial government, which then signed and send it to the military bureau. The Department
of Peasants and Merchants would calculate the price of the arms. The Corps had to state in
details about why they required guns.”22
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Generally speaking, the government wanted to maintain its monopoly on violence and
guaranteed its authority would not be challenged by an armed populace. Thus, gun control policy
was bound to be strict to maintain its monopoly. However, starting from the late Qing period,
China suffered from a “state involution” process, in which the state’s authority was hardly
appreciated by local society.23 In short, the state was not able to control the provinces. The
provincial governors were charged with local affairs. After the fall of the Qing dynasty, political
decentralization was accelerated along with the weakness of the central Beiyang government.
Therefore, the orders issued by the Beiyang government could not be carried out effectively in
provinces. In the meantime, local provincial governors also relied on local gentry, who were the
most zealous of developing local militia forces. Therefore, the government’s firearm control
policy was not appreciated by provinces. The existing sources suggest that the government was
more likely to encourage the gentry to develop militia forces. What they did was simply warning
local gentry that the firearms should be carefully contained.
Under such situation, both local government and gentry or merchants did not take the
prohibitory order seriously. For example, in November 1914, when the Fengtian government
received the order, the governor issued it to local governments, ordering that “all the people and
governments had to comply with the law.”24 On the other hand, however, the governor also
called for the organization of militia forces, and claiming that “now the self-defense bureau is set
up, thereafter, local militia forces required firearms and weapons in large amount. Otherwise, it
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is hard to defend localities. If militia requires bullets, such a request should be sent to
government immediately to avoid banditry.”25
In Guangdong province, the situation was rather similar. In the early 1912, the
Guangdong Chamber of Commerce suggested establishing a Merchants’ Corps to the provincial
government. In the application, it is indicated that the Chamber of Commerce could also serve as
bondsman for the procurement of weapons. Such a request was immediately approved by the
Guangdong government, which was now controlled by the revolutionaries, rather than the
Beiyang government in Beijing. In 1913, when Long Jiguang took over the Guangdong province,
the governor also encouraged local gentry to organize militia forces. If guns were necessary, “the
county magistrate must make sure the necessity and then acquired guaranty from local influential
people. The request would be sent to provincial government before firearms distribution.”
According to these accounts, the governments in the early Republican period established
relatively lax firearm control policies in comparision with the Qing. In 1924, the county
magistrate of Gaoyao wrote to Sun Yat-sen, asking for five hundred rifles. Sun did not reject its
request. A lot of requests like this suggest that any levels of government or individuals had no
difficulties to obtain guns, once they had someone assure their guns would not be used by
bandits. In the June of the same year, the Da Tangbao of Taishan County also applied to buy one
hundred rifles. The local government reviewed their request carefully, and noticed that their
application document did not show the quantities of existing guns. When the document was
supplemented, their request was approved without any difficulty.
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In 1924, the Guangdong arsenal set up a regulation on the distribution of guns to local
militia. In this regulation, it clearly stated that:
First, for the militia forces with a desire to arm with guns, they should submit their
request to county government. The arsenal would not issue their order before receiving approval
from the grand marshal.
Second, as for the rifle, the price would be 160 yuan. The maximum amount of bullets for
each militia is 200. Each bullet worth 20 yuan.
Third, if militia has special requirement on the design of the weapon, a letter of
endorsement is required from the government. In the first month, twenty percent of weapons
would be distributed. The rest would be distributed within three months.
Forth, all of the rifles would be sealed with using guidelines. These guns would be
registered by provincial government. They are awaiting future inspection.
Fifth, the local government had the responsibility to inspect the weapons owned by local
militias. When receiving weapons, militia leaders should report their weapons with detailed
information to local government without any delay.26
According to the regulation established in 1924, it is evident that it aimed to regulate the
weapon use by the militia forces, and in the meantime, it also encouraged the organization of
armed militias. In October of 1924, the military commander of Guangdong, Xu Chongzhi, also
wanted to simplified the procedure of obtaining guns by militia forces. He ordered that “at this
moment, the militia leader could apply their request to the military government directly, and do
not have to submit their request to arsenals.”27
Though both the late Qing and early Republican governments allowed the common
people to own guns for self-defense. Most guns were held, however, by the militia forces.
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Therefore, the government noticed that to regulate civilian weapons, the regulation of militia
weapons was inevitable.
For example, Sichuan province in 1908 issued a statute regulating the militia weapons. In
it, it stated that “as for the militia forces scattered in localities, the foreign guns should be
inspected by local government. These guns must be sealed and registered with local
government… The provincial government should inspect these guns at least once per quarter. If
the gun was lost or lent out to others, the militia leaders must be punished heavily.” In the
meantime, Sichuan government also regulated that “other than weapons owned by militias, those
guns owned by ordinary people without government sanction should be confiscated. These gun
owners could be compensated. Those who refused to turn their guns in would be published.”28
The regulation upon the militia weapons was in place during the late Qing period. In
1901, the Guangdong Bureau of Military Logistics established a more detailed regulation over
the militias and their weapons.
“After the militia purchased weapons, its leader had to report to the local government.
The militia also needs to report if they had used the guns against bandits. If any guns were lost,
they had to report immediately to the government.
Local government is required to inspect the militia weapons regularly. If they fail to
fulfill their duties, they would be punished. If the guns or bullets got lost, the militia leaders
would be punished. If some militia members transfer the weapon to bandits, they would be
arrested immediately.
The distribution of guns is based on how many militia members. If some members leave
the militia, their guns must be turned in immediately. If the militia forces dismissed, all of their
weapons must be collected by local government without delay.
The information on the quantities of guns and their maintaining records, along with the
registration records would be open to the public.”29
“Jin Mintuan Sishou Qiangdan 禁民團私售槍彈” (To ban militia forces from selling firearms
and ammunitions), Shenbao, July 12, 1908.
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In 1909, the Bureau once again revised the statute, and emphasized that “thereafter, local
gentry should report the use of weapons by militia forces to the provincial government every
year. If the guns were used to stamp out bandits, a letter is required. Different levels of
governments should inspect the guns owned by militia forces.”30
According to the statute, the Guangdong government of the late Qing granted the power
to regulate militia forces to the local government. The organization of militia forces had to be
approved in advance by local government. Then, the local government had absolute power to
regulate and control the militia weapons. The officials in local government were also required to
inspect the militia force on a routine basis. There are many similar regulation across the country.
These regulations require the officials to oversee the ownership of weapons by militia. As we
know, the routine inspection is a duty for the local officials, who in reality, on rare occasion
inspected the militia guns.
After the Republic of China was established, almost all the provincial governments set up
policies toward the weapons owned by militia forces. In 1921, Jiangsu Province promulgated the
law on regulating militia and civilian weapons. It clearly stated that “all of the weapons owned
by militias, no matter whether they were used or not, had to be registered with the local
government. The registration included the types of guns, quantities, seal numbers, and other
information. The inspection of firearms had three steps. First, the gun should be sealed with
unique number. Second, the information must be registered. Third, a license will be issued.”31
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These regulations and laws were collected in the Xianzheng Quanshu in 1925, which was
used during the Republican period as a guideline to manage local affair for local magistrate. The
Xianzheng Quanshu also served as guideline about how the regulate or control civilian gun
ownership. According to the Xianzheng Quanshu, “all of private armies with defense purposes
should be purchased through county magistrate. The guns must be sealed and then distributed to
local people. The guns must be registered with local government and disclose their usage
monthly.”32
The similar regulation also appeared in Guangdong. In 1913, the Guangdong government
enacted “Regulations on the Militia Forces,” in which it clearly stated that all counties if bought
guns from other channels, rather than the government, militia leaders have to report to county
government immediately. The county government had the duties to collect these guns and seal
them before they could be used by militia members.”33
A glance at the gun regulations established during the early Republican period reveals
that the policies were embodied in two aspects. First, all the government emphasized the
importance of engraving of guns to assure these guns were used legally. Second, inspection is
also required by law to assure that the guns were kept by local militia forces, rather than other
outlaws.
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Gun Licensing and Registration
The late Qing’s attempts to mobilize armed people to regain control over society
backfired when popular armed forces undermined the state’s monopoly on violence. But a
variety of gun regulation measures targeting at armed individuals including registration,
periodical inspection, and licensing originated during the late Qing formed an important legacy
to the Republican period. Though the rise of provincialism after the founding of the Republic
troubling the implementation of a uniform gun control law, most provinces, acting in concert
with the central government, all adopted independent policies regarding private gun ownership.
These gun regulation policies, despite the local variations, appeared to follow a similar logic and
purpose. The major goal of regulating gun owners was to put guns in the hands of those people
who would not use their weapons to commit illegal acts.
To purchase a gun, the law-abiding civilians had to meet specific requirement designed
by either central or local governments. The common procedure is to get a purchasing permit
from local government in advance, providing proof of their status as “good civilians.” What was
the status to be a “good civilian?” In the spring of 1922, the Ministry of War of the Beiyang
government telegraphed to the Fengtian Province, specifying the qualification of the purchaser.
According to this decree, any people living in the rural regions had to meet the minimum
property requirement. In Fengtian for instance, a good civilian was obliged to provide
information about the arable land (at least 750 acres) and housing (at least 20 rooms). If the
family did not meet the requirement, he might not occupy certain official rankings.34

“Qudi Qiangxie zhi Tongling 取締槍械之通令” (The order to stamp out guns), Shengjing
shibao, February 18, 1922.
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In the December of 1926, the Nationalist Revolutionary Army enacted the first
nationwide gun control law “The Statute on the People’s Self-Defense Guns” in which Chiang
Kai-shek’s military government ordered all the weapons owned by either ordinary individuals or
militia forces had to be reported to his government. The purpose of establishing the policy was to
have the compliance of the gun owners. However, if we look at the policy closely, the policy
placed too many requirements on the local gentry and militia leaders. It was difficult to make all
these strongmen follow the government order as expected. In a period that the state had no direct
control over the local society, the firearm control was hardly effective. In 1925, the Canton
Municipal Police admitted that “the government only issues gun licenses and engraves their
guns. It never addressed the issue of illegal ownership of guns, which caused more serious
problems.”35
The governments in Manchuria had similar regulations as Guangdong. In 1912, the
governor-general of Guangdong Zhao Erxun ordered all the counties to report the guns owned by
local militia forces. He also ordered the foreign firearm merchants to stop selling any types of
weapons to people without government licenses.36 Based on the newspaper accounts, Zhao’s
order was quickly carried out by local counties. County magistrates sent working reports to
Zhao, reporting the policy has been implemented. The Liaoyang County reported that “the
magistrate dispatched police to investigate the use of firearms among militias and then seals their
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weapons.” In 1922, Jilin province enacted similar regulations, which required all the weapons
owned by police forces, militias, and ordinary individuals to be registered. 37
The regulation of guns owned by ordinary individuals had three aspects. First, the
government set up the qualification of individuals who could buy guns. In 1915, for example,
Fengtian government carried out a policy that designed the qualification of armed people. “The
Manchuria was famous for its frequent banditry. Many ordinary peasants purchased guns for
self-defense. This has been sanctioned by government. In recent days, local government reported
many cases of robbery and banditry. These robbers and bandits all were equipped with guns. It is
possible that the peasants who had guns in home are likely to assist bandits and outlaws. If one
gun was lost among ordinary people, then a bandit would get one gun. If so, the consequence
would be disastrous. The self-defense power was not strong among the people, police force and
militias, and collective defense forces are necessary. In the meantime, the guns owned by
ordinary people should be closely monitored.”38
If we read this letter closely, it is evident that the Fengtian government took the private
gun ownership for granted. The government noticed that it was legal to own guns by ordinary
people, but was also worried about the regulation of these scattered guns. In this statement, the
government merely ordered local government officials to deal with the issues, but failed to point
out the content at all.

“Qudi Qiangzhi zhi Tongling 取締槍支之通令” (The order to stamp out civilians’ guns),
Shengjing Shibao, February 18, 1922.
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In 1917, Fengtian government went further to regulate the qualifications of individuals
who were eligible to purchase guns. “In recent days, the bandits disturbed localities with guns. It
seemed that they had powerful foreign guns and countless bullets. It could be speculated that
these bandits got these weapons from ordinary armed civilians, because it was hardly possible
for these bandits to buy guns without government approval. In order to stamp out bandits, it is
necessary to regulate the civilian weapons. Thereafter, only rich families whose properties worth
more than three thousand dollars were eligible to purchase guns. Even if the families were rich,
they did not hair brave men, these families were not eligible to purchase guns.”39
In 1921, Jilin province enacted a new law about the private gun ownership, because the
1917 regulation was “hardly implemented.” The new gun control law changed the requirement of
property. “All the merchants and people have to meet the following requirement to get the
license to purchase a gun. The merchants should own more than two thousand yuan, or owned
more than 10 mu land and 5 rooms, or rent land for more than 20 mu. The merchants also require
some others who could write warranty for them. The guns must also obtain license from local
government and got registered. If any guns or weapons lost, the owners have to report to local
government immediately. After the privately-owned guns get registered, the owners should have
their weapons inspected twice per year by local government.”40
The regulation in reality set a precondition for the gun purchase. According to the law,
only wealthy families, including merchants, landlords, and other businessmen could get guns

“Jinmin Maiqiang zhi Bugao 禁民買槍之佈告” (The announcement to ban people from
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lawfully. However, the policy was difficult to implement. First, even if the eligible merchants,
they had to purchase their guns from government, which was much expensive than other
channels. Second, to get the license, they had to find some other people to serve as their
guarantors, which was hard. In the meantime, some poor families for the sake of self-defense
also obtained their weapons from smugglers or in black market, which was invisible to the
government. In practice, the law enacted by the Jilin and Fengtian provinces were fruitless.
There are also other provinces establishing similar requirements for the purchase of guns.
In 1920, Jiangsu provinces enacted similar regulations. “One civilians who satisfy the following
requirements are eligible to own guns. First, any corporations or organizations registered with
local government. Second, civilians with formal occupation. Third, wealthy merchants.”41 The
law also regulated the quantities of guns ought to be owned by each household. Each household
only could get five guns maximum. All the weapons had to be reported to government.
Some counties in particular encouraged eligible merchants or gentry to purchase guns.
For example, the Yi County of Fengtian province encouraged the wealthy gentry to purchase
guns for the purpose of collective defense. Though these guns would be prepared by these
individuals, as suggested by the council meeting, they could be organized by local county to
organize militia forces. To deal with the loss of privately-owned guns, some counties also helped
maintain these guns. In one county of Fengtian, “the police department noticed the frequent loss
of civilian guns, which channeled the banditry. The government encouraged these armed
civilians sold their guns to the Police Department, or turned their guns in with compensation. In
the season when banditry was frequent, these guns would be mobilized to form collective
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defense forces.”42 Existing sources do not disclose the implementation of this policy. It is likely
that setting up the qualification of armed civilians did not prevent illegal civilian ownership.
Another policy that was used to regulate civilian weapons was gun registration. From the
Qing dynasty to the Republican period, sealing on the guns and then registering with local
government became the common way to keep civilian weapons under control. In 1914, Canton
Municipal Government carried out a policy requiring “all the officials who conducted survey in
local counties had to investigate the circulation of civilian weapons, and have these weapons
sealed.” “After the guns were sealed, local government should inspect their registration
immediately.”43 Each gun was assigned a specific number for tracking its usage. During the
whole Republican period, the government used three steps to have civilian guns under
surveillience: sealing, numbering, and registration. The well-known Shengjing Shibao 盛京时报
reported largely about the registration of civilian weapons.
The gun licence was issued to the civilian gun owners who were sanctioned by local
government to bear their weapons. The policy was not carried out until the early 1900s, and then
continued to be implemented during the Republican period. In 1913, after the failure of the
Second Revolution, politics in Guagndong once again became quite complex because Chen
Jiongming and Sun Yat-sen were pushed out of power by the Guangxi Clique army, which was
allied with President Yuan Shikai, who was engaged in a political and military battle with Sun
over the nature of the Republican regime in Beijing. In 1913, Long Jiguang, who was warlord of

“Qudi Minyou Qiangxiean 取締民有槍械案” (The order to ban civilian gun ownership),
Shengjing shibao, September 10, 1913.
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the Guangxi Clique ruled most of Guangdong on behalf of Yuan Shikai until late 1917. When
Long arrived in Guangdong, he carried out a massive campaign to stamp out Sun Yat-sen’s
remnants. Fearing the armed civilians posting threat against his military government, Long
reclaimed that “if anyone concealed the gun without obtaining licenses from government, they
should be punished.”44 It is hard to measure how the policy was implemented. The control of gun
in the chaotic period was extremely important to maintain the warlords’ prominent status.
Some counties in Guangdong also enacted specific regulations towards private gun
ownership. In 1922, the Taishan County of Guangdong established a law, requiring “(1) All the
armed individuals or groups, if not those police or soldiers, must obtain gun license; (2) To apply
the license, one should submit their application in person in local police department. (3) The
application should clearly identify the name, occupation, detailed description of guns, the
quantities of bullets, and other necessary information. (4) The armed individuals are required to
obtain a letter of endorsement from local gentry, who assure their guns are used for self-defense
purpose only.”45 The new law also listed the price for licenses. It should be noted that the
government made differences among the types of guns. For the advanced Mauser, Colt, and
other foreign guns, the price is five yuan, while the outmoded guns deserved much less price for
the license. Certainly, the government also required local police to keep close eyes to these
licensed guns to avoid any lost.
Long Jiguang’s Guangxi Clique did not rule long in Guangdong. In late 1917, his troops
were again defeated by Sun yat-sen and his ally Chen Jiongming, who then established a
44
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claiming to be the legitimate Republican government. The alliance between Sun and Chen
Jiongming ended in 1922. After a military conflict between Sun and Chen, Chen was chased
from Guagndong and fled to the eastern part of the province and was finally defeated in 1925.
Thereafter, Sun used Guangdong as his headquarter of his North Expedition. In 1923, Sun Yatsen enacted a statute entitled ‘The Regulation on Civilian Weapons,” in which it identified the
qualification of armed civilians and the procedure of license application. “The gun license is
required for civilian gun holders in urban area. One must submit their name, home address,
occupation, and other information on the guns to the government. A letter of endorsement by
wealthy merchant is still required. As for the rural area, government recognizes the letter of
endorsement from merchant is difficult to obtain. The letter could be sent from local gentry or
other prominent individual in village.”46 All the licenses would be issued by Sun Yat-sen’s
Republican government only.
The mechanism of gun licensing changed from the late Qing to Republican period. The
early Republican government required every single gun should be licensed, rather than one
license for all, as late Qing government did. So called “one gun, one license,” the new policy
aimed to make a difference between “legal” and “illegal” guns. When the police inspected guns,
the license became the sole standard. The law also required that the license is required to transfer
the ownership of guns. The mechanism indicated that the government acknowledged the
popularity of guns in society, and also made the ownership of guns legal. When Chiang Kai-shek
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unified China in 1928, the issuance of gun licenses turned out to be the typical way to manage
civilian weapons.
It should be noted that the early Republican government only required armed individuals
to apply for gun licenses. Militia forces and merchants Corps, as discussed in the previous
chapters, would not need licenses for every single weapon. As mentioned in the second chapter,
one channel of the circulation of guns during the Republican period was the transference from
the sanctioned militias to outlaws or other demanded individuals. Therefore, the policy which
aimed exclusively at the individual guns also generated some social programs. It failed to resolve
the problem that some militia member might sell their weapons to bandits or other outlaws. The
government was not unaware of this social problem. In 1925, Guangdong government issued the
amendment to the “Statute of Civilians Weapons.”
First, the statute aims at stamping out illegal civilian weapons to maintain social order.”
Second, the Ministry of Military of the Guangdong Government is responsible for
regulating civilian weapons.
Third, the Bureau of Police was the sole government organ to issue gun license in
Guangdong. Local bureau of police should collect the materials from armed individuals and
submitted them to the Ministry of Military, which will review their qualifications.
Fourth, each single gun should have one license. For the cannon, the same policy applies.
Fifth, applicants should also pay the license fee.
Sixth, all the guns and other firearms, no matter they owned by individuals or by
collective forces, should have licenses with them. Otherwise, the owner would be punished. The
gun licensing policy also applies to the one who worked in government or military, but owned
guns for individual use.47
The new policy clearly states that all the guns and cannons should be entitled to obtain
licenses. Cannons were not typical weapons for individuals with defensive purposes. Only

“Huangqu Renmin Ziwei Qiangzhi Zhizhao zhi Bugao 換取人民自衛槍支執照之佈告”
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militias, some villages, and commercial ship owned cannons for collective defense, while the
guns were owned mostly by ordinary individuals. The new law also required that individuals
who worked in government and military registered their personal weapons with local
government. Letters of endorsement were required to get the gun licenses. The new policy
indicated that the previous gun sealing practice gradually gave way to the gun licenses. The gun
sealing proved ineffective to keep gun owners lawful. The guns with seals would be transferred
or stolen. Local police could not make sure the holders of sealed guns were its lawful owners.
Nevertheless, the gun licensing policy also encountered many challenges when it was
carried out in local society. The Sanshui County of Guangdong province, for example, wrote to
Guangdong government in 1926, complaining that “after the new law was enacted, no one
applied gun license in local government.”48 The County magistrate explained that “the new
statute states that letter of endorsement from wealthy merchants or wealthy gentry are necessary
to get a license. However, in some remote areas, there are few business exiting and armed
civilians could not find one to write the letter. In the meantime, guns as tools for defense, had
potential to kill others. Even if there were merchants and gentry in local village, few of them ran
risk to write the letter.”49
After Guangdong government received the complaint, the Military Council made slight
change on the law, and claimed that “As for the people living in remote region, if there is no
wealthy merchant, every five armed individuals could organize as an entity to write the letter of
endorsement on a mutual basis. The county magistrate should also sign on the letter to prove it is
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appropriate.”50 It is clear that even if the law aiming at regulate civilian weapons and maintaining
local order was enacted, the effectiveness of its implementation was highly doubtful. Given that
many guns circulated in local society are those without gun licenses, people would not like to
apply the licenses. In 1924, a newspaper editorial stated that people had a couple reasons that
made them reluctant to apply the licenses. “First, it is difficult to get the letter of endorsement
from either wealthy gentry, merchants, or their fellow gun owners. Second, to apply a license,
they had to pay certain amount of money, which brings financial burden to peasants.”51
Besides the Guangdong province, the provinces in Manchuria also adopted a gun license
policy. In the years of the early Republican period, the Fengtian government ordered that all the
merchants and ordinary civilians apply for gun licenses and have their weapons registered with
local government. Heilongjiang province also made more explicit regulation which were then
distributed to local county governments in 1912. However, the provincial government discovered
one year later that local county governments did not report how the policy was implemented. In
1914, the provincial government in Harbin made another announcement, requiring them to
“make sure all the civilian weapons, no matter newly purchased ones or outmoded. are carefully
inspected by local county governments, which maintained the records and submit to provincial
government.” In 1916, the Department of Police of Jilin Province sent an order to all the
policemen in province. “Thereafter, all the policemen should inform the armed residents in their
jurisdiction that all the weapons could not be lent out or transferred without government
approval. Once an unlicensed gun is discovered, its owner had to have their guns sealed
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immediately. Otherwise the owner would be punished, and his weapon will be confiscated.”
Based on these order issued from provincial government, it is safe to make a judgment that the
gun control policy was not carried out effectively. Unlike Guangdong, where the policy of gun
licensing was implemented as early as 1910s, many regions like Manchuria did not adopt such
policy.
The policy of gun licenses was adopted nationwide starting from 1920s. The legal
documents of the provinces in Manchuria in the early 1920s clearly exhibited the policy
transition. In the early 1923, Jilin Province issued an order to local county governments again,
stating that “the issue of gun was extremely important to the national security and social stability.
For those merchants and ordinary civilians who plan to purchase guns for self-defense should
apply gun licenses to local government.” 52From this statement, it can be speculated that in the
early 1920s, the policy of gun sealing was replaced by gun licensing. After receiving the order,
the Chamber of Commerce in Jilin Province forwarded this order to the Jilin merchants. The
Chamber also provided convenient channel for merchants, who could send their application to
the Chamber. The Chamber then collected all the documents, which would be reviewed by the
provincial government. In the April of 1923, the Fengtian Police Department also issued a
similar order like Jilin. Like Guangdong province, the provinces in Manchuria also realized that
it was hard for ordinary peasants to get a letter of endorsement from local wealthy merchants and
prominent gentry. Therefore, both Jilin and Fengtian provinces made an amendment, claiming
that the gun owners could write the letter mutually.

“Ziweiqiang Yixu Lingzhao 自衛槍亦須領照” (License is required for self-defense guns),
Shengjing shibao, January 16, 1924.
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Even though government of different levels issued gun control policies, namely the
mechanism of gun licensing, the effectiveness of its implementation was highly doubtful. As
suggested in many newspaper accounts, many peasants did not register their guns as required by
local government. For example, in 1924, a military commander in Jilin admitted that “many
merchants and other civilians prepared guns for self-defense, most of whom did not have their
gun registered and did not obtain gun licenses. The local police set up some checkpoint in
important regions to inspect if passing people have unregistered guns with them. Some gun
owners counterfeited the gun licenses. Some bandits even shot policemen when encountering
inspection.”53 The military commander once again reiterated that gun licensing was mandatory.
For those armed people without licenses, the punishment was severe. Many accounts like this
indicate that the prevalence of unlicensed guns also became a social problem, even if the policy
was promulgated for years in Manchuria.
Conclusion
In March 1938, Chen Cheng, a senior general in the Nationalist Chinese military wrote to
Chiang Kai-shek, expressing his deep concern over the popular movements in southwestern
Shandong province. The confiscation of civilian-owned guns in Shandong, Chen argued, did
more to provoke peasants’ anti-government outrage than any socio-economic cause. Chen
attributed the peasant unrest to the policy of confiscating guns adopted by Han Fuju, the military
governor of Shandong, who had been executed two months previously for disobeying central
government orders. Starting in the early1930s, Han took the advice of Liang Shuming (梁漱溟

“Hufei Qiangsha Xunjing 胡匪槍殺巡警” (Bandits killed police with his gun), Shengtian
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1893-1988), a leading figure of the rural reconstruction movement, to collect private guns, which
were then distributed to militia for collective defense.54 However, local residents were skeptical
about the policy, fearing that they would lose their means of self-defense. To avoid escalating
tension, Chiang quickly ordered Shandong authorities to return the guns and required them not to
register any private weapons.55
In was shown in the 1938 case that the gun policy that local government adopted was not
consistent as expected. This chapter focuses more on the regulation policies from both national
and provincial governments, which was not effectively implicated. The Nationalist government
realized that civilian possession of guns subverted their authority over local areas, and enacted
various mechanisms to regulate the private gun ownership and its circulation. The purpose was
to put the gun in the hands of “good people” who were expected to protect themselves and
defend their localities. Nevertheless, these central gun regulation efforts failed when regional
power blocs undercut the central government’s power. Though both provincial and central
governments adopted similar strategies to regulate armed people, a standard and unified policy
was absent. As discussed in the beginning, in wartime, the government changed its policy for
fear that restrictive control might provoke illegal gun owners to insurrection. This lax and
inconsistent gun regulation policy, however, gave the Chinese Communist Party the opportunity
to take advantage of these armed masses, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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~ CHAPTER FIVE ~
“Political Power Grows out of the Barrel of a Gun”:
The Mobilization of Armed Masses in the Communist Revolution

Introduction
In summer 1939 most Western countries were still at peace, while the flames of war had
already raged in China for years. Two years before, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident sparked the
eight-year long Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which inflamed Chinese nationalism against
foreign aggression. After the Xi’an Incident of 1936 the Nationalists and Communist parties had
put aside their domestic hostilities in a joint effort to stave off Japan. Known as the Second
United Front, the alliance did not last long because both parties still competed for strategic
advantage in “free China.”1 The alliance was in name only. Although the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) agreed to place its armies under Nationalist command, it never ceased to expand its
independent military power in the provinces of North China.
The CCP’s acts of noncompliance and other unsanctioned activities were frequently
reported to Chiang Kai-shek, the generalissimo of the Nationalist Army. In 1939 Liao Lei (廖磊
1891-1939), the provincial governor of Anhui Province, wrote to Chiang, bitterly criticizing
Communist general Peng Xuesong (彭雪楓 1907-1944) who, along with his army, confiscated
people’s guns in the Jiangsu-Anhui border region.2 Peng’s cruel and surreptitious action, as
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reported in Liao’s letter, was apparently in violation of Chiang’s command, who had repeatedly
ordered local armies to not seize people’s armsregistered or not--during the war. Chiang was
well aware of the CCP’s steady efforts to strengthen its military capabilities in the rural areas.
His attempts to centralize military and political authority seemed futile. He merely ordered
Peng’s commanding officer Ye Ting (葉挺 1896-1946), the army commander of the New Fourth
Army, to admonish Peng.3 However, Chiang himself was clearly aware that his Nationalist
government, now based in the southwest city of Chongqing, barely held direct control over the
north, especially the rural areas where the CCP had been building its political legitimacy for
years. Neither Nationalist nor Communist sources tell us whether Peng Xuefeng and his army
were subject to any disciplinary punishment. Liao Lei also referred this issue to Zhang Yunyi (張
雲逸 1892-1974), the chief of staff of the New Fourth Army, expecting the Communists to
respect the central command and not confiscate civilian weapons. However, Zhang deliberately
ignored the request and ordered his subordinates to focus their attention on strengthening the
army’s independent military presence.4
The dispute between Liao and the Communists in Anhui Province was not an isolated
episode. Military reports that condemned the CCP’s confiscation of people’s guns or mobilizing
armed peasants to expand its own military power were consistently reported to the central
government in Chongqing.5 However, Chongqing’s efforts to command the Communist-led
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armies seemed futile. Moreover, Chiang failed to predict the Communists’ effective efforts in
utilizing the armed populace in their revolutionary agenda. Scattered as they were, these military
reports to Chiang Kai-shek indicated some new elements of the CCP’s activities in wartime
China. In these reports the CCP was accused of confiscating people’s guns for its own military
use. Nevertheless, what Chiang had been told about the CCP’s activities was incomplete. Gun
confiscation was one of many policies that the Communists had adopted to cope with the armed
populace in local society. Even Peng Xuefeng, who was blamed in these military reports for
taking away the peasants’ guns, actively mobilized armed peasants and organized them into local
militia forces, which was a distinctly different way of dealing with civilians’ guns.6 The strategic
importance of an armed populace, and how the Communists utilized them in many instances but
confiscated their weapons in other instances thus deserves further scholarly attention.
In the late 1930s the Communists, who had just survived the epical Long March, were
dedicated to building and consolidating the base areas. When the CCP enlarged its military and
political influence in North China and established its grip in the provinces, including Shanxi,
Gansu, Ningxia, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong, they encountered an already-militarized local
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society that led to the proliferation of guns among the masses.7 Some wealthy landlords not only
armed themselves with rifles but also organized community armed forces to protect their family
and property. Ordinary peasants also sought to protect themselves against bandits with guns. The
existence of an armed populace in North China offered the Communists the opportunity to bring
armed civilians into and advance the Communist cause. For instance, in 1940 Mao Zedong was
concerned with developing armed forces in Shandong Province. In his telegraph to the 115th
Divisions of the Eighth Route Army, whose troops were already stationed in the province, Mao
stated that he was pleased that the “civilians’ guns” were sufficient to support the development
of the Communist force.8 For the CCP leaders, effective control of an armed peasantry was a
prerequisite to strengthening the Communist military force and to consolidate its power in local
society.
The party endeavored to launch massive programs to mobilize the masses for their
Communist revolution, an effort that has been the subject of numerous studies. Many research
works have centered on questions such as what factors made Chinese peasants revolutionary and
how the CCP won mass support. For instance, Mark Seldon’s seminal studies of Communist
activities in Shaanxi and Steven Levine’s analysis of revolution in Manchuria demonstrate,
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though in different ways, that the CCP deployed its strength in organizational and mobilization
skills through either social revolution or political action.9 The CCP’s efforts to form tactical
coalitions with armed groups or secret societies, such as the Red Spears, have also been deeply
analyzed.10 However, previous studies of the CCP’s mobilization efforts have rarely taken the
party’s gun policies seriously because historians assume that armed people automatically
belonged to either militia forces, bandit groups, or other armed local groups. These studies place
the complicated nexus bewteen the Communists and armed groups at the center of their inquiry,
but overlook those armed individuals who had no affiliations to any groups. Thus the study of
how the CCP co-opted militia forces, local militarists, or bandit groups is not sufficient to draw a
complete picture of the party’s policies for coping with an armed populace. Many ordinary
Chinese men and women of different class backgrounds owned guns, and the party sought ways
to accept that reality and turned it to its advantage.
The important role of privately owned weapons in the party’s revolutionary cause has not
been taken into account. Building on the existing scholarship on the CCP’s revolutionary
enterprise in the 1930s and 1940s, my research goes further, exploring how the CCP dealt with
armed individuals in a fragmented and militarized society. This chapter makes three arguments.
First, the CCP made the mobilization of an armed populace part of its mass line policy to fulfill
its revolutionary agenda. Second, the implementation of the CCP’s gun policies at the local level
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was tied to its overall mobilization tactics, adopting varied stances toward gun owners in term of
their class division and social status. The CCP’s clear distinction between what historian Odoric
Y.K. Wou defines as core and peripheral groups in mobilizing the masses loomed large in its gun
policies.11 Finally, the CCP’s gun policies were designed only in part to arm the masses, as they
did routinely by recruiting peasants into the army or Communist-affiliated militia forces. Rather,
they were about dealing with a preexisting pattern of personal gun ownership. Their practice
aimed to bring these previously armed civilians into the revolutionary cause. Based mostly on
party archive documents and local historical materials, this chapter first attempts to answer the
question of why the mobilization of armed civilians was inevitable in the CCP’s revolutionary
cause. It then follows the strategies and tectics that the CCP adopted in mobilizing an armed
populace in North China.
Overview of the Communist Mobilization in North China
Our central task at present is to mobilize the broad masses to take part in the
revolutionary war, overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang by means of such
war, spread the revolution throughout the country, and drive imperialism out of
China. Anyone who does not attach enough importance to this central task is not a
good revolutionary cadre. If our comrades really comprehend this task and
understand that the revolution must at all costs be spread throughout the country,
then they should in no way neglect or underestimate the question of the
immediate interests, the well-being, of the broad masses. For the revolutionary
war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and
relying on them. (Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-being of the
Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work,” 1934) 12
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When Mao Zedong gave this famous address in January 1934 in which he called for the
mobilization of the masses against imperialism and its domestic rival, the Chinese Communist
Party was about to be wiped out in the Jiangxi Soviet Base by Chiang Kai-shek’s Fifth
Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign. A few months later the Communists were compelled
to abandon Jiangxi Soviet, and then embarked on the legendary Long March to Northwest China,
where the Communist Revolution ensured its survival.13 The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
and the Xi’an Incident of 1936 saved the Communists from being eradicated and offered them a
breathing spell to expand. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the party, now headquartered in
Yenan 延安, stretched its political influence across North China and some base areas in the
southern provinces. When the Japanese surrendered in 1945 the CCP became a considerable
military and political power that could not be underestimated by the Nationalist government. It
was already in a position to fight Chiang Kai-shek’s armies in the civil war that ensued.14
One of the contributing explanations for the CCP’s stunning victory lies in its effective
mobilization of the masses during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Mao Zedong’s address in
1934 calling for the mobilization of the broad masses proved vital in the expansion of
Communist power during the Second Sino-Japanese War. When the Communists steadily
expanded their revolutionary bases in the north, they encountered a highly militarized and
fragmented society. The decentralization of political power and widespread local militarization
had led to a proliferation of firearms in the rural areas. In addition to bandit groups and
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community-based forces, landlords and peasants armed with modern firearms also became the
CCP’s major target for mobilization. This section argues that the mobilization of the armed
populace was an integral part of the CCP’s revolutionary project in North China. In order to
understand how the CCP survived in the militarized society and enlisted armed civilians in its
revolutionary cause, it is necessary to first look at the new political situations in which
Communist cadres exercised their mobilization skills. An overview of the CCP’s mobilization
tactics and strategies then follows, which is necessary because these strategies were thoroughly
adopted when the Communist cadres actively mobilized individuals and groups equipped with
guns.
The Political Turmoil and Prevalence of Guns in Northern China
In order to understand how the CCP seized the opportunity to form an alliance with the
armed populace in North China, it is necessary to first look at the social and political situation.
Generally speaking, the regions in which the Communists were extraordinary active were mainly
rural societies over which the Nationalist government and the Japanese had limited control. For
example, Henan Province, which had suffered from constant warfare and banditry since the
1920s, witnessed the increasing militarization of the local society.15 During wartime the

According to Phil Billingsley’s investigation, Henan Province had the highest number of
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warlord period. As discussed in the introduction chapter, Henan in the 1920s became a hotly
contested area among warlords who competed to exercise their control of the province. Local
elite or predatory warlords organized militia forces, which also transformed the power structure
in the local society and accelerated local militarization. For social transformation in Henan see
Xin Zhang, Social Transformation in Modern China.
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Nationalist government loosened its hold on the province, which gave the Japanese and the CCP
opportunities to strengthen their presence.16 While the Japanese mainly controlled the urban
centers and major transportation lines, the CCP’s expansion occurred primarily behind the
Japanese.
A similar situation happened in other northern provinces as well, where previous
warlords still preserved their power. This prevented the penetration of the central government’s
authority. With the completion of the North Expedition in 1928, Chiang Kai-shek and his
Nanjing government aimed to claim central authority over the northern provinces as one crucial
part of his state-building program. However, Chiang’s national unification campaign was
completed through a collaboration with warlords in the north, who retained their political power
in Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan.17 Even within these provinces the peirod of warlordism
had left a legacy in which the local society was controlled by regional military commanders,
whose power was secured by their ability to organize military forces.18
The Japanese invasion and the escape of the Nationalist government and some local elites
altered the political landscape in the rural areas of North China, leaving a significant power
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vacuum. The weakness of the central government became worse after the outbreak of the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. In Hebei Province the defeat of the Nationalist 29th Army in 1937
made Song Zheyuan (宋哲元 1885-1940), a former warlord who controlled the province, lose
his political prominence in the region. The Japanese Imperial Army then quickly occupied Hebei
and Chahar. Han Fuqu, the chairman of the Shandong provincial government, was arrested and
executed in early 1938, leaving a governmental vacuum in the province. The situation in Henan
was much more complex. The central government never practiced direct control over the entire
province. Government and regional military commanders shared their political interests to
manage local affairs. After the outbreak of the war with Japan the Nationalist armies, which
failed to stem the Japanese advance, retreated southward. From late 1938 the Japanese controlled
all of eastern Henan Province.19
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Figure 10. The Political Situation in Wartime China. “Sino-US Relations during World War II,”
accessed July 12, 2017, http://sino-american-relations.weebly.com/home/sino-us-relationsduring-world-war-ii.
After China’s failure in 1937 major Nationalist armies in the north were ordered to retreat
to the south, which also weakened the government presence in the northern provinces. As
Communist general Zhu De (朱德 1886-1959) commented in 1937, “the remaining Nationalist
troops lacked the capability to coordinate the fight with the Japanese. The fighting plan created
by the central government was not carried out effectively.”20 In the meantime, the Japanese did
not stop their military advance in the north, sweeping through major cities in Hebei, Shandong,
and Henan provinces and controlling the main lines of transportation. In many instances officials
of local governments retreated to interior sites to escape the Japanese invasion. Many landlords
and local elites also fled from the Japanese-occupied areas. Behind these areas the Communists
were dedicated to expanding their sphere of influence in the rural areas. They gradually
organized local governments and put their political authority into practice.
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In additional to the weak central power and Japanese invasion, northern provinces
witnessed rural militarization in the early twentieth century. Most northern provinces had a long
tradition of forming collective armed forces, such as the famous Red Spear.21 The collapse of
Nationalist regime and the Japanese occupation accelerated the process of local militarization. In
the late 1930s this culture of collective violence continued to play a role in most rural
communities. Local gentry, bandits, and militarists all organized armed forces based on their
community. Some defeated Nationalist military commanders carved out territorial bases for
themselves in these localities. A number of landlords purchased weapons and organized their
independent force to protect their families and communities. These forces existed in a variety of
forms. Some armed forces had a collective-defense nature. For example, in Henan Province
wealthy local gentry organized “house-watching aquads” (护院团), “village pacts” (联庄会),
and “joint defense squads” (联防队).22 These local gentry had channels to acquire better
weapons. In many regions the gentry brought these armed forces together and formed joint
defense battalions.
As mentioned in the introduction, influenced by these local elites the ordinary peasants
also obtained weapons for self-defense purposes. The prevalence of private gun ownership in
Henan had been grasped by local Communist cadres, who conductd social surveys to determine
the possible ways in which these guns could be mobilized (the CCP’s social survey is discussed
later in this chapter). The northern provinces had similar reasons for the prevalence of guns.
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First, Shandong, Henan, Hebei, and other northern provinces were traditional areas known for
their frequent banditry.23 In the shadow of bandit activities, peasants and landlords took up guns
for self-defense. Second, these provinces also suffered from chronic warfare in the 1920s.
Military weapons fell into the hands of either bandits or ordinary peasants.
To sum up, when the Communists entered the northern provinces, the party encountered
a completely different social and political situation in which various political entities, including
Nationalist rampant soldiers, bandits, local armed forces, and Japanese invaders, coexisted in
these provinces. The local society was increasingly militarized. The weak governmental presence
in the northern provinces meant that large numbers of guns owned by peasants or landlords had
not been regulated or detected by the Nationalist government. This new situation provided the
Communists with an opportunity to expand their influence, in which the organization of armed
civilians served as one integral part of its overall revolutioanry agenda.
Mobilization Tactics
The idea of a mass line (群眾路線 qunzhong luxian) strategy proved crucial to the CCP’s
dramatic development. Behind enemy lines, the Communists were making every effort to launch
a social revolution at the grassroots level through which the masses of the rural sectors would be
mobilized. In so doing, the CCP was able to claim political legitimacy and succeeded in gaining
people’s support in anti-Japanese activities and the Communist expansion. Historical research on
the CCP’s mobilization strategies has been abundant. Historians have provided a set of
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interpretive frameworks, asserting variously that the commitment to nationalism, socioeconomic
policies, organizational control, and democratic management have played vital roles.24
Much of the scholarship directed at the CCP’s grassroots effort inevitably touches on
two issues: how to gain popular support, and how to get masses involved. In the first place, the
CCP modified its radical policies during the Jiangxi Soviet period, when all landlords and gentry
were shorn of most political and economic rights, by making a number of moderate moves.
Under what Mark Selden has termed the “Yenan way,” attempts were steadily made to secure
peasants’ economic status.25 In the base areas the party halted the radical policy of land
confiscation as they did in Jiangxi, and rapidly promoted a program of rents, taxes, and interest
reduction. Popular support also stemmed from peasants’ awareness of political consciousness.
Mao Zedong ordered the establishment of representative assemblies in base areas and devised
the “three-thirds systems,” which not only aimed to win the adherence of nonparty elites but also
to facilitate the political participation of poor peasants in local communities.26 In many regions
peasants who had previously exercised no rights were elected to serve as village heads or
representatives to the CCP National Congress.27 In so doing, the role of the gentry was shattered
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in the traditional power structure. In wartime China the “mass line” strategy became one
cornerstone of Communist ideology in building a reciprocal relationship between the CCP and
the general public.
Despite the fact that the party agreed to form a united front with traditional elites and
advocated a series of moderate social policies for the sake of the anti-Japanese war, it did not
abandon the class struggle to fulfill its revolutionary goals. In practice, priority was given to
mobilizing the poor peasantry against local despots and landlords. Communist cadres made the
peasants organize numerous peasants association, a crucial step in taking part in local affairs and
challenging village elites. Communist work teams provided educational sessions to ensure that
the peasants would be protected if they took action against the elites, and to indoctrinate the
masses about Communist ideology. As Elizabeth Perry has demonstrated, the CCP proved adept
at using emotion to excite peasants’ hatred of their class enemies.28 The public forums for
“speaking bitterness” (诉苦 suku) or “criticism and self-criticism” (批評與自我批評 piping yu
two piping), for example, were frequently organized by local Communist cadres. To resolve the
problem of peasants’ unresponsiveness to the program against their previous masters, as Chen
Yung-fa vividly puts it, struggle-meetings involving landlords and their “neighbors, relatives,
and bystanders in quarrels” were held to provoke peasants into openly expressing their anger
against the traditional elite, through which the preexisting solidarity in the local communities had
been disrupted.29
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Paralleling the effort to polarize the masses and traditional rural elite, the party devoted
considerable attention to ensuring the political compliance of the popular armed forces. During
the first half of the twentieth century, privately organized forces had sprung up in North China
due to social and political turbulence. The growth of banditry and the Japanese invasion made it
necessary for the local communities to create these defense forces, which generally took the form
of self-defense corps (自衛隊 ziwei dui) and militia (民兵 minbing), though they varied in their
names and organizational structure.30 The party envisioned these spontaneous armed forces not
only as auxiliary forces to assist the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, but also as
one major vehicle for mobilizing the masses into the Communist movement. Immediately after
the Second United Front was established in 1937 the CCP Central Committee issued the
Instruction of Organizing Local Work in Wartime, in which local Communist cadres were
ordered to utilize and organize “any forms of traditional armed forces, including militia, peace
preservation forces (保安隊 baoandui), able-bodied forces (壯丁隊 zhuangdingdui), and
volunteer army (義勇軍 yiyongjun),” and to try “by all means to play a guiding role in these
forces.”31 A few months later another order was made to “train and assist popular forces in all
aspects to improve their political awareness and military skills.”32
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The importance of various militia forces was always highlighted in both the battles with
the Japanese and in the revolutionary enterprise. In 1937 Liu Bocheng (劉伯承 1892-1986) used
a metaphor to describe the importance of militia forces, stating that “a regular troop is the bone, a
guerrilla is a tendon, and the militia is muscle.” An effective military campaign was produced by
coordination among these three groups.33 Under orders from the Central Committee, local
Communist cadres always highlighted the role of militia forces in their fight against enemies. 34
As Odoric Y.K. Wou’s research suggests, the important roles of militia forces lay first in their
familiarity with the local conditions, and second, in their lower level of vulnerability to enemy
attack because they “formed small targets.”35 To encourage people’s participation in militia
forces, local Communist cadres held educational meetings that led the people to believe they
were fighting for themselves。
It is clear from the above discussion that the Communist revolution was composed of
both a social revolution and military campaign. The strategies that the CCP adopted to involve
the masses also applied to the armed population. When the Communists arrived in North China,
what awaited them was a highly-militarized society. The frequent military conflicts led to a
proliferation of weapons among civilians. Banditry and increasing social chaos made many
people arm themselves with guns to defend their communities. The CCP’s activities in
mobilizing an armed populace was one integral party of their mobilization activities. It turns out
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that the strategies and tactics that the CCP adopted to embrace the masses were applicable to its
activities towards the armed masses. For the CCP, an armed populace was crucial in the war,
because in many cases these people’s arms provided the party with weapons, particularly the
Communist forces that encountered a shortage of arms. Another strategic importance of the
armed masses lay in the prospect that these masses could function in the revolution because they
were empowered by gun ownership. The next two sections consider how these two reasons
integrated together led to the mobilization of the armed masses.
The Problem of Weapons
The lack of weapons was a consistently major concern of the CCP before the end of
1945, when the Soviets turned over the weapons of defeated Japanese armies in Manchuria to the
Communists.36 As the Red Army waged a guerrilla war in the Jiangxi Soviet region in the early
1930s the soldiers armed them with primitive equipment, including traditional bird guns, spears,
and swords, while modern rifles or pistols were scarce.37 Despite the fact that the Red Army, led
by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, survived in Jiangxi and maintained some small arsenals, it was
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unable to supply sufficient weapons to all of its soldiers.38 Shao Shiping (邵式平 1900-1965),
the commander of the independent regiment of the Red Army, offers a firsthand account of how
invaluable the guns were. In the early 1930s Shao was optimistic about the army’s active
recruitment of soldiers but was worried about the shortage of firearms. This was reflected in a
popular saying in the army, “There were far more people than guns, and the bullets fared far
worse.”39 Shao’s regiment made every effort to secure their logistics supply. He finally managed
to purchase two foreign guns, one Browning and one Colt, from a nearby city at an exorbitant
price, though only the Browning pistol came with bullets. A few days later both pistols had
broken, but for several months Shao’s regiment was unable to find anyone to fix them. Even so,
these nonworking guns functioned well in deterring local tyrants.40
Other memoirs by Red Army veterans provide moving accounts about the lack of
weapons. In his memoir Liu Desheng (劉德勝), who had joined the army in 1930, recalled that
no rifles or pistols were available to recruits until they succeeded in seizing enough enemy
weapons.41 The heavy financial burden of the Red Army and the GMD military blockade
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restrained the Communists from obtaining sufficient weapons.42 Before the Red Army settled in
Yan’an in 1936 it depended strongly on confiscated guns from local bullies or defeated enemies.
Edgar Snow, the author of Red Star Over China, observed in 1938 that:
The Reds had a very limited output of armaments: their enemy was really their
main source of supply. For years the Red had called the Kuomintang troops their
“ammunition carriers,” and they claimed to capture more than 80 per cent of their
guns and more than 70 per cent of their ammunition from enemy troops. The
regular troops (as dstinct from local partisans) I saw were equipped mainly with
British, Czechoslovakian, German, and American machine guns, rifles, automatic
rifles, Mausers, and mountain cannon, such as had been sold in large quantities to
the Nanking Government.43
There did not appear to have been any significant improvement of the supply of weapons
even after 1936, when the Nationalist government agreed to lift the arms embargo to the
Communist troops. After the Xi’an incident both parties reached a military agreement under
which the GMD promised to appropriate guns and ammunition. Zhu De (朱德 1886-1976), the
commander in chief of the Red Army once noted that by 1940 the Nationalist government was
providing a monthly aid of 680,000 yuan in fabi, along with eight million bullets.44 In the
meantime, all divisions of the Eighth Route Army had constructed factories of varying scale that
produced a wide range of weaponry, ranging from rifles and pistols to grenades and land
mines.45 According to a CCP report dated February 10, 1941, the party’s largest military facility
in Shanxi at that time had a production capacity of 3,360 rifles per year. Nevertheless, the
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Nationalist appropriation and self-production could hardly support an army of over 500,000. The
CCP’s dependence on outside military aid became unstable in late 1938, and ultimately came to
an end as the GMD-CCP United Front suffered an irreversible split in the New Fourth Army
incident of 1941. The military facilities operating in the base areas were unable to provide
sufficient arms for all soldiers. Other statistics show that the military factory of the 115th
Division only produced 292 rifles in 1941.
How did the Communist forces overcome the lack of weapons? With the increase in its
military power after 1937, the military commanders explicitly encouraged their soldiers to do all
they could to collect weapons abandoned or surrendered by the enemy from battlefields, just as
they did in Jiangxi and on the way to Yan’an.46 According to a military report, the Eighth Route
Army seized 207,000 pistols and rifles, 1,106 machine guns, 16,800 pieces of ammunition, and
many other weapons as it swept aside the Puppet Army in Shandong Province during the eight
years of war.47 The source does not reveal how the Communists obtained these weapons from
defeated soldiers. Given the frequent battles between the Eighth Route Army and the Puppet
Army in Shandong, it was possible to capture a large amount of guns and ammunition. However,
weapons from the defeated soldiers could not support all Communist troops. As mentioned
above, the primitive arsenals were operated by local Communist branches. It was imperative for
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the Communist forces, which had limited access to any outside sources, to secure other channels
for procuring weapons.
Arming and Disarming the Masses
The current scholarly literature gives much attention to the CCP’s effort to gain the
alliance of heterodox forces such as the armed bandits. As Phil Billingsley observes, the
Communists adopted a pragmatic approach that allowed a coalition to be formed with bandits. In
a community where bandits brought social chaos and had little public support, the CCP sought to
suppress these groups to win respect from the peasants. In many other cases in which the bandits
had close ties with their community, the party utilized both military and political means to gain
adherence from the bandits. The establishment of military dominance over the bandit groups laid
the foundation for the CCP to form an alliance with them.48
What the current scholarship has overlooked is how the CCP dealt with a large number of
armed individuals who had obtained guns in this era of consistent warfare and social unrest.
Many strategies that were adopted to mobilize the masses also gained importance. Considerable
efforts were made to make use of civilian weapons in the revolutionary campaign. As mentioned
above, the CCP, now headquartered in Yen’an, was good at using class struggle to mobilize the
ordiarmy peasants againt local elites or power holders. The makeup of the ordinary armed people
in local society was highly varied in terms of their social class. The CCP adopted different
strategies towards different armed people. To utilize the armed masses in its revolutionary cause,
the party placed its gun policies in its overall rural mobilizatio pragrams.
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Identifying Gun Owners in the Local Society
The party devoted much attention to investigating the scale of private gun ownership in
the local society. When the Communists arrived at a location, determining the degree of civilian
gun ownership became one of their priorities. The investigation included the number of guns in
the village, the political affiliation of local elites, and the places where people stored their
weapons. The survey reports sent to Yan’an played an instrumental part in establishing
mobilization strategies.
In early 1940 Wei Gongzhi (危拱之 1908-1973), a female Communist cadre, conducted a
detailed investigation in Western Henan Province. Her report provides some perspective on how
local cadres viewed the importance of the armed populace in their activities. When Wei Gongzhi
arrived in Henan she was shocked by the prevalence of guns in the local society. She was not
able to determine how many guns were owned by ordinary individuals, but did estimate that the
majority of guns were controlled by community-based armed forces, the number of which was
impossible to estimate. Because some collective-defense forces were registered with the local
government, she used these officially sanctioned forces to attest to the popularity of arms. For
example, the visible militia forces in the thirteen counties of Nanyang city controlled at least
130,000 rifles or guns. “More than 10,000 guns were owned in the counties like Xinyang 信陽,
Runan 汝南, and Xiangcheng 襄城. Even the less militarized counties had 3,000 to 5,000 guns.”
Wei listed the numbers of militia forces in these counties, as shown below.49
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County

Number of Guns

County

Number of Guns

Nanzhao

5,000

Tanghe

1,2000

Neixiang

4,0000

Wuyang

8,000

Yexian

9000

Zhenping

5,000

Xichuan

5,000

Fangcheng

8,000

Tongbai

5,000

Miyang

8,000

Xinye

7,000

Dengxian

8,000

Table 5. The Numbers of Milita Forces in Western Henan
Wei Gongzhi believed that the actual number of guns owned by either militia forces or
ordinary peasants went far beyond the numbers listed above since the majority of guns were not
reported to the government. She concluded that the proliferation of modern firearms had already
become part of Henan’s social ecology.
According to Wei, there were at least four sources for the masses to obtain guns. First,
almost all the counties in Henan had locally- based arsenals that were operated by either the
government or by landlords. Private manufacturers concealed their arsenals in rural villages. The
landlords then sold their guns to individuals and groups. Second, the frequent military conflicts
from the 1920s scattered a large number of guns throughout the local society. Third, bandit
groups or secret societies controlled a large numbers of guns. “It was reported that some
ambitious peasants seized the weapons from warlords’ armies.” 50 Fourth, most wealthy families
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purchased advanced weapons from urban cities, where more-sophisticated guns could be
obtained.
The types of guns owned by peasants or landlords varied. Wei Gongzhi was delighted
that the quality of these privately owned guns was better than in other provinces. Roughly 40
percent of these guns were forged locally in the primitive arsenals. She also acknowledged the
fact that class differences were obvious among gun owners, since most peasants owned primitive
arms while wealthy landlords carried better ones.
Wei Gongzhi’s social survey was one example of many carried out by local cadres.
According to Wei, these reports allowed the Communists to designate specific policies targeting
armed individuals of different classes. Additionally, in many cases local Communist cadres
conducted these social surveys before they initiated their mobilization activities. One newspaper
report stressed the importance of conducting these social surveys before penetrating rural
settlements. Communist cadres were aware that the village head who dominated local power was
always reluctant to have their villagers’ guns confiscate or mobilized. The survey about the
number of guns in the village was vital because it precluded the village head from concealing
their weapons.
The use of class in the control of guns
As discussed above, one of the major tools that the CCP used in their mobilization efforts
was the use of class distinction. In this way different policies were adopted that targeted people
of different classes. The CCP’s ideology of mobilizing the peasants as its priority was applicable
to its gun policies as well. As discussed above, peasants were always willing to collaborate with
the party; the difficulty came with the local elites or landlords. In practice, the Communist cadres
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took advantage of the collaborated poor peasants, who were ordered to persuade the landlords to
surrender their arms. In her report to Yan’an, Wei Gongzhi reported one effective way of
obtaining guns from landlords in which poor peasants played a major role. Wei noticed that
many poor peasants owned no guns while the landlords possessed large numbers. Landlords
normally hired local peasants to carry guns to protect their properties.51 It should be noted that
these landlords were not powerful enough to organize community-based forces; they simply
hired peasants to patrol their property at night. Local Communist cadres saw this as an
opportunity, and encouraged poor peasants to work for landlords. Wei Gongzhi believed that
once these peasants received the guns these weapons could be used by the party.
Mass associations were widely organized and became an effective tool to penetrate into
the local society. In South Hebei Province, for example, the CCP first instructed the mass
associations about the importance of surrendering their guns and ordered these mass associations
to force landlords to surrender their guns. Under these methods, the pressure was intense. In
Xushui County of Hebei Province if rifle owners refused to surrender their guns to the party, the
mass association would ask them to volunteer themselves. If the owners refused again, the
association used another persuasive effort, such as by surrounding the landlord’s house and
applying collective persuasion.
Educational Meetings
When the Communists arrived in Hebei, Shandong, and Henan provinces, they were well
aware of the proliferation of arms among the ordinary rural population. To win the support of
these armed civilian was not an easy task, given the complexity of the social categories of these
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armed people. As mentioned above, the CCP adopted specific policies toward heterodox armed
groups, who were either surrendered to the Communist army or suffered from bloody
suppression if their resistance was resolute. However, like many other orthodox armed people,
their stance could not be overly simplified. The Communists had two methods of dealing with
these armed peasants. First, the party members encouraged these armed people to surrender their
arms as a way of directly supporting the Communist military campaign. Second, if armed
peasants were reluctant to surrender their weapons, the Communists aimed to organize them into
militia forces. To fulfill these two targets local Communist cadres designed a series of
educational programs to convey an ideology to the local peasants in which the Communists’ gun
policy was justified.
A propaganda program was always introduced. In many villages in Hebei and Henan, for
example, Communist cadres organized the educational meeting. In the meeting the CCP
demonstrated their strong military presence and justified their efforts to stamp out Japanese
invasions or local bandits. In Ruxian County of Hebei Province, for example, local CCP troops
cooperated with community forces to eliminate the bandits, thus promoting a different image of
themselves as the protector of the citizens. In this way, local peasants welcomed the CCP and
wanted to attend the educational meetings. In one meeting one leader of the CCP branch told the
peasants that “it was the CCP troops who defended the country actively and protected the local
community from bandits. Thus all the armies should be utilized in a proper force that fights for
the people.” 52
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To resolve the peasants’ worry that their rights of self-defense would be taken away, the
cadre stated, “The people’s guns are owned by people. The purpose of owning a gun is
absolutely to protect the people. Therefore the CCP respects and guarantees the people’s rights to
arm themselves. However, to defend the people and their community effectively, we think they
will exert the largest effect only if the CCP manages these weapons. The party will not
confiscate their guns, but use considerable ways to utilize these weapons to make sure they play
their role as expected.” In Henan Province, for example, the CCP cadres actively conveyed to
the people that their right to own a gun would be protected and that their weapons would be used
to defend themselves.53 In these educational meetings the party rarely told the peasants that the
party would confiscate their guns; rather, they told the peasants that weapons would be
mobilized and organized in their community.
Gun Registration
To strengthen their control of guns, the Communists quickly enacted decrees that made
the armed masses register their weapons. Gun registration was carried out as a common way to
make sure the armed masses used their guns in the proper way. In his seminal work on the
Communist movement in eastern and central China, Yung-fa Chen finds that the local
Communist government “required all rifle owners, including communities as public owners, to
register their weapons with the Hsiang government.”54 Local governments issued permits to gun
owners, who had to prove that their use of the gun would be for self-defense. Such policies were
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effectively enforced only when the CCP consolidated their power in the region. However, the
implementation of gun registration was determined by the power base of the party. When the
party’s power was relatively weak in regions where either the Nationalist government or local
elites dominated the local power structure, the party always tended to conceal unregistered guns.
In Henan Province, for example, party cadres deliberately kept unregistered guns hidden from
the Nationalist government. These guns would later be mobilized without being noticed by the
government.55
Confiscating Guns from the Armed Masses
When the CCP cadres became aware of the degree of private gun ownership, the next
step was to take advantage of these weapons. One of their purposes was to acquire the weapons
when the CCP troops lacked military weapons. Their policies varied from place to place, and
time to time. Besides educational meetings, in Western Henan Province, where the ownership of
firearms was a community effort, the CCP first established a model in the village who agreed to
surrender their weapons. The collective meeting was then held to encourage other villagers to
surrender their weapons. However, not every peasant or landlord was willing to turn in their
weapons. In such cases the CCP would use coercive means to force armed landlords to surrender
their weapons. Local peasants were informed if the local gentry refused to surrender their
weapons and received punishment; they were then more willing to cooperate with the party to
avoid such coercive action.56

Wei Gongzhi, “Guanyu Yunan Wuzhuang Gongzuo Buchong Baogao 關於豫南武裝工作補
充報告,”100.
55

56

“Shouqiang 收槍” (Collecting guns), Xinhua Zhoukan 新華週刊, 3, no.4 (1949): 19-20.
245

The local province also used “gun borrowing” to acquire guns from local peasants. If a
local cadre discovered that some landlords had recently obtained new guns, they sometimes
asked them to “borrow” their guns. However, the practice of borrowing was coercive. In Heze
County of Shandong Province, one local Communist cadre wrote out a certificate regarding
borrowing a gun from a landlord. It stated, “It has been heard that the landlord owns a pistol with
five [pieces of] ammunition. To support the war against Japanese invasion, the Communist Party
requests that you loan the gun to the local Communist troops. We know you are open-minded
and supportive; please be sure to surrender your weapons. Otherwise you will be arrested.”57
Conclusion
This chapter connects private gun ownership with the Communist movement in 1930s
and 1940s China. It again proves the overall thesis of this dissertation, that any government
entity’s policy toward armed civilians was contigent and dynamic. When the CCP arrived at
northern China they encountered a highly militarized and fragmented society. This provided the
CCP with both challenges and opportunities. While previous studies have focused exclusively on
how armed groups, such as bandits, militia forces, or secret societies, were either suppressed or
mobilized by the Communists, my research in this chapter places the ordinary armed civilian at
the center of inquiry. As this chapter argues, the CCP deliberately adopted different approaches
that targeted people of different classes in their mobilization work. Armed peasants were the first
group that Communist cadres approached, who were then encouraged to assist the party in
making landlords or the elite turn in their guns. The CCP’s policy towards armed civilians were
thus a dynamic process, adopting different stances towards different social class.
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Local Communist cadres either organized the armed civilians into guerrilla units or confiscated
private guns for their military use. The mobilization of armed civilians in rural society played an
important role in strengthening the CCP’s military power from 1937 to 1945.
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~ EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION ~
Disarming the People in the Early Years of the People’s Republic of China
1949, the fourth year of the war between the KMT and the CCP, opened with brilliant
victories for the CCP. Having liberated the entire northeast, most of the north, and central China
through three major campaigns, in October, the Communist forces, which now numbered over
five million, quickly drove Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces out of Mainland China.
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the new Communist regime launched
a series of political campaigns and programs to consolidate political control and to buttress its
legitimacy. Of the many forms of political culture created by the Communist government, the
Monument to the People’s Heroes (人民英雄紀念碑, Renmin yingxiong jinianbei), on which
eight reliefs were sculpted, was one of the most prominent. As historian Chang-tai Hung puts it,
the reliefs which displayed most important historical events in modern China reflected the
Chinese Communists’ attempts to use history to promote their prescribed political agenda, and to
“monopolize collective memory.”1 The War of Resistance against Japan was carved on the
western side of the monument, which depicted the contribution of the CCP-led ordinary people
led by the CCP to victory. In the relief, the designer told a narrative scene of the Chinese
peasants’ energetic participation in guerrilla warfare: peasants with their weapons in hand were
ready to fight; an old woman gave her son a gun and persuaded him to kill enemies. The relief on
the War of Resistance against Japan did not explicitly portray major battles that the CCP fought,
Chang-tai Hung, Mao’s New World, Political Culture in the Early People’s Republic (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2011), 254. The eight reliefs include the Opium War, the Taiping
Rebellion, the Revolution of 1911, the May Fourth Movement, the May Thirtieth Movement, the
Nanchang Uprising, the War of Resistance against Japan, and the Yangzi Crossing by the Red
Army. As Hung argues, the building of the Monument was a politically highly contested project.
For the choice of historical events, see Hung, Mao’s New World, 235-256.
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but placed the masses at center stage. As represented in the portrayal, the new Communist
government particularly reinforced and glorified the active role of the armed masses, who took
up their guns to join the revolutionary cause.

Figure 11. Relief Sculpture, War of Resistance Against Japan on the Monument to the People’s
Heroes.
The relief on the monument that highlights the sacrifice of the armed peasants was in line
with Party policy to mobilize the armed people in the Communist Revolution before 1949. As I
analyzed in chapter five, the CCP saw the peasants with guns as a power to be reckoned within
its revolutionary agenda in the rural base areas in North China. When the revolution entered the
consolidation phase after 1949, the Communist government took the opposite stand, seeking to
assert its monopoly on the use of guns. In Guangdong, for example, the local government
collected over 500,000 guns or rifles by September 1953.2 In the early 1950s, mass movements
and campaigns that were aimed to disarm the local populace could occur in almost any regions
where gun ownership was prevalent during the turbulent Republican period. As one integral part
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of the 1950-1953 campaign to “suppress counterrevolutionaries” (鎮壓反革命 zhenya
fangeming), the government employed its administrative presence to penetrate into local society,
and confiscate people’s guns regardless of the owners’ social status or intent to bear arms.3
The tactics of mass mobilization developed in the revolutionary bases before 1949 had
remained crucial in the movement of collecting civilians’ guns. Several memoirs of local
Communist cadres provided rich information on the day-to-day workings of how the movement
was being conducted in local society. In 1950, the local government of Yichun County 宜春縣 in
Jiangxi province decided to collect people’s guns and dispatched work teams to towns and
villages that were heavily affected by the proliferation of arms. The work team was usually
comprised of a number of recently trained cadres and led by a “sent south cadre” (南下幹部
nanxia ganbu).4 A newly recruited cadre named Wu Jitao 吳繼濤 was selected to join a team to
confiscate privately-owned guns in Yichun’s Hengtang 橫塘 township, a turbulent region that
was known for lineage feuding and violence. He recalled years later that their gun confiscation
activities would not be possible without the involvement of the masses. When the work team
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arrived in the town, their first step was to establish a “friendly relationship” with local poor
peasants who were expected to provide more detailed information about gun ownership in the
town. Wu and his colleagues were instructed to get acquainted with local peasants. To become
highly interactive with the community, Wu helped one peasant with farm work for three
consecutive days. The peasant ultimately agreed to tell the work team how many guns were
floating in the town and who owned them. Through the mouth of collaborating peasants, Wu and
other cadres became aware that the acquisition of guns was largely a community effort. In
addition to the guns owned by bandits or local bullies, most individual guns were held by local
elites, who were heads of either lineage or household registration groups (保 bao).
Upon receiving the first-hand information, their next step was to collect these guns. The
efforts to collect privately-owned guns were to be carried out with a company of well-equipped
soldiers to avoid the armed resistance from gun owners, as the cadres in the work team were not
armed with weapons.5 Certainly, the work team expected people to turn in their guns voluntarily.
To induce people to give up their guns, the work team launched a series of programs of
education and mobilization to involve the participation of all the peasants. As recalled by Wu,
cadres went street to street, singing the song, “No new China without the Chinese Communist
Party” (沒有共產黨就沒有新中國 meiyou gongchandang jiu meiyou xinzhongguo). Later,
peasants were ordered to gather to learn the song, as a means to direct public feelings of loving
the Party and the nation. In the educational meeting, the work team explained the current
5
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political situation to the peasants, and stressed that self-defense with guns was not necessary in
the new China, as the Communist government possessed the capability to protect all the
civilians.
Another mobilization strategy was to organize the poor peasants to report local elites who
were reluctant to surrender their guns. This echoed the policy adopted by the CCP in the rural
bases before 1949 that linked class struggle with mass mobilization. Those landlords or elites
who refused to turn in guns were publicly accused in the public struggle session (批鬥會
pidouhui) in which poor peasants were encouraged to denounce their noncooperative landlords.
Gradually, peasants were willing to cooperate with the work team. For example, a peasant
reported a local bully to have a pistol concealed in his home. Under pressure, the bully was
forced to surrender his weapon. A wide range of programs like this facilitated Wu Jitao and his
colleagues to disarm the local people within one month and collected more than eighty guns in
the town.6
This scene, recalled by Wu Jitao, could be seen in many places in early 1950s China,
when the Communist government attempted to achieve exclusive authority over the localities. In
the urban areas, gun collection was carried out by local Public Security Bureau (公安局 gongan
ju), which first ordered armed individuals and groups to register their guns, which provided local
authorities detailed information about gun ownership. Educational programs and gun
confiscation would ensue. In Xiamen 厦门, for example, a similar movement was launched in
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late 1949. Within three months, the city’s authorities collected 499 guns and 9804 ammunition.7
As such, the campaign to disarm civilians to some extent reflected the politicization of social
life.
Paradoxically, before 1949, the Communists in rural bases had every intention of
mobilizing the armed masses into the revolutionary project. As portrayed on the Monument to
the People’s Heroes, peasants who joined the fighting front with their arms were commemorated
as heroes. The new Communist government’s determination to disarm civilians, as Wu Jitao’s
personal experience indicated, ran counter to the practices in the rural revolutionary bases. In this
sense, the year 1949 marked a turning point of the CCP’s gun policy, shifting from less
restrictive to resolute control. Like any other revolutionary movements, the Communist
Revolution in China followed a dialectical process of expansion, consolidation, and
centralization of power. In the expansive process, the power and energy possessed by the armed
masses played an inevitable role in strengthening the CCP’s military presence, while in the
consolidation phase, armed masses’ power became counterproductive and a threat to the new
regime.8 This is especially evident when the Chinese Communists sought to establish political
legitimacy in the early years of the P.R.C.
The discontinuity in the CCP’s gun policies across the 1949 divide to some degree echoes
the main argument of this dissertation: the state’s regulation and control over the armed civilians
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appeared as a contingent and dynamic process, which was determined by social and political
situations. In 1949, China entered another phase of history. China not only recovered from one
century-long period of constant military conflicts and imperialist invasions, but also witnessed
the political decentralization came to an end. In contrast to the late Qing and Republican periods,
the new state had the capability to assert its domination over society. An autocratic socialist
system backed by military force facilitated the government to impose strict social control, in
which the ban on gun ownership played a major part.9 Though the Communist government in the
early 1950s shifted its previous position on private gun ownership, it does not mean no
continuity could be traced across 1949. Cadres like Wu Jitao in Yixing County adopted a similar
strategies like their predecessors in rural bases. They accorded high priority to the mobilization
of the ordinary people in the movement, and took class struggles as the key in the programs of
either mobilizing armed people or confiscating their guns.
The movement to disarm local residents had not come to an end with the conclusion of
the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries in 1953. Even ten years later, privately-held
guns obtained during the chaotic Republican period could still be found in rural areas. Some
landlords who managed to conceal their weapons in the early years of the P.R.C were later
reported by other villagers in the early 1960s. Another gun collection movement started in 1962,
as a component of the Rural Socialist Education Campaign initiated by Mao.10 In the suburbs of
Beijing, for example, the total number of guns collected by police was 24, along with 4461
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bullets. The sources of these guns were listed in an internal document preserved in the Beijing
Municipal Archives. Three guns were concealed by two former landlords and one former bao
head; six guns were found in the houses previously owned by landlords, rich peasants, and
counterrevolutionaries; six guns were surrendered by poor peasants who purchased arms before
1949 to avenge local bullies; the last four guns were picked up by peasants in the field. Beijing
Public Security Bureau then decided to display the guns and ammunitions in an exhibition that
celebrated the success of the Rural Socialist Education Campaign. It should be noted that only
the guns confiscated from “four bad types” were exhibited to the public, as the main purpose of
the movement was to “reintroduce class struggle into local communities.”11 The government
sought to use the guns owned by the class enemies to convince the general public how they
suffered from oppression from the landlords in the past.12 The case in Beijing was one among
many. Owing to the centralization of state power and stringent control measures, the state was
able to retain the privately-owned guns in relatively low numbers after the founding of the
People’s Republic.
Private Gun Ownership in Contemporary China
Unlike the Republican period, the majority of ordinary civilians in contemporary China
are not obsessed with guns, and assault weapons are not omnipresent nationwide, as they are in
the U.S. A report issued by the Small Arms Survey Research Group in 2007 estimated that the
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number of privately-owned firearms (both licit and illicit) might reach close to 40,000.000. Per
one hundred people, China had only 4.9 firearms reported and ranked at No. 102 among 178
countries. In the U.S., the number was 88.8 per one hundred people, and ranked at No.1.13
Private gun ownership is less prevalent in contemporary China, which contributes to the low
frequency of homicides and lethal violence. Owing to the strict gun control policy, many
criminals find it difficult to obtain guns. For example, on December 14, 2012, a 36-year-old man
from China’s Henan province barged into a local elementary school with a kitchen knife,
stabbing twenty-two children, none of whom, fortunately, was fatally wounded. A similar violent
incident also happened in America on the same day. Conversely, twenty-six people, including
twenty children and six adult staff members were shot to death by a twenty-year-old man in the
Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. As the deadliest mass shooting
incident on school grounds in U.S. history, the horrific tragedy once again prompted fierce
debate on private gun ownership and gun control measures among legislators and the general
public. After the incident, Chinese media likewise drew a comparison between the two school
attacks, and asserted the strictest firearm control policy of China prevented crimes from
obtaining either guns or explosives. American Journalist James Fellow claimed that “that is the
difference between a knife and a gun.”14
The low rate of private gun ownership in contemporary China is a result of the strict gun
control policy. In contrast to American gun law, which is designed to acknowledge the Second
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Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear arms,” China begins with the premise of
forbidding the possession of firearms.15 The Firearms Control Law which took effect in 1996
prohibited any private possession of firearms with extremely few exceptions, and the maximum
penalty for violation is death.16 The law defines the firearms as “various guns that are propelled
by gunpowder or pressurized air, and that use tube-like equipment to shoot metal balls or other
materials that are powerful enough to injure or kill people or render them unconscious.”17 The
government deliberately uses a broad definition of guns to minimize any potential security
threats. Even less aggressive air guns and replica guns are subject to the ban. For example, in
early 2017, a Chinese woman, an operator of a fun-fair booth, was jailed for three-and-a-half
years because she provided air guns to shoot balloons, though she was unaware the air guns were
considered contraband under the law.18 According to the Firearms Control Law, three types of
firearms, including sport-shooting guns, hunting rifles, and anesthetizing guns are permitted for
civilian use. To obtain firearms, civilians must obtain licenses from local public security organs.
However, the permission is on paper only, as the licenses are no longer issued to ordinary
civilians.
Gun control in China is both a social issue as well as a political issue. Initiated by the
fourth-generation leadership headed by Hu Jintao 胡錦濤, China is constructing what it terms a
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socialist “harmonious society,” with the purpose of achieving social rewards that would
reconcile social tensions and satisfy the interests of the majority. The signature narrative of
present Chinese leader Xi Jinping 習近平, the “China Dream” serves the same end essentially.
No matter how political leaders inspire Chinese people with compelling and motivating slogans,
their practices and policies have to usher in an era of social stability and unity. As the People’s
Daily editorialized in 2005, the building of a harmonious society could not exist without public
security and order.19 The existence of unregulated guns, in the eyes of the government, had the
potential to jeopardize the safety of civilians, which requires immediate and resolute action.
Despite the strict regulations, gun-involved crimes have been increasing in recent years
and grabbed headlines of state-run newspapers quite often. One prominent case was that a fiftyfive-year-old man of Hebei’s Cangzhou city shot his fellow villagers unpredictably with a
double-barreled hunting rifle in 2015, which resulted in two deaths and several serious injuries.
The man then shot and killed two police officers when they tried to chase and arrest him. Hours
later, Liu was found dead after he was trapped in his house. The perpetrator’s motive was not
clear, but it was reported that he suffered from schizophrenia. The extraordinary act of violence
immediately spurred intense public and media interest. The media reportage not only blamed the
murderer and condoled the victims, but also marveled about how Liu with mental illness got hold
of the assault weapon in a country where private gun ownership is strictly regulated.20

“Weihu Shehui Wending, Goujian Hexie Shehui, 維護社會穩定, 構建和諧社會” (Upholding
social stability and constructing harmonious society), People’s Daily, May 24, 2005.
19

“Hebei Cangzhou Suningxian Fsheng Teda Qiangjian 河北滄州肅寧縣發生特大槍擊案”
(Shooting incident in Suning County of Hebei Province’s Cangzhou City), Lianhe Zaobao 聯合
早報, June 9, 2015, http://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20150609-489774.
20

258

The shooting incident, tragic and distressing as it was, is only one ordinary case among
many gun-involved crimes that have been plaguing China’s public security and social order in
recent years. As the case in Cangzhou shows, even an ordinary villager has easy access to a gun,
which undoubtedly increases the risk of violence in local society. The death of two police
officers also indicates that the government’s police, who are given legitimate right on the use of
force, reluctantly find themselves difficult to maintain such monopoly. It seems that the Chinese
government is very hesitant to disclose social evils (including gun crimes), which might indicate
the governmental mismanagement. In contrast to these obscure official information, the social
media has generated a broad set of reports surrounding the arms trafficking, illicit firearm
manufacturer, and gun violence. In 2014, the police of Guiyang, the capital city of Guizhou
province cracked down on a criminal gang and seized more than 10,000 guns, the largest number
of confiscated weapons to date.21 While law-abiding people are hardly possible to obtain assault
weapons under the existing control rules, an illicit production and trafficking network has been
forming underground, which supply Chinese crime organizations and the general gun enthusiasts
with the guns that could escape government surveillance, posing a new challenge to the state
authority and social order.
Though not prevalent in the whole Chinese population, the existence of a large number of
illicit guns break the state’s zero tolerance stance on popular power and violence, which in turn
prompted harsher and more brutalizing actions against illegal weapons. In the year of 2016, the
Ministry of Public Security launched a nationwide program to confiscate guns and eradicate
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underground gun market. According to the official statistics, local police departments
confiscated approximately 178,000 guns, 638,000 replicas, 3,9000 tons of explosives, 7.77
million detonators, and 4.75 million bullets within four months.22 Many circulation mechanisms
resemble that of the ones during the Republican period. The ban on gun ownership and
circulation creates flourished black market where guns were manufactured and trafficked. In the
cyber age, gun consumers, manufactures, and intermediaries are connected online, which also
facilitated the underground transaction.23
The increase in gun crime in recent years seems to confirm the causal relationship
between owning weaponry and criminal violence. Based on the existing criminal cases revealed
by the government and press, the private weapons owners are predominantly comprised of gang
members and individuals acquiring guns to commit crime. Illicit gun ownership can hardly be
viewed as an isolated crime. Rather, arms trafficking, human trafficking, drug trade, and other
offensive crimes are intrinsically related and it is impossible to separate them. The acquisition of
guns is often crucial in committing crimes. A prison officer in Shanghai has conducted a
scrupulous survey on gun-involved crimes of the city based on the interviews with the police
officers and criminals. According to this 2013 study, among the inmates who were arrested for
the gun-involved crimes, 63.2 percent have previously engaged in drug trafficking, illicit
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gambling, and sexual transaction.24 The evidence also makes it clear that the rifle or low-quality
local gun is the primary firearms in most criminal cases involving guns. What follows are the
replica guns, military weapons, and air guns. In additional to sporadic criminals who acquired
guns for individual motives, a majority of gun-bearers and arms trafficking practitioners consists
of the members of black societies and triad-like organized gangs. The presence of criminal
organizations and their role in arms trafficking are not novel to China.
While it is fair to assume that most illicit gun owners today are the ones with purely
criminal intentions, China in recent years also witnesses a rise of shooting enthusiasts and gun
amateurs. Though the strict ban on private gun ownership, the government and general public’s
lauds over marksmanship have never been faltered. Rifle shooting has become an integral part of
China’s military training programs for college students. Since pistol shooter Xu Haifeng won
China’s first Olympic gold medal in 1984, he emerged as a superstar and a household name, and,
for most Chinese people, the shooting sports were tightly bound to China’s Olympic dreams.
China’s superior position in shooting events have become apparent in the successive Olympic
games, as Chinese athletes have successively displayed their gold medal potentials. In some firstand second-tier cities, the government has sanctioned the private operation of shooting clubs,
which would satisfy the country’s rising upper-middle class’s demands for stimulating and
adventurous activities. 25 The North International Shooting Range located in north Beijing and
the East Shanghai Shooting and Archery Club are the two major ranges for hobby enthusiasts to
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relax and practice shooting at a high price. These enthusiasts (mostly middle-class men with
legal occupation) are known for their buying power and the readiness to collect fashionable guns.
It is now pretty apparent that a significant number of gun collectors frequently express their
predilections for small arms and connoisseurship on many cyber forums for gun amateurs. One
of such forums, which has more than 70,000 registered members contains sixteenth sub
discussions, six of which focus on small arms craftsmanship, personal experience, and hunting.
Apart from these cyber forums, many other QQ groups, BBSs, and chat rooms have provided
these enthusiasts platforms to exchange gun information and help spread purchase channels.
These people, though not in huge numbers as criminals, constitute another important gun
consumers.26
The Chinese government is deeply wary about the armed populace, and has been taking
high-handed tactics to stamp out illicit gun ownership. With China’s rapid economic growth and
the process of globalization, there has been a trend of the expansion of underground gun trade.
As discussed above, both the criminal groups and some better-off Chinese people have growing
demand for guns, adding new challenges to public safety. Certainly, it is unlikely for the ban on
private possession of guns to be lifted, nor will it become a controversial political issue in
today’s China. A unified China under one-Party rule today guarantees the maximum
effectiveness of the gun control policy. Conversely, as this proceeding chapters suggested, the
political decentralization of the late Qing and Republican China kept the governments from
constructing a consistent and effective gun policy.
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Conclusion
Using government documents, criminal cases, popular writings, private memoirs, and
many other primary sources, this dissertation has presented the multifaceted symbolism of the
gun in modern China, and has shown how the prevalence of gun ownership influenced social
life, and the dynamics between state and society. This dissertation has suggested that guns
became invested with social and symbolic meanings, which were subject to change over time
and space. In a period characterized by both disintegration of state power and rapid sociocultural
transition, the word qiang (槍 gun) connoted different things to different non-state actors who
sought to arm themselves during the late Qing and Republican periods. It was a tool to commit
violence, a symbol of self-empowerment, and an the indicator of one’s commitment to national
politics. For successive Chinese governments, the gun in civilian hands meant either a social
power that would be relied upon or a representation of a threat against state authority.
As this dissertation has argued, the multiple sociocultural and political implications of
private-owned guns in modern China revealed the difficulty in carrying out a consistent and
resolute policy towards an armed populace. As we have seen, in the context of the disintegration
of central power, foreign intrusion, and political fragmentation, state builders from the late Qing
dynasty viewed putting guns in the hands of ordinary civilians as extensions of state power,
under the prerequisite that armed civilians were properly regulated. A model of what I termed
“control/reliance” was shaped in the late Qing, as a means to maintain government coexistence
with the armed civilians. Nevertheless, the equilibrium between a weak state and society was by
no means stable, as the state’s resolute determination to assert its legitimate authority was never
shaken. As suggested in chapter three, the early Republican government’s suppression of the
Canton Merchants’ Corps indicates that the state frowned on an armed populace lest they
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threaten government authority, though armed forces like the Corps’ important role in the
province was acknowledged and even relied upon when Sun Yat-sen’s revolution was in its
expansive phase. Modern China’s political decentralization determined that the balance between
state and society swung back and forth. As chapter four showed, a sustainable relationship with
the armed population led by local elite facilitated state penetration of the rural society, which,
however, prevented the government from implementing its gun regulations, leading to an
inconsistent and contingent policy. This gave the Chinese Communist Party the opportunity to
integrate the armed civilians into its revolutionary agenda. The Communists in North China
adopted the practice of class struggle in the process of mobilization of armed peasants in the
1930s and 1940s, which played a critical role in consolidating its political power and expanding
its military presence. Finally, as discussed in this chapter’s first section, the Communist
government’s movement of disarming civilians echoes the thesis of this dissertation that the
state’s stance towards private gun ownership was dynamic and contingent, which was
determined by central power and political conditions.
Scholars based in both China and the West have construed the historical development of
modern China in many different ways, but some key themes have prevailed. These themes have
included: the parallels and contradictions between Western culture and Chinese culture; the
protracted struggle between state-building efforts and intractable energy of local society; the
constant military conflicts and their impacts on politics and society; the Chinese participation in
a global or transnational discourse; the process of a grassroots revolutionary movement led by
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the Chinese Communist Party; socio-political changes and their reflections in popular culture.27
Most of these studies, fruitful as they are, however, are confined to a single aspect of China’s
historical trajectory. It should be noted that modern China was shaped by the convergence of
these social, cultural, and political elements.
This dissertation focusing on gun culture and gun regulations provides a prism through
which we can observe the interconnectedness and combinations of these elements in the making
of modern China. It supplements our common knowledge of the gun, which, as the proceeding
chapters argued, meant more than a tool used by soldiers to defend the nation, or held by police
to maintain social order. As an exotic commodity, the gun links foreign technology with Chinese
conditions, and reflects the process of how a once powerful empire was drawn into the whirlpool
of global movements. The gun also enriches our understanding of the Chinese people – elite,
peasant, woman, outlaw, new middle class, and many others. Their different motives and uses of
guns, from another perspective, illustrate the impact of social forces on personal lives. A close
look at gun regulation and control implemented by the late Qing and Republican governments
helps investigate the bond and divide between government authority and social autonomy. The
dual process of mobilization and confiscation of the gun by the Communists in the countryside
sheds new light on how the CCP seized every possibility to further and deepen its revolution.
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say the gun is also a prism through which modern China’s
social change and complexity are refracted.
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